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ABSTRACT
The question of how to enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid has plagued re-
searchers for over six decades. Although in some cases scholars have positive support
regarding aid’s impact on economic growth in recipient countries, others have ques-
tioned these findings, and some have even demonstrated that aid has a negative
impact on growth. I address this question from a new perspective by analyzing
how the organizational characteristics of aid agencies lead to differences in devel-
opment policies. Specifically, I highlight how the characteristics of an understudied
group of agencies, multilateral aid agencies, impact their effectiveness. I demonstrate
my argument by collecting original qualitative and quantitative data on three vari-
ables related to organizational performance. I then empirically test my expectations
through a series of panel analyses of aid and economic growth from 1973-2012. The
results support my theoretical expectations that organizational differences matter in
terms of the outcomes they produce.
I argue that three specific organizational characteristics enhance multilateral aid
effectiveness: motivation, specialization, and autonomy. Agency motivations mat-
ter because they impact aid allocation patterns, which are critical for distributing
effective aid. Specialization allows the agency to provide more funding to each of
their targets, reduce transaction costs, and implement knowledgeable and effective
policies. Autonomy determines the ability of the agency to resist attempts to pres-
sure them to distribute politically driven aid. In order to test these arguments, I
present original data documenting the motivations, specialization, and autonomy of
forty multilateral agencies. I test my arguments using estimation techniques robust
to issues of endogeneity and instrumentation that have hampered past research.
ii
My results support my argument. Generally, bilateral aid is found to be less
effective than multilateral aid. Furthermore, I demonstrate that differences within
multilateral aid agencies exist as well, and show how more autonomous agencies
are comparatively more effective. I find little support, however, for my expectation
regarding agency specialization, suggesting a fruitful avenue for future research. My
results are able to account for past discrepancies within the aid literature, provide
strong policy prescriptions for the aid community, and lend support for the salience
of international organizations.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN AID EFFECTIVENESS
Does foreign aid work? This question has plagued researchers and policymakers
since the inception of foreign aid six decades ago. Following World War II, a growing
sense of internationalism as well as national commitment to welfare policies spurred
the establishment of foreign aid agencies in countries throughout the developing
world. These unprecedented programs of foreign assistance were designed to help
alleviate poverty and expand economies in the developing world (Lumsdaine, 1993).
These programs continued to grow throughout the Cold War, and today constitute
one of the largest forms of interactions among states. In 2012 alone, the developed
world committed over $183 billion in aid funds, a truly remarkable achievement
(OECD, 2015).
Despite the billions of dollars that have been spent, foreign aid’s track record
remains staunchly debated, as it is associated both with incredibly positive and
negative results. In some cases, large commitments of aid were able to help produce
positive outcomes. Mozambique, for example, had a GNI of only $410 per person
and a mere 1.1% economic growth rate in 2000. Trapped in the most abject levels of
poverty, approximately 85,000 children born in Mozambique would die before their
fifth birthday (World Bank, 2015). As one of the poorest countries in the world, it was
in desperate need of help. Little more than a decade later, and after receiving some
of the greatest contributions of foreign aid in Africa, the situation in Mozambique has
greatly improved. In 2012, its economy grew by a robust 7.2%, and GNI per person
had more than doubled to $980. School enrollment climbed above 86%, and tens of
thousands more children are expected to reach their fifth birthday. As Mozambique
receives approximately 50% of its annual government spending from external aid
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sources, these advancements would not have been possible without foreign aid (UN
Mozambique, 2015).
But in other cases, foreign aid has been associated with disastrous failures. A
prime example is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has received
some $58 billion in foreign assistance between 1980 and 2013 (OECD, 2015). In
spite of this substantial inflow of funding, the Human Development Index (HDI)
indicates that the DRC has made virtually no development progress in that same
time period. In Uganda, the HIV/AIDS infection rate has once again begun to rise,
despite receiving over $1.7 billion from the U.S. alone since 2005 to help fight the
epidemic (Kron, 2012).
Issues of corruption are also rampant. In her book, Dambisa Moyo describes how
the former presidents of Malawi, Zaire (now the DRC), and Zambia all pilfered from
aid funds meant to support projects related to health, education, and infrastructure
(Moyo, 2009a). A prime example of such corruption is the World Bank’s provision of
$4.2 billion for the development of a Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline. Instead of being
used to build the pipeline, however, the funds were transferred to the country’s gen-
eral budget by President Idris Deby, and are purportedly being used to rig elections
and perpetuate his regime. Foreign aid scholar Graham Hancock has even argued
that the disappearance of foreign aid to Nicaragua in the 1980s resulted in a dras-
tically improved economic situation, as aid was being used to prop up the Somoza
family’s dictatorship (Hancock, 1989). Moyo presents a similar argument with re-
gards to aid in Africa, and suggests that aid is hurting economies in the region rather
than improving them (Moyo, 2009a).
In each of these examples, no conclusive evidence has emerged regarding foreign
aid’s ultimate impact in the developing world. As a consequence of this and the
continued presence of global poverty, the buoyant optimism of the 1950s regarding
2
aid effectiveness has to large degree been replaced with a cautious and rigorous eval-
uation of aid practices. In an effort to make the most of aid funds, both policymakers
and academics alike continuously examine how and when aid is able to effectively
contribute to development, and what can be done to make it more effective in the
future. Through a series of conferences and summits, the international aid commu-
nity has put forth new operating standards for aid organizations, and new goals for
the aid community. Agreements such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,
the Accra Agenda for Action, as well as the Busan Partnership for Effective Devel-
opment Cooperation represent such renewed efforts, and aim to improve aid agency
policies and evaluation methods, and also help coordinate donor efforts. Meanwhile,
aid scholars continue to expand their analyses by studying specific aid projects, the
effects of aid in smaller geographic regions, and the effects of aid on a variety of
sectoral outcomes, such as education, health, and the environment.
Building on past work, recent aid research has made substantial progress. We
now know much more about where aid is going, how it is being distributed, and
whether or not it is being effective. However, there is much that remains to be
done. According to the World Bank, in 2011 an estimated 2.2 billion people were
still living on less than US $2 per day (World Bank, 2015). Creating more effective
aid is therefore a complex, yet imperative task, as the global community continues
to try to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
As foreign aid scholar Michael Tierney succinctly states,
...aid is neither pure problem nor pure solution; its motivations, distribu-
tion, and effects are complex, and shifting. Capturing this complexity re-
quires detailed data, careful thought, and sophisticated methods that allow
scholars to make conditional, causal, and descriptive inferences (Tierney
et al., 2011, p. 1893).
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Establishing a more complete understanding of what makes aid effective is therefore
the most pressing task for future aid research, and the main motivation of this
dissertation.
1.1 The Importance of Foreign Aid Types
Foreign aid is one of the most commonly used foreign policy tools in existence.
Lumsdaine (1993) defines foreign aid as, “gifts and concessional loans of economic
resources, such as finance and technology, employed for economic purposes provided
to less developed countries by governments of the developed democracies, directly or
through intermediaries such as UN programs and multilateral development banks”
(p. 33). When providing foreign aid to developing countries, donor countries have
two options. The first option is for them to distribute aid directly to recipient
countries through bilateral aid. Most aid donors are members of the OECD’s DAC,
which currently has 32 members, listed in Table 1.1.1 The second option is for
the donor state to contribute to a multilateral aid agency, which then pools those
resources with those from other states, and subsequently determines how, where, and
when to allocate those funds. According to the DAC, multilateral aid agencies are
defined as:
...those international institutions with governmental membership which
conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favor of development
and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks
(e.g. World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies,
and regional groupings (e.g. certain European Union and Arab agencies).
A contribution by a DAC member to such an agency is deemed to be
multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the
discretion of the agency (OECD Statistics).
1The number of non-DAC aid donors is growing, as is the size of their aid contributions (Woods,
2008). While acknowledging this, I focus my discussion on aid from DAC donors due to issues of
data availability.
4
Although not exhaustive, Table 1.2 lists forty of the most prominent multilateral aid
agencies operating today.2
Table 1.1: OECD DAC Members
Australia Greece Poland
Austria Iceland Portugal
Belgium Ireland Slovak Republic
Canada Italy Slovenia
Czech Republic Japan Spain
Denmark Korea Sweden
European Union Luxembourg Switzerland
Finland The Netherlands United Kingdom
France New Zealand United States
Germany Norway
Source: OECD Statistics
Bilateral and multilateral aid organizations each offer different types of benefits.
Bilateral aid enables the donor state to maintain control over how aid funds are used.
This allows the donor government to pursue their national interests, or ensure that
domestic firms are chosen to implement developmental projects. Multilateral aid, on
the other hand, takes control away from the donor states and invests it in a third
party. Rather than being controlled by a single donor government, a multilateral
aid agency is governed by a group of contributing donor governments. Since the
preferences of the donor governments are aggregated into a single agency, multilateral
2Although Kharas (2007) estimates that there are close to 210 multilateral aid agencies operating
today, I focus my analysis on the forty listed in Table 1.2 for two reasons. First, these agencies
represent some of the largest and most prominent multilateral aid agencies currently in operation.
Second, these agencies are the only ones for which we have consistent and reliable data in terms
of their funding and spending patterns. As more data is made available, future research should
examine a wider group of multilateral aid agencies as well.
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Table 1.2: Multilateral Aid Agencies
Agency Abbreviation
African Development Bank AfDB
African Development Fund AfDF
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BADEA
Arab Fund (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Develop-
ment)
AFESD
Asian Development Bank AsDB
Asian Development Bank Special Funds AsDF Spec. Funds
Caribbean Development Bank CarDB
Central American Bank for Economic Integration CABEI
EU Institutions EU
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD
European Commission EC
European Development Fund EDF
European Investment Bank EIB
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations GAVI
Global Environment Facility GEF
Global Fund Global Fund
Inter-American Development Bank IDB
Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund IDB Spec. Funds
International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD
International Development Association IDA
International Development Association - Multilateral Debt
Relief Initiative
IDA-MDRI
International Finance Corporation IFC
International Monetary Fund (Concessional Trust Funds) IMF
Islamic Development Bank Isl. Dev. Bank
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNAIDS
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MIGA
Nordic Development Fund Nordic Fund
OPEC Fund for International Development OFID
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNHCR
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE
United Nations Democratic Republic of Congo Pooled Fund DRCPF
United Nations Development Program UNDP
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNECE
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNICEF
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund UNPBF
United Nations Population Fund UNFPA
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East
UNRWA
World Food Programme WFP
World Health Organization WHO
Source: OECD Statistics
6
aid is able to operate in an environment further removed from the domestic political
constraints that are often placed on bilateral aid agencies.
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Figure 1.1: OECD ODA Data: Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Donations
Although both bilateral and multilateral aid have existed since the beginning of
the modern era of foreign aid, bilateral aid has typically been more prominent, both in
terms of the amount of aid provided, as well as being the primary focus of scholarly
research. However, the nature of foreign aid contributions has begun to change,
with increasing amounts of aid being channelled through multilateral institutions.
Using information from the OECD’s dataset on Official Development Assistance
(ODA), Figure 1.1 shows the total amount of aid provided to developing countries
by DAC countries and multilateral aid agencies. While bilateral aid remains the
more dominant type of aid spending, the graph shows that the size of contributions
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Figure 1.2: AidData: Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Donations
from multilateral aid agencies has also grown steadily. In fact, in 2011 multilateral
aid agencies donated $55 billion USD, encompassing 40% of all ODA (OECD, 2013).
According to a new dataset, this estimate of multilateral assistance may actually be
low. Figure 1.2 uses information from AidData and shows foreign aid commitments
by bilateral and multilateral aid donors over the same time period (Tierney et al.,
2011). According to this dataset, which includes more multilateral agencies than
the ODA dataset, multilateral aid has actually been a larger source of aid funds in
recent years compared to bilateral aid. In addition to the growth of multilateral aid
contributions, there has also been a dramatic increase in the number of multilateral
aid institutions (Kharas, 2007), topping over 210 separate agencies in 2013 (OECD,
2013). Taken together, both the number of multilateral aid agencies, as well as the
size of their contributions to developing countries is on the rise.
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As donor countries become more rigorous in evaluating their aid practices and
search for the most effective policies available to them, it is essential that all poten-
tial avenues of aid delivery are examined. However, in spite of recent trends, few
analyses have focused their attention on multilateral aid agencies as a group separate
and distinct from bilateral aid agencies. Empirically, the relatively few works that
exclusively address multilateral aid usually examine delegation to these agencies. In
terms of theory, while there are a multitude of studies addressing how politics and
other factors impact aid effectiveness for bilateral donors, there have been few such
attempts aimed towards multilateral agencies. Those works that consider the effec-
tiveness of aid primarily focus on bilateral aid, while multilateral aid is included as
a side note. The exceptions to this are case studies that have focused on a single
multilateral agency, usually the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Studies conducted by Weaver (2008) and Vreeland (2003, 2007), for example,
have provided extensive insight as to the internal functioning of these agencies. In
general, however, scholarly research has to a large degree overlooked multilateral aid
and its ability to enhance aid effectiveness. Considering that the number of multi-
lateral agencies continues to grow, as well as the high level of variation that exists
among them, this is an important gap that must be examined. As the aid commu-
nity continues to look for the most effective donors and agency practices, properly
analyzing the full spectrum of aid agencies, including multilateral agencies, is an
important piece of the puzzle regarding aid’s effectiveness.
1.2 Research Questions
Considering the dearth of studies focusing on multilateral aid agencies, the main
contribution I make is to investigate how organizational characteristics inherent in
multilateral aid agencies make them effective aid donors. To this end, I address two
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specific research questions related to multilateral aid in my dissertation. The first is:
What organizational factors make bilateral or multilateral aid more effective? Very
few scholars have addressed this question, and those that have investigated it have
done so in an indirect manner. Rather than relegating the question of bilateral versus
multilateral aid effectiveness to an empirical afterthought, I cast it as the one of the
focal points of my dissertation.
My second research question examines the relative effectiveness of multilateral
aid agencies. Just as bilateral agencies are affected by the priorities and structures
of their governments, multilateral aid agencies are likewise affected by variations
within their structures and policies. Thus, it is important to recognize how varia-
tions within multilateral agencies impact their effectiveness. Therefore, the second
research question I address is: What organizational factors make some multilateral
aid agencies more effective than others? By shedding light on the internal func-
tioning of multilateral aid agencies we can better understand not only what makes
aid effective, but what makes an organization effective. As such, although the two
research questions I pose here are focused on the issue of multilateral aid, they are
derivatives of a much broader research question, namely: What characteristics make
an organization more or less effective? Consequently, while my analysis and results
are specific to the foreign aid literature, they also have broader implications for other
studies of organizations.
These research questions are important both theoretically and substantively. The-
oretically, the answers to these questions have implications for effective patterns of
aid allocation, institutional design, as well as the overall salience of international in-
stitutions. If bilateral aid is indeed found to be substantially less effective compared
to multilateral aid, then this has a strong policy implication that countries need to
donate more of their aid to these multilateral agencies. However, if these agencies are
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found to be little better than bilateral aid donors, it draws a grim picture for their
future. Additionally, as more multilateral aid agencies are being created, this study
will help illuminate the types of structures and characteristics newly developed agen-
cies should pursue in order to be as effective as possible. From a policy perspective,
as the foreign aid community places an increasing emphasis on aid effectiveness, it is
important that the effects of donations from all types of members, not just individ-
ual donor states, are considered. Each of my research questions contributes to this
task in a different way. The first addresses macro differences between bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies, while the second provides a more micro-level description
of how and when multilateral aid is able to contribute to effective development. By
addressing multilateral agencies in this comprehensive manner, I hope to provide a
more detailed picture as to the usefulness of multilateral aid in promoting effective
aid policies.
1.3 Organizations and Effectiveness
In order to envisage an effective aid agency, I draw on decades of studies related
to organizational performance. Previous research has described how organizational
traits such as a large budget, staff education, oversight mechanisms, incentive struc-
tures, and organizational culture, networks, constituent support, goal clarity, etc.
contribute to improvements in organizational effectiveness. In order to address my
research questions on foreign aid, I focus on three of these as the foundation of
my theory of organizational effectiveness: motivation, specialization, and autonomy.
Agency motivation is critical because it helps employees focus on tasks and goals, and
also creates a sense of purpose within the agency, both of which have been found to
enhance organizational performance (Moynihan and Pandey, 2005). Specialization
allows the agency to benefit from the gains that stem from a division of labor, as de-
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scribed in economics. Finally, autonomy influences the ability of the organization to
operate independently, as restricting organizational operations has often been found
to be detrimental for performance (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999).
Applying this theory to my research questions, I expect that bilateral aid will
be more effective at promoting development as it is more likely to be motivated
by development and specialized. Additionally, when comparing among multilateral
agencies, I expect those that are more specialized and autonomous to be more ef-
fective aid donors. Taken together, these arguments provide a strong argument that
multilateral aid should be more effective at promoting development than bilateral
aid, and that substantial variation exists among multilateral aid agencies that should
be accounted for.
1.4 Roadmap
In order to address these research questions, the remainder of my dissertation
proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview of the current state of the
literature regarding foreign aid effectiveness. In Section 3, I present a general theory
of organizational effectiveness and describe how agency motivation, specialization,
and autonomy contribute to organizational performance, both in a broad sense and
specifically in the context of foreign aid. After applying this argument to my two
research questions, I derive four testable hypotheses regarding multilateral aid effec-
tiveness.
In order to test my hypotheses, I first rigorously measure agency specialization
and autonomy in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and present two original datasets.
In Section 4, I build on previous studies that have addressed specialization among
aid agencies, but unlike these past studies I apply this concept specifically in demon-
strating the difference in specialization levels between bilateral and multilateral aid
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agencies. I then use two different measurements to capture levels of country, re-
gion, and sector specialization. While issues of agency autonomy have been studied
in relation to delegation to multilateral aid agencies, none have yet examined how
autonomy impacts aid effectiveness. Therefore, in Section 5 I present an original
dataset that measures the autonomy of multilateral aid agencies through voting pro-
cedures and agency funding patterns. After presenting the data, I then empirically
and rank agencies based on their autonomy scores.
With this new data on agency characteristics, I test my hypotheses in Section
6, 7, and 8 by examining economic growth rates in recipient countries. In Section
6, I examine differences between bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. Section 7
examines how specialization of aid agencies impacts their effectiveness. In Section 8,
I investigate the impact of agency autonomy on the effectiveness of multilateral aid
organizations.
Section 9 provides an overview of my argument and findings. I conclude that de-
spite the multitude of criticisms that have been leveled at them, multilateral agencies
offer a much more conducive platform for achieving development goals compared to
bilateral agencies. Furthermore, my dissertation provides the foundation for a more
extensive investigation of how organizational characteristics of aid agencies affect
development outcomes.
1.5 Conclusion
Overall, the evidence presented throughout my dissertation offers strong support
for a more substantial use of the multilateral aid system. This conclusion implies
that if states are truly interested in using aid to advance developmental priorities and
achieve the MDGs, they should move away from bilateral aid spending and instead
channel aid through specialized and autonomous multilateral agencies. Alternatively,
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bilateral aid agencies can undertake a process of internal reform, by focusing their
spending and making aid more about development and less about politics. While
it is unreasonable to believe that states will relinquish their bilateral aid programs
entirely, as they provide a highly useful tool of foreign policy, efforts can nevertheless
be made to urge states to channel their aid through multilateral aid agencies in order
to avoid the continued politicalization of foreign aid. If the international community
is truly invested in alleviating poverty throughout the globe, multilateral aid offers
the best solution.
This conclusion lies in sharp contrast to many of the criticisms that international
organizations currently face. Scholars, policymakers, and politicians often decry
the failures of multilateral aid agencies. Criticisms of the IMF and World Bank,
for example, are prolific. But if we are to improve aid’s track record and actually
achieve sustainable development goals, leveling criticisms at these institutions is not
enough. Instead, we must look deeper in order to find out if they are truly as bad as
the critics claim, especially considering the available alternatives. While multilateral
aid agencies are unlikely to ever be completely devoid of problems, I argue that
based on my results, they represent the best option currently available within the
aid community. Moving beyond this, we must also ascertain if the problems that
have been directed at organizations such as the IMF and World Bank are universal
to all multilateral aid agencies. If these problems are specific to certain institutions,
then identifying them will only assist in overcoming them. If these problems are
persistent in all multilateral agencies, then more radical change may be necessary.
Regardless of the result, we need a more detailed analysis of the inner workings of
these agencies in order to ascertain what makes them successful, and what causes
them to fall short of their potential.
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Finally, although the argument presented here focuses on issues of aid effective-
ness, its implications are much broader in scope. Throughout my dissertation, I
ground my argument in interdisciplinary studies of bureaucratic politics, delegation,
and political economy. This broad foundation not only contributes to the strength
of my theory, but also allows my findings to have significance for other subfields of
political science as well. The benefits that multilateral aid agencies supply clearly
have implications for studies of bureaucracies and the general salience of all inter-
national organizations. Perhaps the most novel contribution this dissertation makes
is in regards to agency autonomy. While governments are often loathe to relinquish
control of policymaking, the evidence presented here suggests that oftentimes only
by relinquishing control can goals actually be met.
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2. FIFTY YEARS OF AID RESEARCH: A REVIEW
The question of what makes aid effective is the subject of an expansive literature
spanning over half a century. Researchers in this area have asked questions such as:
How can the aid community make aid more effective? What policies foster successful
development? What policies are problematic for development? How do we measure
“effectiveness”? Is effectiveness determined by how aid is given? Or are recipient
characteristics the critical factor? and, What types of aid should we be giving? In
asking these questions, scholars have developed a substantial understanding of when
foreign aid is, and is not, effective. Given the notable amount of work that has
already been done in this area, I provide a review of these studies to serve as a
foundation for my own argument and analysis.
My review of the literature demonstrates that most of the time, bilateral donors
provide aid in order to promote their own geo-strategic interests. This self-interested
nature of bilateral aid is then reflected in studies regarding bilateral aid effectiveness,
which find limited support for the argument that aid is actually promoting develop-
ment in recipient countries. If we consider the fact that most of the time bilateral
aid has not been given to promote development, this conclusion is hardly surpris-
ing. The few studies that address multilateral aid, however, paint a more positive
picture. Multilateral aid appears to be targeted towards poorer countries, and those
with institutions more likely to capitalize on the funds they receive. These findings
offer a prelude to my theoretical argument, which expands upon the organizational
characteristics that contribute aid effectiveness.
I proceed in four main parts. First, I define two key concepts–development and
effectiveness–that are critical components of my dissertation. Second, I review the
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literature on aid allocation. While aid allocation is not my main focus, it is never-
theless useful to discuss the factors that drive aid spending patterns. Aid cannot be
effective if it is not received, or if only minimal amounts are received by developing
countries. Therefore, before considering how aid can work, we must first examine
who actually gets aid, why, and under what conditions. Third, I review studies of
aid effectiveness on a variety of issues areas. I conclude by summarizing the main
points of previous work on foreign aid.
2.1 Defining Key Concepts
Before evaluating claims as to what makes aid more or less effective at promoting
development, I first define each of these concepts. The term development encom-
passes the ultimate goals of aid and is often synonymous with foreign aid. Aid is
often referred to as “development assistance,” and the OECD’s main foreign aid
database is even called “Official Development Assistance”. In order to be considered
ODA, aid must be, “...administered with the promotion of the economic development
and welfare of the developing countries as its main objective...”(OECD, 2015). Yet
these definitions are repetitive at best. To provide a clear definition of development,
I revert to that provided by Merriam Webster, which defines development as, the
act or process of growing or causing something to grow or become larger or more
advanced. Thus, development is a form of progress, growth, or expansion. The ques-
tion then becomes, within a recipient country, what is foreign aid meant to develop?
Development could be captured by any one of a number of indicators. While many
studies focus on economic growth as their main indicators, development could also be
reflected by improvements in education, the environment, infrastructure, health care,
political institutions, trade, or water sanitation, to name a few. Development should
therefore not simply be interpreted as economic growth, because (as economists will
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quickly point out) increases in income do not necessarily deliver benefits to all cit-
izens. Instead, evaluations of development must consider the entire spectrum of
factors that can improve quality of life. In light of this, I allow the term development
to incorporate any indicator that reflects advancement in an aid recipient.
An “effective” development policy can then be simply defined as one that is
successful in promoting the development of a recipient country. Foreign aid can be
considered effective when it increases a recipient country’s GDP per capita, reduces
its carbon emissions, enrolls more children in school, or lowers mortality rates. Any
one of these results reflects a success for foreign aid. While reviewing the literature on
aid effectiveness, I highlight the indicators various authors have used to investigate
whether or not an aid policy has been effective. While many scholars address aid
effectiveness using economic growth as their dependent variable, others (although far
fewer) analyze equally important outcomes.
2.2 The Politics of Aid Allocation
When the era of foreign aid began in the 1950s, for the first time ever, there
appeared a systemized sense of moral obligation by states to help those that were
less fortunate. As articulated in Truman’s inauguration speech after World War II,
Western states believed that, “...only on the basis of a just international order in
which all states had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible” (Lums-
daine, 1993, p. 30). The vision was that foreign aid would help contribute to world
peace by encouraging development in poor countries and alleviating the suffering
that underlies violent uprisings. In reality, however, aid quickly became a tool of
statecraft, one that often disregarded the needs of the developing world in order to
ensure the advancement of political agendas. Below, I demonstrate how aid alloca-
tion is too often influenced by political issues. Additionally, I highlight those studies
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that distinguish between bilateral and multilateral aid flows, as well as the relatively
few cases that exclusively examine aid allocation by multilateral aid agencies.
2.2.1 Studies on the Allocation of Bilateral Aid
Numerous studies have demonstrated that a majority of the time, bilateral aid
donors give aid in a manner that benefits their own strategic or economic interests
rather than those of the recipient. Rather than being used primarily to address
development concerns, bilateral aid has become a political tool, one that can be
used to extract valuable policy concessions from recipient governments, or to bolster
support for foreign allies. As Kosack (2003) clearly states:
It is relatively rare that aid is given solely for the benefit of the recipi-
ent country: as noted earlier, there is often a good deal of self-interest
inherent in aid, especially in bilateral aid (p. 14).
This pessimistic viewpoint has been borne out in many studies. For example, in
a case study analysis of France, Japan, Sweden, and the U.S. during the 1980s,
Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) find evidence that strategic and economic moti-
vations largely outweighed humanitarian concerns for aid distributions. The authors
further argue that Cold War strategy was a prime determinant of how the U.S. spent
their aid money, in that U.S. allies were much more likely to receive aid. In another
study, Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that political and strategic considerations
dominated bilateral aid allocations from 1970-1994. Specifically, they find evidence
that similarity of UN voting behavior and a recipient country’s colonial past are
more determinant of aid giving than the political institutions or economic policies of
recipient states.
Using a game theoretic model, Bueno Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007)
present a formal argument of how bilateral aid can be used to strategically bene-
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fit donor states. The author’s posit a theory of aid being exchanged for policies
in the framework of the selectorate theory. Donors give aid in return for beneficial
policy concessions, and recipient leaders use the aid to provide benefits to their coali-
tion supporters. Evidence from U.S. bilateral aid allocations support their argument.
Bueno Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) extend this argument by allowing na-
tions to bargain over the size of the policy concessions that are being traded for aid.
The authors then test their argument using bilateral aid flows to recipients. Assum-
ing that aid is fungible, the model demonstrates that as salience, coalition size, and
resources in the recipient state increase, the donor gives an increasing amount of aid
in order to maintain desired policy concessions.
Political concerns have also been shown to underly the motives of aid given various
development sectors. Drury, Olson and Belle (2005) find that U.S. foreign policy
factors are critical determinants of whether or not to provide humanitarian aid, as
well as how much aid should be distributed. Examining U.S. humanitarian aid from
1964-1995, the authors find that U.S. allies are much more likely to receive disaster
assistance than non-allies, especially during the Cold War. The authors conclude
that, “Indeed, our results paint a picture of high U.S. foreign policy decision makers
as realists at heart, seeing disasters as opportunities to enhance security” (Drury,
Olson and Belle, 2005, p. 470). Expanding on this, Kevlihan, Jr. and Biglaiser
(2014) investigate aid given in instances of conflict rather than just natural disasters,
and examine the post-Cold War and post 9/11 periods. Using infant mortality rates
as a measure of need and war casualties as a measure of conflict intensity, they find
that the U.S. does actually exhibit some altruistic motives when conflict is included
as a measure.
Economic considerations are also a key determinant of bilateral aid distribution
patterns. Foreign aid can be used to bolster trade ties, or can even promote the
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interests of specific firms or contractors within the recipient through the use of tied
aid (Tierney et al., 2011; Radelet, 2006). Younas (2008) shows that OECD countries
tend to allocate more aid to recipient nations that import more goods in which the
donor state has a comparative advantage. Therefore, he argues that aid can be
given not simply to promote the interests of individual firms in the recipient state,
but also for donors to acquire an overall higher share of the recipient’s imports.
Lundsgaarde, Breunig and Prakash (2010) test bilateral aid flows and find that aid
is given primarily to support the commercial interests of the donor state. They find
that aid is given to trading partners in order to strengthen export markets and to
support donor firms.
Several other factors have also been studied as determinants of bilateral aid.
Carey (2007) examines the conditionality of aid based on the human rights practices
of recipient countries and shows that, despite the rhetoric countries employ to en-
sure the public that aid is going to “good” countries, human rights practices have
no bearing on aid allocation. In an analysis of U.S. economic aid, Demirel-Pegg and
Moskowitz (2009) reach a different conclusion. They find that change in the inter-
national environment matters, as they demonstrate that economic development was
more important for U.S. aid before the Cold War, but that human rights are more
influential in the post-Cold War world.
In another study, Berthe´lemy (2006) investigates differences in allocation pat-
terns among bilateral donors, arguing that the behavior of each donor is unique, and
that aggregating them is empirically wrong. Berthe´lemy (2006) states that, “Aggre-
gating donors is valid only under the assumption that all donors behave the same,
which seems to be wrong” (p. 179). The author concludes by distinguishing between
altruistic donors (Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and the Nordic countries) and ego-
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istic donors (Australia, France, Italy, Japan, and the U.S.) and demonstrating that
differences exist between these two groups.
It is important to emphasize that allocation decisions are not made in a vacuum,
but are subject to strategic calculations as well. This is demonstrated by Knack,
Rogers and Eubank (2011), who investigate the varying provisions of tied aid based
on the amount of donor fragmentation within a recipient country. Building on col-
lective action theory, the authors argue that when a donor has a larger share of aid
in a recipient country, they will provide less tied aid because they want the aid to
be effective. In other words, they have a greater incentive to make sure that their
aid is actually working. The authors find support for their argument in a test of aid
allocation in 2006.
It is also worth discussing briefly the rise of a new group of donors within the
aid community. While developed democracies have been the dominant sources of
aid donations for decades, non-DAC countries in emerging economies such as China,
Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, and the United Arab Emirates have been
providing increasing levels of development aid (Woods, 2008). Some estimates state
that by 2006, this group of donors had contributed over $8.5 billion in foreign as-
sistance. Increases in aid from this group of donors is concerning on several levels.
First, few studies have examined the nature and consequences of aid from this group
of emerging donors. Second, these donors often do not impose conditionality con-
straints on their development funds, in sharp contrast to many DAC donors, and
even more so to multilateral donors (Woods, 2008). Without conditions attached to
aid funds, emerging donors are essentially offering the same levels of assistance to aid
recipients, but at a cheaper price. Whether or not these funds will be as effective in
promoting effective and responsible development patterns remains to be seen. Third
and lastly, the foreign policy goals of these donors are often at odds with countries
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in the DAC. With increasing tensions between the East and West, the use of foreign
aid to solidify allies, secure economic relationships, and extract policy concessions is
especially concerning.
2.2.2 Studies Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Allocation
Few studies of aid allocation have made a clear distinction between types of aid.
This is a mistake because bilateral and multilateral aid are starkly different. Asher
(1962), an early scholar of foreign aid lists the benefits of multilateral aid in that it
is nonpolitical, enables coordination among donors, promotes efficiency, and reduces
the relative costs of aid giving by reducing administrative costs. Supporting this
argument, in one of the earliest studies of multilateral versus bilateral aid alloca-
tion, Alfred Maizels (1984) examines 80 developing countries from 1969-1970 and
1978-1980 and finds that bilateral aid is driven by political, economic, and military
strategic interests, whereas multilateral aid is driven by recipient need. These results
have also been supported by more recent studies of aid allocation. Focusing on both
bilateral and multilateral aid flows, Dollar and Levin (2006) study the “selectiv-
ity” of aid allocation decisions, emphasizing the importance of good institutions and
policies in recipient countries as being key for aid effectiveness, as advocated in the
2002 Monterrey Consensus. Examining aid to developing countries from over forty
donors from 1984-2003, the authors find that multilateral aid is in fact channeled to
countries with better institutions, such as rule of law, property rights, and democ-
racy. Bilateral aid on the other hand, has only a weak relationship with democracy,
and there is no significant impact of rule of law or property rights on bilateral aid
allocation. Overall, the authors conclude, “multilateral aid is more ‘selective’ than
bilateral aid” (Dollar and Levin, 2006, p. 2036)
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In their widely cited work, Burnside and Dollar (2000) examine both growth
and aid allocation to 56 developing countries from 1970-1993. Using information
on budget surplus, inflation, and trade openness in recipient countries, the authors
create a policy index which is their key variable for determining both aid allocation
and effectiveness. In their study of aid allocation, the authors find that multilateral
aid is given to countries with low income levels, smaller populations, and better policy
environments. Bilateral aid, however, is not targeted towards countries with good
policy environments. This suggests that aid governed by multilateral aid agencies is
more likely to go to countries with good policies, and ultimately result in economic
growth.
Alesina and Weder (2002) examine how corruption impacts aid allocation from
1975-1994. They find that while the U.S. gives more aid to corrupt governments,
Australia and Scandinavian countries give aid to less corrupt governments. In terms
of multilateral aid allocation, they find no systematic difference between it and bi-
lateral aid. The authors then conclude that on the whole, neither type of aid seems
to discriminate based corruption levels in recipient countries. In their discussion, the
authors describe how this is somewhat counterintuitive:
Since international organizations should be less directly affected by the
colonial history of the recipients, international alliances, and geopolitical
considerations, one may expect that multilateral aid flows may be more
responsive to the policies and institutions of receiving countries. Specif-
ically, one may expect that multilateral aid should penalize corruption
more than bilateral aid (Alesina and Weder, 2002, p. 1128).
I return to this puzzling finding in my final discussions.
Investigating the relationship between aid allocation and human rights, Neumayer
(2003) explicitly distinguishes bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Using the Political
Terror Scale (PTS) as a measure for respect for human rights, Neumayer (2003)
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examines aid allocation with panel data from 1984-1995. He finds little general
evidence that respect for human rights matters at all. Only multilateral aid seems to
show any real promise, with multilateral agencies giving more aid to countries that
improve their civil and political rights, especially for the post Cold War era.
A recent book by Hicks et al. (2010) examines the allocation of environmental
assistance to developing countries. The authors empirically examine allocation pat-
terns of both bilateral and multilateral aid donors, and also provide case studies to
highlight their argument. The authors conclude that bilateral aid donors are actu-
ally more responsive to a recipient country’s environmental need than multilateral
aid donors. Hicks et al. (2010) also finds that bilateral aid donors are more likely to
pay attention factors that may signal the potential success of an environmental aid
project, compared to multilateral aid donors. These conclusions are quite negative in
regards to multilateral aid, and beg the question as to why any donor would utilize
a multilateral aid organization at all.
In another early investigation of aid allocation, Rowe (1978) investigates U.S. bi-
lateral and multilateral aid allocation to Latin America from 1961-1970. Rowe (1978)
specifically studies whether U.S. interests are able to drive multilateral aid alloca-
tion patterns, reflecting a common criticism of multilateral agencies in that they are
merely conduits for their more powerful member states. Despite being “nonpolitical”
agencies, Rowe (1978) describes several ways in which political considerations can
affect multilateral aid allocation: namely, the influence of powerful donors, such as
the U.S., on voting patterns as well as informal negotiations, and evaluations of eco-
nomic or financial criteria for recipient states. His findings suggest that each agency
varies according to how political considerations affect their allocation patterns. The
IDA, UNDP, and other UN programs have a weak relationship with political vari-
ables that are driving U.S. aid, indicating that multilateral aid is in fact distinct from
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bilateral aid in this case. Other agencies, however, specifically the IBRD and IDB,
are strongly associated with “conservative politics,” factors such as civilian control
of the military, democratic or semi-democratic regimes, and the presence of labor
forces in politics. Ultimately, Rowe (1978) concludes that multilateral aid agencies
are not simply reflections of U.S. policy preferences, but are able to exert their own
influence over aid allocation decisions under certain conditions.
2.2.3 Studies on the Allocation of Multilateral Aid
Relatively few studies have exclusively examined aid allocation by multilateral
aid agencies. Several studies have found evidence demonstrating that multilateral
institutions are able to pursue policies that are devoid of national interests. Burnside
and Dollar (2000) find that aid controlled by multilateral agencies is allocated more
to countries with good policies. Hlavac (2007) also finds conditional support for this
argument. His findings demonstrate that aid from multilateral agencies is indeed
targeted towards the neediest populations in sub-Saharan Africa from 1995-2004. In
their study, Clist, Isopi and Morrissey (2012) find that the European Commission
(EC) and World Bank will give more of their aid in the form of general budget support
to those recipients who demonstrate better expenditure monitoring and allocation
systems.
Several studies have addressed multilateral aid’s relationship with human rights
practices in recipient countries. Tsoutsoplides (1991) studies aid allocation by the
European Community from 1975-1980 and finds a positive and significant association
between amounts of aid received and the recipient country’s Physical Quality of Life
Index (PQLI) score. Neumayer (2003) also investigates the relationship between
multilateral aid allocation and human rights. Specifically, he examines the allocation
patterns of four regional development banks and three UN agencies with regard to
26
recipient behavior on human rights. Using panel data from 1983-1997, the PQLI
score, PTS data, and corruption levels, he finds that aggregate multilateral aid is
targeted towards countries with a greater respect for political freedom, as well as
smaller and poorer countries. Interestingly, he also finds that colonial past is a key
determinate of multilateral aid giving, indicating that bilateral preferences can also
have spillover effects on multilateral aid allocation. Neumayer (2003) further finds
that multilateral aid allocation varies depending on who the donating agency is.
UN agencies are more likely to consider human development needs, as captured by
the PQLI score, compared to the regional development banks, who focus mainly
on economic need. He also finds that political freedom is significant for the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), UN International Children’s Emergency Fund
(UNICEF), and UN Transitional (UNTA), but that this finding is relatively weak.
Overall, he concludes that political freedom and corruption levels do not matter for
aid allocation by these agencies, making them appear little better than their bilateral
counterparts.
In another study, O¨hler and Nunnenkamp (2014) take an in depth look at the
regional aid allocation aid projects by the World Bank and the African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB). The authors argue that it is important to look at allocation
patterns within recipient countries, as substantial variation may exist. They there-
fore examine allocation within 27 recipient countries. They test the argument that
multilateral agencies are more likely to provide aid to needier regions, regions with
better governance, regions with lower levels of conflict, and regions in which political
leaders were born. Testing World Bank projects from 2005-2011, and AfDB projects
from 2009-2010, the authors surprisingly do not find any support for the argument
that multilateral aid is targeted to needier regions, whether this is measured through
higher infant mortality rates, worse maternal health, or more severe malnutrition.
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This would seem to go against what multilateral agencies espouse to do. Further-
more, the authors describe that while the World Bank appears to stay clear of conflict
situations, the AfDB does not avoid conflict-prone regions, and has even engaged in
promoting conflict resolution. O¨hler and Nunnenkamp (2014) also conclude that fa-
voritism is an important determinant of how multilateral aid is allocated regionally,
indicating that multilateral aid is often able to be captured by leaders.
Schneider and Tobin (2013) discuss how the internal characteristics of aid agencies
may affect their distribution patterns. Specifically, they analyze allocation by the
EC from 1977-2006 and find that a recipient country will receive more aid when there
is a powerful coalition within the EC that has an interest in that recipient, or when
it is a poor country and there is a heterogeneity of preferences among members of
the EC. In the first case, when members of the EC have similar interests, they are
able to manipulate the actions of the EC and direct more aid to those countries that
they have economic, political, or strategic interests in. In the second case, members
with divergent interests are unable to manipulate the actions of the EC, allowing the
agency to distribute more aid to poorer countries.
In their recent book, Greening Aid, Hicks et al. (2010) devote two of their chapters
to multilateral aid agencies. They provide case studies of environmental aid policies
from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the Global Environ-
mental Fund (GEF), and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID).
The authors demonstrate that spending by each of these agencies has changed sub-
stantially over time, and that it also varies according to different institutional struc-
tures, political interactions, preferences, and specialization of the agencies. The
authors find that overall, multilateral aid agencies are now providing less environ-
mentally harmful aid, or dirty aid, and are providing more environmentally neutral
aid through programs such as health and education. In terms of agency characteris-
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tics, the World Bank in particular is shown to be highly influential, especially in the
environmental sector, as many other multilateral agencies follow its lead in terms
of how and to whom they should donate to. However, the authors also find that
the World Bank has been especially reluctant to provide more environmentally re-
sponsible aid projects and to reduce environmentally harmful projects. Much of the
progress that has been made is a direct result of pressures from donating members,
especially the U.S. The AsDB has also made improvements in its environmental aid
portfolio, but these changes are usually a source of tension between wealthier donor
states and impoverished recipient states. Recipients often protest, or at the very
least are highly skeptical of environmental reform policies, as they are concerned
that environmental concerns will trump important infrastructure projects that are
needed for development. Nevertheless, the AsDB continues to expand its activities in
the environmental sphere. The authors then discuss how the GEF has been plagued
by administrative and organizational disagreements since its inception, which at one
point resulted in the agency being completely restructured only three years after
it had been created. OFID has also increased its environmental aid, although its
primary focus continues to be on poverty reduction and economic growth. Overall,
the study by Hicks et al. (2010) suggests that multilateral aid agencies are increas-
ing their environmental aid, but that there are also tensions within them among
donors, debates on what types of environmental projects they should finance, and a
struggle between the tradeoff of pursuing poverty reduction versus environmentally
responsible aid.
2.2.4 Summary of Aid Allocation Literature
Overall, the discussion presented above suggests that bilateral aid is often given
for political, strategic, or economic interests that benefit the donor state rather than
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the recipient. Multilateral aid, on the other hand, presents a more positive picture.
Multiple studies suggest that multilateral aid is more responsive to recipient need,
issues of human rights, and good governance in recipient countries compared to
bilateral aid. The summary is not entirely positive, however. Other studies have
cited allocation problems associated with multilateral aid, such as regional favoritism
(O¨hler and Nunnenkamp, 2014) and corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Neumayer,
2003). Hicks et al. (2010) also demonstrate how multilateral aid agencies may not
be as good at providing environmentally responsible aid as compared to bilateral aid
agencies. Irregardless of these shortcomings, the general trend appears to be that
multilateral aid is distributed in a manner more conducive to promoting development
than bilateral aid, although this finding is not without caveats.
2.3 Is Foreign Aid Effective?
The second main category that studies of foreign aid have focused on is the
issue of effectiveness. For the most part, these studies examine the effectiveness
of aid in promoting economic growth. However, developmental goals are far more
varied than economic growth. Nevertheless, other studies of aid effectiveness, such
as conflict, education, health policies, or the environment, are greatly outnumbered
by studies of economic growth. Below, I briefly summarize some key works regarding
aid effectiveness. Admittedly, I place an emphasis on economic growth studies, as
a reflection of the state of the literature. I also separate my discussion by agency
type in order to highlight the differences that exist between bilateral and multilateral
aid agencies. My review indicates that on the whole, there remains little consensus
regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid.
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2.3.1 Bilateral Aid Effectiveness
Theoretically, there are several mechanisms through which aid is thought to help
facilitate economic growth. First, aid is expected to increase capital spending in
the recipient country. The infusion of aid into a country allows the government to
spend more than it would normally be able to, and thus stimulates the domestic
economy and contributes to economic growth (Radelet, 2006; Wright and Winters,
2010). A second mechanism is that when aid is given in a conditional manner, it
can lead to changes in economic and political institutions, allowing aid to indirectly
contribute to development (Radelet, 2006). A third mechanism through which aid
is expected to enhance economic development is through transfers of technology or
knowledge, which in turn enhance the economic productivity of the recipient country
(Radelet, 2006). A final mechanism is that by making improvements in healthcare
and education, foreign aid will indirectly enhance worker productivity and thus,
economic performance (Radelet, 2006).
Critics, however, argue that in reality aid does more harm than good. Foreign aid
has been accused of propping up inept governments, perpetuating ineffective politi-
cal systems and economic practices, and encouraging corruption among government
officials. Hancock (1989) offers a stark condemnation of foreign aid, stating that:
[I]in the developing countries, aid has perpetuated the rule of incompetent
and venal men whose leadership would otherwise be utterly non-viable; it
has allowed governments characterized by historic ignorance, avarice and
irresponsibility to thrive; last but not least, it has condoned - and in some
case facilitated - the most consistent and grievous abuses of human rights
that have occurred anywhere in the world since the dark ages (p.93).
Far from contributing to the economies of developing countries, critics claim that aid
is often never even used for developmental purposes. The recent embezzlement of an
estimated $12 million by Malawi’s former President Bakili Muzuli is a stark reminder
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of the potentially corruptible influence aid can have (Moyo, March 21, 2009b). In
addition to promoting corruption, foreign aid has been accused of actually hurting
the economies of recipient states because it reduces savings, causes the currency to
appreciate, and as a consequence, discourages private investment (Radelet, 2006).
Scholarly research investigating the true relationship between foreign aid and
development has found a broad range of evidence supporting both of these extreme
perspectives, as well more moderate viewpoints. Radelet (2006) and Addison, Mavro-
tas and McGillivray (2005) reach a positive conclusion, and state that foreign aid has
indeed improved the lives of the world’s poor. On the other hand, in a macro-study
of 97 empirical studies of foreign aid, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) conclude that
development aid has ultimately not been effective. Clemens et al. (2012) on the other
hand, argue that studies do not sufficiently consider the length of time it may take
for aid to impact economic growth. Examining aid and growth over a longer time
frame, the authors find that aid does in fact promote growth when evaluated in a
longer time frame.
Many other scholars have found evidence supporting the effectiveness of foreign
aid, but only under certain conditions. In their highly debated article, Burnside and
Dollar (2000) find that aid does lead to growth, but only when it is given to countries
with good political institutions. Easterly (2003) challenges these relatively optimistic
findings on a positive relationship between aid and growth, and in an extension of
Burnside and Dollar’s dataset, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) find evidence
that challenges the robustness of Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings. Mosley, Hud-
son and Verschoor (2004) also find a positive relationship between aid and poverty
reduction, if aid is given in a conditional manner. Winters (2010) suggests that for-
eign aid will be more effective in promoting economic growth when there are more
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accountability mechanisms in place, such as democratic political institutions and a
strong rule of law.
Other studies on the conditional effectiveness of aid cite donor motivations as
being key determinant variables of aid’s success. Bobba and Powell (2007) argue
that aid will only be effective when given to recipients who are not allies of the
donor state, as aid given to allies is often used to buy policy concessions, or to
buy goods and services from that specific donor, thereby rendering the aid given
relatively ineffective. Using voting patterns from the UN General Assembly, the
authors find support for their argument. Bearce and Tirone (2010) argue that aid
is only effective when donors can obtain strategic benefits from giving aid. Their
study finds evidence that economic reform and growth are linked with foreign aid,
but only for the post-Cold War period in which the strategic benefits of providing
aid dropped substantially. Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) conclude that while aid
has no impact on growth, it does improve national health levels, education, and
institutional quality in recipient countries.
Another criticism of foreign aid is that it can perpetuate the rule of autocrats
(Bauer, 1972; Friedman, 1958). As Ahmed (2012) demonstrates through a formal
model and empirical evidence, aid allows governments to transfer funds to support
patronage activities rather than supporting welfare programs. In a study of the
short and long term effects of aid on government tenure, Kono and Montinola (2009)
argue that aid can promote political survival, but that its effects are contingent
upon regime type and time horizon. The authors argue that current aid is more
likely to help democratic regimes stay in power, as they can quickly disperse the
aid in social spending. Autocracies on the other hand, stockpile aid for emergencies
and use these funds to perpetuate their rule in times of crisis. In their study of 162
developing countries from 1960-1999, they find that while current aid can promote
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democratic regimes, long term flows of aid to autocracies will also perpetuate those
regimes. Bermeo (2014) argues that aid can insulate authoritarian leaders from
turnover because it is a non-tax revenue. She therefore expects that donors will
provide fungible aid to strategic allies and non-fungible aid to non-allies. Testing her
argument on 129 recipient countries from 1973-2010, she finds that the amount of
fungible aid a country receives varies over time depending on the country’s strategic
importance and the attractiveness of a democratic transition.
Bearce (2013) challenges this argument, and states that depending on regime
type, there are different causal channels through which aid will impact growth. He
first argues that democracies do not invest more than autocracies, as demonstrated
by Przworski et al. (2000). Second, he argues that if democracies did indeed invest
more compared to autocracies, then aid should actually lead to more growth in
autocracies, since without aid, they are only spending money on consumption and
private goods. Alternatively, Bearce (2013) argues that aid can encourage growth
by promoting institutional reforms. However, once again the effectiveness of aid in
this case is dependent on regime type. With fewer veto players, autocracies may be
better able to enact economic reform compared to democracies. This would again
suggest that foreign aid may actually be more effective in promoting economic growth
compared to democracies. In conclusion, Bearce (2013) suggests that the effect of
regime type on the relationship between aid effectiveness and economic growth is not
as straightforward as some would suggest.
Accusations regarding foreign aid’s effects on internal conflict are mixed. Since
aid is a potentially lootable resource, it can may encourage the formation and con-
tinuing existence of rebel groups, as they can use aid money as a source of income.
On the other hand, Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that aid can help alleviate the
risk of civil wars during economic downturns, as it allows governments to continue
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social spending programs rather than cutting them, thereby making rebellion less
attractive.
Studies have also examined aid’s relationship with democracy and democratiza-
tion. Bermeo (2011) argues that the source of aid is highly important for regime type
in recipient countries. Aid from democratic donors is much more likely to prompt
a democratic transition, while aid from authoritarian regimes decreases the likeli-
hood of democratization. While Goldsmith (2001) finds a small positive relationship
between aid and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa from 1975-1997, Dunning (2004)
reexamines this argument and finds that the positive finding is constrained to the
post-Cold War period. The authors argue that since the end of the Cold War, geopo-
litical concerns are no longer as dominant as they were beforehand. Therefore studies
of foreign aid should be attuned to the potential different effects aid can have in these
two time periods.
2.3.2 Multilateral Aid Effectiveness
Generally, studies devoted solely to the effectiveness of multilateral aid agencies
remain quite rare. A large share of those studies that have been conducted usually
focus on total levels of aid, or bilateral aid, and include results relating to multilateral
aid only as an empirical afterthought, without presented any theoretical expectation
as to the potentially different effects each type might have. Rajan and Subramanian
(2008), for example, examine both bilateral and multilateral aid flows but conclude
that neither has a significant relationship with economic growth. Studies by Ram
(2003, 2004) reach a much more negative conclusion in regards to multilateral aid
effectiveness. In both studies, the author disaggregates aid into bilateral and mul-
tilateral aid flows, and finds that bilateral aid is substantially more effective than
multilateral aid. He attributes this to the conditionality measures, such as struc-
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tural adjustment, that multilateral agencies attach to their aid. Ram (2004) tests
the same argument examining the good policy argument presented by Burnside and
Dollar (2000), and again finds that even in good policy environments, multilateral
aid does not promote economic growth. In contrast, Headey (2008) finds that multi-
lateral aid has had quite a substantial effect on economic growth, while bilateral aid
has had a positive effect only in the post-Cold War period. Minoiu and Reddy (2010)
distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid flows, and expect multilateral aid
to be spent more on development activities as opposed to non-development activi-
ties. In an analysis of growth in developing countries from 1960-2000, the authors
find a positive but insignificant relationship between multilateral aid and economic
growth. The authors further find that donor characteristics have an effect on growth
that has no relation to recipient characteristics. This suggests that donor type, and
donor characteristics matter. While they measure these in the case of bilateral aid
donors, they do not do the same for multilateral aid donors.
Studies comparing multilateral and bilateral have also addressed issues beyond
economic growth. Studying the effect of legal origin on aid effectiveness, Wamboye,
Adekola and Sergi (2014) analyze 32 African countries from 1975-2010 and find that
multilateral aid contributes to growth only in countries with British legal origins.
Terrorism has also been studied in relation to foreign aid. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler
and Younas (2014) argue that multilateral aid and bilateral aid will reduce incidents
of terrorism, but in different ways. Bilateral aid will reduce transnational terrorism,
as it will be used in counterterrorism efforts. Multilateral aid, on the other hand,
will reduce domestic incidences of terrorism because it can improve economic con-
ditions and living standards in recipient countries. Using a generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimation method, the authors find support for their argument.
In the health sector, Nunnenkamp and O¨hler (2011) study the relationship between
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aid and alleviating HIV/AIDS. Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach
and examining the Global Fund, they find that aid from multilateral organizations
has surprisingly not been effective in reducing the number of AIDS related deaths,
but that bilateral aid from the U.S. has actually helped in this area. The reasoning
behind this, they suggest, is that multilateral aid organizations spread their funds
out quite substantially, which limits the amount of impact they are able to have in
a single country. The U.S. and other bilateral aid donors, on the other hand, focus
their funding on countries with severe HIV/AIDS epidemics, and are therefore able
to make a more sizable impact. Lancaster (1999) offers a promising study of aid
agencies in her book, Aid to Africa. However, she too focuses mainly on bilateral
donor agencies, with the exception of the World Bank and the EC.
Other studies have focused exclusively on multilateral aid agencies. Vreeland
(2003) argues that the IMF actually hurts economic growth in recipient countries, and
that IMF programs exacerbate income inequality due the conditionality constraints
that they impose on recipients. Another study by Winters (2013) examines World
Bank projects from 1996-2005. He argues that projects that are more precisely
targeted will be more effective, as they are less likely to be fungible and subject to
corruption. By more precisely targeting the geographic area to which a project will
operate, government accountability is enhanced, and the project is more likely to
achieve its goal. Examining the Implementation Completion Reports of 600 World
Bank projects, Winters (2013) finds that those projects targeted to single cities or
regions, or specific industries or businesses are less likely to be captured than national
level projects, and are thus more effective.
Another study focusing on multilateral aid in the environmental sector by McLean
(2015) examines how strategic interactions between multilateral aid organizations
and recipient governments can promote environmentally favorable outcomes. Using a
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formal model, McLean (2015) argues that multilateral aid provided for environmental
purposes can successfully attract the support of recipient governments and ultimately
be successful, but only when they use aid as a carrot to induce recipients to cooperate
with projects rather than through capacity building. Essentially, her model shows
that multilateral aid agencies that attract government co-financing will be more
successful in reaching project goals. Simply providing more aid money, however, will
actually reduce the likelihood of a successful project because the donor has a much
higher standard for success that a less developed country will be less likely to be
able to achieve. Her empirical study of 177 projects issued by the GEF between
1991 and 2007 demonstrates that the agency is able to induce recipient governments
to make environmental improvements. Her results demonstrate how the conflicting
interests and motivations of donor agencies and recipient governments create strategic
interactions that can inhibit environmental protection.
2.3.3 Summary of Aid Effectiveness Literature
The above literature review indicates that studies of aid effectiveness are far from
conclusive. Critics of foreign aid have argued that it has failed to achieve economic
development, and has even been cited as extending episodes of civil conflict, all
the while wasting billions of dollars of development funding (Easterly, 2006; Moyo,
March 21, 2009b). Supporters of aid, however, argue that it does indeed promote
development, and can also be used in such a manner that may even alleviate potential
conflict situations or improve the environment. However, each of these successes is
oftentimes conditional upon an additional factor, such as recipient institutions. In
terms of multilateral aid, the overall assessment is equally mixed. Some studies find
a positive relationship between multilateral aid and growth, while others find that it
has a negative association. Critics of multilateral aid organizations argue that they
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impose constraints on their funding and do not focus enough activities in a single
area to achieve sizable results. Thus, past work suggests that multilateral aid will
be more effective when it is targeted locally (Winters, 2013), and when it is able to
induce recipient support of project goals (McLean, 2015).
2.4 Conclusion
The literature review presented here highlights several important findings regard-
ing aid allocation and aid effectiveness. First, it is quite clear that bilateral aid is
often allocated to further the domestic political and economic interests of the donor
government, while multilateral aid agencies often motivated more by recipient need.
Second, the effectiveness of foreign aid in general remains highly debated. Although
some studies have found support for the argument that aid does promote devel-
opment, others find equally compelling evidence that aid has not had any positive
impact. Given that the aggregate findings regarding aid’s effectiveness are so mixed,
researchers are now conducting more micro-level analyses as to the type of aid that
is most effective, as well as the conditions under which aid is most likely to succeed.
The results of these studies will provide a more comprehensive understanding of aid’s
true impact on development.
My main contribution to this ongoing debate is to highlight how differences among
aid agencies affect aid outcomes. Although much of the literature has focused on
factors within recipient countries that impact development, my argument scrutinizes
the aid agencies themselves. While many studies have acknowledged the inherent
differences that exist among aid agencies, especially the differences that exist between
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, as of yet none have specifically explored and
tested how these differences impact actual aid results. I address this void in the
remainder of my dissertation.
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3. A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
When examining international organizations or domestic government agencies,
one of the most prevalent concerns for policymakers is their effectiveness. As these
organizations are designed to serve a specific purpose, assessing whether or not they
are in fact achieving their goals is an important and ongoing task for researchers. The
issue of organizational effectiveness is especially pertinent to the aid community, as
the 2005 Paris Declaration states that, “aid effectiveness must increase significantly”
in order to reach the Millennium Development Goals (OECD, 2008). To this end,
scholars and policymakers have endeavored to identify the aid agencies and policies
that foster the best results. Casting this issue in the the broader context of inter-
national and domestic organizational effectiveness, my contribution to this research
area is to highlight how the internal characteristics of organizations directly impact
their ability to deliver positive results. Drawing on past work in political science and
public administration, I identify and discuss in detail three such factors: motivation,
specialization, and autonomy. Each of these factors plays a key role in contributing
to overall organizational success.
After describing my broader theory of how internal characteristics impact organi-
zational success, I next use this theory to answer my two previously posed empirical
research questions regarding multilateral aid effectiveness. The first question I ask
is: What organizational factors make bilateral or multilateral aid more effective?
As discussed in Section 1, although both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies are
designed to distribute foreign aid abroad, there are important differences that char-
acterize each type. Bilateral aid agencies, for instance, often provide more aid than
multilateral agencies, but they are also tasked with pursing both their domestic
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geopolitical interests along with the goal of helping to alleviate third world poverty.
Meanwhile, multilateral aid agencies are more divorced from these domestic political
constraints, but must then navigate through the institutional constraints placed on
them. I argue that these differences must be considered if we are to truly comprehend
the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of these two types of aid agencies. Drawing on my
general theory of organizational effectiveness, I argue that two key organizational
differences–motivation and specialization–will make multilateral aid more effective
than bilateral aid.
My second research question focuses on comparing multilateral aid agencies to
each other. Although I argue above that multilateral aid agencies are likely to be
more effective aid organizations compared to bilateral aid agencies due to their moti-
vations and specialization, it is also important to recognize that a substantial amount
of variation exists within multilateral aid agencies themselves. Thus, my second re-
search question is: What organizational factors make some multilateral aid agencies
more effective than others? In my argument, I highlight how variations in two or-
ganizational characteristics–specialization and autonomy–lead to differences in mul-
tilateral aid effectiveness.
The remainder of this section proceeds in four main parts. First, I present a
general theory of organizational effectiveness focusing on the internal organizational
characteristics. Second and third, I apply this argument to my two research questions
regarding foreign aid effectiveness. In each, I develop testable hypotheses that I
empirically test in Sections 6, 7, and 8. I conclude by discussing the implications of
my theory for the aid community, as well as describing the next steps I take in order
to test my argument.
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3.1 Describing an Effective Organization
Understanding what makes an organization effective is a challenging task to say
the least. Past research on organizations has found evidence that factors such as net-
works (Provan and Milward, 2001; Provan and Kenis, 2008), goal clarity (Moynihan
and Pandey, 2005), managerial style and leadership (O’Toole and Meier, 1999; Meier
and O’Toole, 2002), organizational culture (Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Rainey and
Steinbauer, 1999), and the centralization of decision-making power (Wilson, 1989) all
have important influences on the outcomes that the organization is able to deliver.
Likewise, studies of foreign aid have demonstrated that effectiveness is determined
by political and economic preferences, human rights considerations, strategic inter-
actions with the recipient state, and the type of aid that is provided. Stepping back
from such a myriad of conditions, I ask a simple question: What does an effective
organization look like? The list of possible answers to this question is potentially
endless. While acknowledging the wide range of factors that have been cited as
contributing to enhanced organizational performance, I limit my discussion to three
factors that are especially pertinent to studies of foreign aid agencies: motivation,
specialization, and autonomy. While I first discuss each factor in broad terms, I then
discuss it more specifically in the context of foreign aid.
3.1.1 Motivation
The first factor that I argue will contribute to an organization’s effectiveness is its
motivation. If the motivation of the organization is unclear, it will be more difficult
for it to achieve positive results due to conflicting perceptions of what precisely the
organization is intended to accomplish. This strong relationship between motivation,
or goal clarity, and organizational performance has been well-documented in public
administration research. According to these studies, having clear and specific goals
42
motivates agency employees to perform better (Wright, 2001; Rodgers and Hunter,
1992). As described by Moynihan and Pandey (2005), “A clear task allows the
organization to communicate goals easily, develop a mission-oriented culture, and
reduce the potential for rival, confusing, and contradictory management systems
and actions because of conflicting goals” (p. 427). Thus, goal clarity enhances
performance in that it provides a focal point for agency activities. Rather than
getting lost in vague idealisms, organizations with clear motivations are better able
to concentrate their efforts.
Applying this argument to foreign aid agencies is quite straightforward: if an
agency is motivated by development goals, they will pursue developmentally ori-
ented policies. If, however, the agency is motivated to disburse their aid in order to
further geopolitical interests, this distracts them from promoting development, and
consequently renders the aid less effective than it otherwise might have been. The
effect of geopolitical aid can also manifest itself in the interaction between the donor
and recipient, whereby donor motivations influence how recipients spend aid funds.
A recent study by Kilby and Dreher (2009) states this relationship quite clearly:
If the donor is motivated by recipient need, its allocation decision depends
on how the recipient uses aid. This induces the recipient to select devel-
opmental policies. If the donor is motivated by self-interest, its allocation
decision does not depend on how the recipient uses aid and the recipient
does not select development policies (p. 1).
Thus, the motives of aid giving clearly matter in terms of the ultimate effectiveness
of aid.
The global aid community has readily acknowledged the diminishing effectiveness
of aid when it is distributed for geopolitical reasons. Consequently, they have estab-
lished a variety of standards meant to urge aid agencies to allocate their funds based
on policies of good governance and need. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
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adopted by the DAC in 2005 emphasized, among other things, that donors should
align themselves with local plans for poverty reduction, shift their focus to develop-
ment related results, and be held accountable for results (OECD, 2008). Building
on this, the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 stressed that donors focus their aid
on actions that will positively impact development (OECD, 2008). Finally, the 2011
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation again stressed the impor-
tance of result oriented aid policies, and states that, “Having a sustainable impact
should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in policymaking” (OECD,
2011).
There are two main reasons why aid motivated by development needs will be
more effective than aid stemming from alternative motives. The first is that this
type of aid is more likely to be targeted to poorer recipients. When aid is provided
to poor recipient countries, it has the potential to have a substantial impact in
terms on development because it is able to address severely dire economic conditions,
conditions that may improve markedly with only slight increases in aid. Although
evidence of economic growth may not appear for a more extended time period, as
it takes years to build an effective infrastructure and strong political institutions,
in sectors such as healthcare or education, small contributions can make a huge
difference. A single dose of the oral polio vaccine, for example, costs a mere $0.10-
0.13 (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 2015), and in Africa $500-650 can send
a child to school for a year (Aid for Africa, 2015). In another example, consider
two countries that struggle with poverty, although at different levels: Nigeria, whose
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2013 was estimated at $3,006 per year;
and Niger, which is contiguous to Nigeria but whose GDP per capita was estimated
at $415 per year (World Bank, 2015). Now consider if each country experienced
a $100 increase in these rates. This would result in a 24% increase in GDP per
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capita for Niger, but only a 3% increase for Nigeria. Clearly then, aid targeted to
poorer countries has a relatively greater impact. When economic or political factors
influence aid giving, however, these poor countries are more likely to be overlooked
in favor of those that can provide a desired political or economic return. Thus,
geopolitical motivations can undermine development by neglecting the poorest of
the poor.
The second way that politically neutral aid can promote effective development
is by allocating aid to countries with good political and economic institutions. As
demonstrated by Burnside and Dollar (2000), Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004),
and Winters (2010), aid is more effective when it is given to countries with better
political and economic institutions. Countries with poor political and economic insti-
tutions are more likely to waste aid through government consumption or corruption,
both of which have plagued foreign aid effectiveness. One of the biggest criticisms of
foreign aid is that it is siphoned off by corrupt public officials and little of it ultimately
reaches its intended sector. When donors provide geopolitically motivated aid, they
are less likely to be concerned with corruption issues. As discussed by Bauer (1972),
Friedman (1958), and Ahmed (2012), aid given in this manner can perpetuate the
rule of autocrats, as it allows them to divert aid money into patronage activities,
and provides little positive impact in the realm of actual development. Thus, when
concerns of good governance are eschewed for geopolitical interests, aid becomes less
effective.
These arguments can also be viewed as a “selection effect.” By providing aid
to poorer recipients with good institutional environments, agencies that are devel-
opmentally oriented are essentially choosing the countries which are most likely to
produce a positive return on aid spending. But a similar argument can be made
for geopolitical aid. However in this case, agencies are selecting into countries that
45
will provide returns on aid that are beneficial to the donor rather than the recipient.
Thus, while geopolitical aid provides private benefits, developmentally motivated
agencies are able to produce development results precisely because they select coun-
tries based on their motivation to promote development.
3.1.2 Specialization
The second factor that will enhance the effectiveness of an organization is its level
of specialization. The argument that specialization can translate into more effective
organizations is found in the logic of division of labor. Specialization has long been
advocated by economists as a way to help improve production and efficiency. As
described by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, concentrating on a single task
improves worker “dexterity,” reduces the amount of time spent transitioning from one
task to another, and promotes “the application of proper machinery” (Smith, 1904).
Using the example of a pin maker, Smith demonstrates how a laborer operating
individually is only able to produce a few pins, whereas a group of laborers who
each focus on a more specific task are able to produce thousands. In addition to
firms, this logic has been applied to countries as well. Rather than attempting to
make every product on their own, countries focus on products in which they have a
comparative advantage, and then trade for the other products they need. A division
of labor essentially allows firms and countries to achieve economies of scale, whereby
they are able to reduce their overhead costs, and thus produce more goods in a more
efficient manner.
Specialization among foreign aid agencies has the potential to yield similarly pos-
itive results. For purposes of my discussion, I define agency specialization as: the
extent to which an aid agency focuses its allocation on a single country, geographical
region, or development sector. Thus, when an agency focuses its aid activity on fewer
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targets, it is more specialized than an agency that distributes its aid equally among
all targets. Related to agency specialization is the issue of aid fragmentation, or the
proliferation of donors within a single recipient country, region, or sector. Aid frag-
mentation is defined by the OECD as, “too many donors giving too little aid to too
many countries.” Similarly, Acharya, de Lima and Moore (2006) define proliferation
as, “the extent to which an aid donor disperses its aid budget among a portfolio of
potential recipients” (p. 9). While the two concepts are highly interdependent, each
refers to a distinct phenomena. Whereas specialization focuses on the activities of
the agency, fragmentation examines the resulting nature of aid within a single coun-
try, region, or sector. High fragmentation within a recipient country, for example,
implies that the country is receiving aid from too many donors. Specialization, on
the other hand, focuses on the behavior of a single agency. Thus aid proliferation
is a consequence of a lack of agency specialization, as well as a lack of coordination
among aid donors. I discuss the relationship between these two concepts in more
detail below.
Issues of specialization and fragmentation have received an increasing amount of
attention in recent years. Both have been cited as critical factors for improving over-
all aid effectiveness by both Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. The
Paris Declaration, for instance, specifically states that, “Excessive fragmentation of
aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness” (OECD, 2008, p. 6).
Despite repeated calls for increases in agency specialization to alleviate these prob-
lems, change in agency behavior has not been forthcoming (Easterly and Williamson,
2011; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). The consequences of such a lack of specialization
are quite dire. As described by the World Bank (2010), “When aid comes in too
many small slices from too many donors, transaction costs go up and recipient coun-
tries have difficulty managing their own development agenda” (p. 131). Foreign aid
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scholars Easterly and Pfutze (2008) have similarly criticized the lack of specialization
among aid donors, stating that:
The real-world effect of this fragmentation is that each recipient must con-
tend with many small projects from many different donors, which breeds
duplication, takes up much of the time of government ministers in aid-
intensive countries, forfeits the opportunity to scale up successes or gains
from specialization, and creates high overhead costs for both donors and
recipients (pp.39-40).
This argument has been empirically substantiated by a recent study on the conse-
quences of aid proliferation for economic growth in developing countries. In their
article, Kimura, Mori and Sawada (2012) examine the consequences of bilateral aid
proliferation for economic growth. Their results indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa,
which has low economic growth rates, is plagued by high levels of aid proliferation,
Meanwhile, aid proliferation is quite low in East Asian countries, whose growth rates
are significantly higher than those of Sub-Saharan African countries. Examining a
cross-national dataset using GMM estimation methods, the authors find that aid
concentration has a positive and significant effect on economic growth rates.
The juncture between the concepts of agency specialization and aid proliferation
warrants special attention. The problems associated with aid proliferation (recipient
countries receiving aid from too many donors) is rooted in two sources. The first
is a lack of specialization within donor agencies themselves. As agencies diversity
their aid portfolios amid a myriad of recipient countries, regions, and sectors, their
ability to implement effective aid programs in each of these targeted areas diminishes,
thereby rendering their aid less effective than it otherwise could have been. This lack
of effectiveness is subsequently compounded when other donor agencies behave in a
similar manner. As evidenced from the quotations above, when recipient countries
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receive aid from a large number of aid donors, their transaction costs go up and aid
effectiveness is diminished.
Agency specialization offers a way to alleviate these costs. In addition to the gains
provided by a division of labor, agency specialization has a further benefit in that it
can increase the expertise and competency of agency staff, thereby making it more
likely that their projects will achieved the desired results. However, observing this
effect may be difficult, as these benefits will only be provided if a group of aid agency’s
specialize and coordinate their behavior. Alternatively, if agencies either do not
specialize and/or do not coordinate their act activities, then recipient governments
will continue to receive highly fragmented aid, which is not conducive to development.
Thus, agency specialization must occur first within agencies, and then agencies must
coordinate their activities in order to fully reap the gains that specialization provides.
Using past research on foreign aid effectiveness as well as the logic underlying
economic factors of scale as a guideline, below I describe three ways in which spe-
cialization can enhance the effectiveness of the agency. These include the ability of
the agency to: (1) devote more resources to each targeted location or sector; (2)
reduce transaction costs; and (3) increase agency expertise. I then discuss potential
counterarguments to specialization, such as issues of spillovers and network effects,
as well as the problem of coordination among donor agencies.
The first reason that donor specialization can improve aid effectiveness is that it
allows the agency to provide more funding to each targeted recipient or sector. For
specialized donor agencies, limiting their targets means that they have fewer activities
over which their funding will be divided. This allows aid specialists to provide
more funding to each of their targets, whether they be individual country recipients,
regions, or aid sectors. By providing proportionally more aid to each targets, agencies
are able to achieve better outcomes compared to aid generalists precisely because
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the target is receiving more funding. To illustrate this argument, consider two aid
agencies: an aid generalist (G) and an aid specialist (S). The aid generalist does
not specialize either in terms of its geographical or sectoral distribution of aid. The
aid specialist, on the other hand, focuses their aid activities within a more limited
geographical and/or sectoral sphere. Each agency distributes aid to xG and xS
targets respectively. Logically, we can assume that aid specialists distribute aid to
fewer targets compared to aid generalists (xS < xG). Each agency also has a budget
of bG and bS. If we assume that bG = bS, then the aid specialist is able to devote
more of their resources to each of their targets. This argument holds even when
the budgets of the two agencies are not equal. If we eliminate this assumption and
instead assume that bG > bS, the aid specialist will still be able to distribute more
funds to their targets, so long as bG/xG < bS/xS. Thus, even if they have smaller
overall aid budgets, aid specialists can potentially distribute more aid to each of
their targets compared to aid generalists. In terms of development outcomes, larger
contributions help to reduce the likelihood of fragmentation within the recipient,
which has been shown by Kimura, Mori and Sawada (2012) to be detrimental for
economic growth.
The second reason that specialized aid can enhance development is that it re-
duces the transaction costs that agencies incur. Using the definition provided by
Brown et al. (2000), transaction costs are, “the costs arising from the preparation,
negotiation, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements for the de-
livery of ODA” (p. 7). The authors then elaborate on this definition by dividing
transaction costs into three different categories. The first are administrative costs,
which entail things such as staffing and overhead. For aid agencies, administra-
tive costs are produced by identifying worthwhile projects to pursue, bargaining and
decision-making while negotiating the details of aid agreements, and monitoring that
50
the agreement is carried out as planned (Lawson, 2009, p. 8). Taken all together,
these administrative costs can be quite substantial. The World Bank, for example,
spent approximately $350,000 over two years while preparing a loan proposal and
another $70,000 each year supervising the project until it was completed (Brown
et al., 2000, p. 14). The second category of transaction costs discussed by Brown
et al. (2000) are the indirect costs of the aid on development goals. Examples of such
indirect costs include, “undermining government ownership and policy consistency
of ODA and public expenditure more generally; disbursement delays (and possible
effects on future commitments), reduced effectiveness (as resources may go to lower
priority areas), and over-financing of capital vis--vis recurrent expenditure” (p. 7).
The third category are opportunity costs, which entail the trade-offs that are made
in order to focus time and energy on each project. The latter two categories are
obviously difficult to observe, but exist nevertheless.
By specializing on a particular sector or recipient, donor agencies are able to re-
duce these transaction costs. Fewer targets means that each agency has to spend less
time and energy finding projects to implement, establishing and maintaining aid re-
lationships, negotiating project terms, and monitoring project outcomes. Returning
to the scenario presented above, transaction costs, t, will decrease as x, the number
of targets, decreases. This implies that tS < tG. As a result, the aid generalist will
have to devote a greater proportion of their budgets to pay for their transaction
costs, and will consequently have to provide less funding to each of their targets:
(bS − tS)/xS > (bG − tG)/xG. Thus, due to lower transaction costs, aid specialists
should be able to provide more actual funding compared to aid generalists.
The third way in which specialization can improve aid effectiveness is by pro-
viding more in-depth development related expertise. Similar to the transaction cost
argument advanced above, specialization allows agencies to invest more knowledge
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in each of their targets. Rather than maximizing financial resources, as is the case in
reducing transaction costs, in this case specialized aid agencies are able to maximize
their country, region, or sector specific knowledge. When aid agencies limit their
aid targets, they are able to dedicate more of their staff’s resources to improving
development in each of those targets. This is the fundamental logic in the public
administration literature regarding goal clarity. As a result, for two agencies of sim-
ilar size, an aid specialist will be able to develop more in-depth knowledge for each
of its targets compared to an aid generalist. The World Bank, for example, which
dedicates a great deal of its aid to environmental issues, has a staff of over 270 envi-
ronmental professionals (Hicks et al., 2010, p. 218). It is quite difficult to envisage
an aid generalist with the capacity to support a similarly knowledgable staff. As a
result of this increase in knowledge resources, aid specialists are able to implement
projects and policies that have been more thoroughly planned and researched, and
therefore have a greater likelihood of enhancing development. Gerlak (2004) for in-
stance, documents how GEF work on water resource management in the Black Sea
and Danube regions has helped to create and spread scientific knowledge through
extensive diagnostic evaluations and strategic action plans they implemented with
participating countries. Without the GEF, it is unlikely that countries could have
individually come together to form such a massive concerted effort on researching
and attempting to resolve the problems that the region faced.
Specialized aid agencies can also generate deeper expertise through staff learning
and task repetition. As has been shown in economics, when workers focus on a single
task they become both better and faster at completing that task. Since they perform
the same task repeatedly, workers are able to learn how to complete that task more
competently and efficiently, and as a result are abel to take advantage of economies of
scale. The same benefits apply to specialized aid agency workers. Acharya, de Lima
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and Moore (2006) describe this problem of aid proliferation as being, “...analogous
to an individual lawyer trying to deal with a hundred cases in any one week...[t]here
is just not enough attention to go around” (Acharya, de Lima and Moore, 2006, p.
15). By working with a limited number of targets, aid workers in specialized agencies
are able to capitalize on task repetition and the knowledge that they gather when
performing these activities. Aid workers in specialized agencies are more likely to
understand the types of projects that are needed, those that are most feasible, what
projects have worked in the past, and to have already established contacts in their
target areas. As a result, the experience that aid agencies are able to develop in each
of their areas of specialization helps them to implement more effective aid projects.
It is important to note that agency expertise is not exclusive to specialized agen-
cies, as aid generalists can also possess high levels of expertise. A study of aid
fragmentation in Burkina Faso by Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) discusses how gov-
ernment officials specifically prefer donors with greater levels of technical and sec-
toral expertise, regardless of the volume of aid they are actually providing. While the
authors specifically identified UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) as being highly
regarded for their expertise, certain bilateral agencies were equally appreciated for
their expertise (Dreher and Michaelowa, 2010, p. 21). My argument however, does
not dismiss the potential for high levels of expertise within aid generalists. Instead, I
focus on the implications of specialization for the distribution of an agency’s knowl-
edge resources and how learning can help create a more knowledgable staff. Neither
of these arguments assumes that aid generalists are not as competent as special-
ized aid agencies. Instead, my argument regarding expertise is grounded on treating
expertise as a type of resource that an agency possess. Assume that both an aid
specialist and an aid generalist possess similar levels of expertise, eS = eG. If this
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expertise must be divided over the number of targets that each agency funds, it log-
ically follows that the aid specialist will be able to provide more expertise to each
target: eS/xS > eG/xG. If we go beyond this assumption and argue that specialized
agencies actually possess greater levels of expertise than general agencies, eS > eG,
the impact of this argument becomes even larger. Thus, I expect specialized aid
agencies to produce more effective aid policies because they are able to devote more
staff resources to each of their targets.
In sum, these arguments suggest that the amount of funding and expertise that
aid specialists are able to devote to each of their targets should be greater than that
provided by aid generalists, thereby making specialized aid more effective. How-
ever, there are important potential counterarguments to this. Most notably is that
even if agencies provide less specialized aid, they are still able to provide effective
aid. For example, agencies whose portfolios are more fragmented may benefit from
spillover effects and enhanced networking opportunities. Country and/or sector spe-
cific knowledge, for instance, can often be applied to other countries and/or sectors
as well. Similarly, increasing the size of an agency’s portfolio also increases their
contacts to other actors in the aid community, such as government officials, experts,
implementing agencies, NGO groups, etc. This allows even an aid generalist to
implement aid in an effective manner.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it discounts the ramifications of
such agency behavior at the target level. That is, although it may not be costly to
the agency to proliferate their aid portfolios, it is costly for the recipient countries,
regions, or sectors. The famous case of Tanzania is a case in point. As reported
by former World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn, Tanzania hosts over 1,000
aid missions and makes 2,400 annual reports to donor agencies indicates that a
recipient countries must devote a substantial amount of their resources to dealing
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with aid agencies.1 Consequently, aid recipients must devote more of their resources
on less productive activities such as negotiating aid contracts, meetings with donor
governments, and filing reports on aid projects. The presence of multiple donor
agencies has also been shown to diminish the bureaucratic capacity of recipient gov-
ernments (Knack and Rahman, 2007). As donors work to produce tangible results,
they “poach” educated government officials in order to capitalize on their expertise.
With more donors operating in a single target area, the demand for educated locals
increases, and many in the population are likely to leave for more lucrative employ-
ment in the private sector (Knack and Rahman, 2007). This decreases the capacity
of the public sector, and thereby reduces aid effectiveness.
A further problem associated with multiple donor agencies being present in a
recipient country, region, or sector is that it induces a free-rider problem. Rahman
and Sawada (2012) demonstrate this by augmenting the team production model put
forth by Holstrom (1982) in the context of foreign aid and selfish aid agencies. As
donor agencies provide a joint outcome, and donor agencies are expected to receive
private gains from aid effectiveness, the optimal supply of aid will be undersupplied.
Thus, the authors conclude that a proliferation of aid donors can lead to suboptimal
outcomes for development due to problems of free-riding.2
To summarize, development policies implemented by aid specialists should be
more effective as they are able to reduce their transaction costs and provide policies
that have been more thoroughly examined by aid experts. While each of these
arguments is applicable individually, when combined they provide a strong case that
specialized aid will be more effective than non-specialized aid. This is not to say
1Roodman (2006) even argues that these figures underestimate the severity of aid proliferation
in Tanzania at the time.
2This problem is solved when the donor agencies are altruistically motivated, as the outcome
then becomes a public good.
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that aid should be supplied by a single donor to each recipient country, region, or
sector. Competition and pressure to succeed is undeniably health for aid agencies
and development policies. However, there does appear to be a threshold at which
the number of active donors in a given sector of development becomes unproductive
(Roodman, 2006). At present, however, donor proliferation appears to significantly
exceed this threshold, warranting continued encouragement for aid agencies to limit
their aid activities.
3.1.3 Autonomy
The third factor that I argue will enhance organizational effectiveness is auton-
omy. In a broad sense, autonomy can be defined as the ability of an organization to
act independently. Autonomy is an interesting organizational characteristic because
it effects organizational performance indirectly rather than directly. Autonomy does
not determine the goals that the organization has, nor does it determine the budget
or human capital of an organization. However, the ability of the organization to effec-
tively pursue its goals and utilize its endowments in a positive manner is highly depen-
dent on organizational autonomy. Many prominent studies of government agencies
have focused on the issue of bureaucratic “red-tape” and its consequences (Wilson,
1989). Brewer and Selden (2000), for instance, describe how excessive managerial
levels inhibit organization effectiveness. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) also highlight
the importance of autonomy, stating that, “Autonomy to manage its mission and
tasks tends to enhance an agency’s performance...” (p. 16). Thus, even if an organi-
zation possess positive traits that are expected to enhance performance, it will only
achieve positive results if it is sufficiently autonomous. When applying this logic to
foreign aid, the expectation is that agencies will only be effective donors when they
have autonomy from their managers, in this case donor governments. Below, I use a
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principal-agent model as a foundation for my argument in order to describe in more
detail the problem that a lack of autonomy creates for aid effectiveness.
Within a principal-agent relationship, the principal (donor) delegates authority
to an agent (aid agency). The problem for aid agencies is that while they are created
to address development, at the same time, donor governments can obtain short term
domestic gains by using foreign aid funds to further their own geopolitical interests.
Therefore, a time-inconsistency issue arises, much the same as that faced by national
governments in setting monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and
Gordon, 1983a). On the one hand, donor governments have mandated aid agencies to
promote development. On the other, they also have an incentive to use foreign aid to
advance their own domestic interests. I argue due to this preference inconsistency, aid
agencies must be autonomous in order to fulfill their goals and address development
issues effectively. In order to demonstrate this, I first describe the insights that
principal-agent theory offers in the context of foreign aid agencies. I then discuss
how a lack of autonomy can hinder the benefits that other organizational factors
provide.
Autonomy is a multifaceted concept that is a key factor in studies of principal-
agent theory. As noted above, in a principal-agent model, the principal delegates
authority to an agent with the expectation that the agent will pursue the principal’s
interests. However, as the agent also has their own preferences, the principal must
find ways to entice the agent to act in such a way that maximizes the utility of
the principal. Ross (1973) describes this relationship in his seminal study applying
agency theory to the design of contracts in economics, while Mitnick (1973) provides
a similarly groundbreaking study in political science. In each of these studies, the
authors describe the principal’s problem as one of motivating the agent to act in a
manner that the principal prefers. The agent, on the other hand, faces a decision
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of pursuing their own self-interests versus those of their principal. It is at this
point that agent autonomy becomes a crucial factor. Offering a broad definition in
their study of delegation to international organizations, Hawkins et al. (2006) define
autonomy as, “the range of potential independent action available to an agent after
the principal has established mechanisms of control” (p. 8). There are two key
components of this definition that it is important to highlight. The first is that
autonomy determines the agent’s “range of potential independent action.” If the
agent has sufficient levels of autonomy, they are able to pursue their own interests
above those of their principal. Principals, on the other hand, want to delegate to
an agent that shares their preferences in order to maximize their own utility. When
the preferences of the principal and agent diverge, delegation can be costly, as the
agent may not pursue policies that are preferred by the principal. As discussed
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the magnitude of these costs depends upon the
divergence between the principal’s and the agent’s preferences, as well as the effort
that the principal exerts in order to control agent behavior. However, the ability of
a principal to delegate to an agent that perfectly reflects their preferences can only
be achieved under conditions of complete information. In reality, this is unlikely to
occur, as agents can engage in “hidden action”, or can disguise their actions through
“hidden information” (Arrow, 1985). Thus, due to asymmetric information, the
principal can rarely be certain that the agent fully shares its preferences.
Because principals can never be certain that they are delegating to an agent that
truly shares their preferences, they can attempt to mitigate the potential losses of
delegation by limiting agent autonomy. This leads to the second key component of
the definition provided by Hawkins et al. (2003), which is that autonomy is dependent
upon the principal’s “established mechanisms of control.” As detailed in studies of
congressional delegation, principals often restrict the actions of their agents because
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of concerns of adverse selection and moral hazard, whereby the agent pursues policies
that diminish the potential gains of the principal (Pollack, 2003). Carpenter (2001)
succinctly describes this problem, known as agency slack, as when, “bureaucrats take
actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized
interests defer even though they would prefer that other actions (or no action at
all) be taken” (p. 4). Agency slack can manifest itself in two ways: shirking and
slippage (McCubbins and Page, 1987). Shirking occurs when agents engage in limited
efforts on behalf of the principal. Slippage occurs when agents shift their preferences
away from those of the principal (McCubbins and Page, 1987). Both can diminish the
utility of the principal while increasing the utility of the agent. Thus, while principals
are eager to benefit from delegation, they are simultaneously wary of agents slacking,
as it is costly for them.
Autonomy is therefore important because it determines the ability of the agency
to pursue their own preferences rather than those of their donors. Thus, I offer a
more specific definition of autonomy in the context of foreign aid agencies as: the
ability of the agency to pursue independent aid policies and achieve its mission and
purpose.3 When autonomy increases, agencies have greater independence from their
donor governments, and consequently a greater ability to pursue their own interests.
Donor governments, on the other hand, may resist such attempts by aid agencies to
increase their levels of autonomy, especially when they do not share the preferences
of the agency, as delegating to agents with divergent preferences can lead to problems
3In addition to Hawkins et al. (2003), I draw on two other sources for my definition of agency
autonomy. The first is from Lancaster (1999), who defines autonomy in the context of foreign aid
agencies as, “the ability of an organization to make policy decisions to achieve its mission and
purposes” (p. 78). The second is from Haftel and Thompson (2006), who propose a similar concept
of independence in their study of international organizations, stating that, “...independence for an
IO is the ability to operate in a manner that is insulated from the influence of other political actors–
especially states” (p. 256). In my definition I capture both the emphasis on independence from
Haftel and Thompson (2006) as well as the pursuit of agency mission as emphasized by Lancaster
(1999).
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of moral hazard and adverse selection (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the
autonomy of the agency is of critical concern for both the donor and the agency alike.
The ultimate impact of the discrepancy between donor and aid agency preferences
is that the benefits that stem from other positive organizational characteristics are
less likely to have a positive impact. Consider, for example, an ideal aid agency.
That is, one that is motivated to promote development, has strong leadership, a
good supply of knowledgable and committed employees, and is specialized. If the
agency is autonomous, it is more likely to be effective because it will capitalize on
all of these positive traits. However, if autonomy is lacking, these can be negatively
influenced by the principal. Donor governments may pressure the agency to alter
their aid policies in order to promote goals and interests that conflict with the goals
of development. Therefore while the autonomy of the aid agency does not make aid
more effective directly, its indirect effects are just as important.
3.2 Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Agencies
Below, I apply my theory of organizational effectiveness to my first research ques-
tion: What organizational factors make bilateral or multilateral aid more effective?
Drawing from the factors described above, I argue that multilateral aid should be
more effective than bilateral aid due to differences in agency motivation and special-
ization. I discuss each of these arguments in turn below.
3.2.1 Examining Agency Motivations
The first reason that multilateral agencies will be more effective than bilateral
agencies is that they are more likely to be motivated to provide nonpolitical aid
(Asher, 1962). Unlike bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies are designed with
the explicit purpose of addressing development concerns. This argument has been
demonstrated by several studies comparing bilateral and multilateral aid alloca-
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tion. According to these studies, bilateral aid allocations are primarily motivated
by geopolitical strategic interests (Alfred Maizels, 1984; Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2009), and pay little attention to recipient qualities such as
corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002); institutional quality, rule of law, property
rights, and democracy (Alfred Maizels, 1984); policy environments (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000); and human rights (Neumayer, 2003). This is detrimental for develop-
ment because rather than aid being distributed to countries who need it the most,
or those countries which have good institutions and will be able to translate aid into
real economic growth, bilateral aid is allocated to strategic allies or countries with
which the donor has strong economic ties. The Cold War, for example, was a key
determinant of U.S. aid distribution patterns in that U.S. allies received substan-
tially more aid than non-U.S. allies. While the Cold War and its effects have largely
dissipated today, donors continue to favor their allies when it comes to aid distribu-
tion patterns. This fact is clearly demonstrated in a recent book by Vreeland and
Dreher (2014), whereby the authors describe how powerful states are able to extract
policy concessions from elected members of the UN Security Council through carrots
including, but not limited to, foreign aid.
Economic motivations follow a similar pattern of self-interests. Fleck and Kilby
(2001) find that of the $12.9 billion that U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) provided in contracts during 1995, $11 billion of that went directly to U.S.
firms. In another study using a time series analysis, Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009)
show that German bilateral aid increased German exports by approximately the
same amount as the amount of aid given. This type of economic patronage is often
provided in the form of tied aid, aid that is dispensed with the contingency that the
goods and services it provides be implemented or sourced by the donor state (OECD
and UNDP, 2014). This limitation on the choices that a recipient country has for
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actually using their aid can significantly constrain aid effectiveness. According to one
study, tied aid is 15-25% less cost-effective compared to untied aid (Clay, Geddes and
Nattali, 2009). While the percentage of untied bilateral aid from DAC members has
grown from 72% in 2008 to 79% in 2012, there is still much improvement to be made
in terms of untying aid (OECD and UNDP, 2014).
Alternatively, many past studies have demonstrated that multilateral aid agencies
are devoid of the geopolitical motivations that plague bilateral aid agencies. Begin-
ning with the study by Alfred Maizels (1984), studies of multilateral aid allocation
have highlighted that the primary motivating factor for these agencies is recipient
need. This has been expanded upon by Burnside and Dollar (2000), who find that
multilateral aid is allocated more to poorer countries, as well as those with better
policy environments. Other studies have shown that multilateral aid allocations also
consider issues of corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002), institutional quality (Dollar
and Levin, 2006), and human rights (Neumayer, 2003) in an effort to ensure that
their aid is truly being used to promote development. A recent field experiment in
Uganda has even shown that individuals prefer multilateral aid, as it they believe
it to be less polarized and more transparent than bilateral aid (Milner, Nielson and
Findley, 2013).
To demonstrate this argument further, I examine the goals of forty-four multi-
lateral aid agencies. In order to do this, I relied on the stated missions or purposes
of the agencies, as articulated in their charters or (if unavailable) described on their
website. The results are presented in Table 3.1. These statements, which are writ-
ten and agreed upon by founding donor governments, all stress the importance of
addressing development concerns. While some agencies focus on development in a
broad sense, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), others
focus on development within a specific issue area, such as the WHO. Regardless of
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their level of concentration, the overarching theme of multilateral is to help pro-
mote development. This evidence clearly shows that multilateral aid agencies are
developmentally oriented.
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Compounding the benefits that politically neutral aid provides, Rodrik (1996)
argues that the development motivation that underlies multilateral aid organizations
enables them to extract policy concessions or changes from recipients that would be
unsuccessful if pursued by bilateral aid agencies. According to Rodrik (1996), if the
recipient observes the multilateral agency as being politically neutral, they are less
likely to suspect it of promoting an ulterior motive. Indeed, the political neutrality
of these agencies, and the legitimacy that this lends to their aid donation policies, is
one of the key benefits provided by multilateral aid agencies (OECD, 2013). This is
especially important in light of rising donations from new aid donors, such as China,
Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and others, as there is widespread concern that many of
these new donors will support rogue political regimes, harm the environment, and
ignore conditions of good governance (Woods, 2008). These donors generally do
not demand the same conditionality constraints that other donors do, which may
persuade recipients to accept aid from these new donors over traditional bilateral
aid donors. Being politically neutral, multilateral aid donors offer a solution to this
problem.
Table 3.1: Agency Mission Statements
Agency Mission
African Development Bank The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the
sustainable economic development and social progress
of its regional members individually and jointly.
African Development Fund The purpose of the Fund shall be to assist the Bank
in making an increasingly effective contribution to the
economic and social development of the Bank’s mem-
bers and to the promotion of co-operation (including
regional and sub-regional co-operation) and increased
international trade, particularly among such members.
It shall provide finance on concessional terms for pur-
poses which are of primary importance for and serve
such development.
Arab Bank for Economic
Development in Africa
The objective of the Bank is to foster economic, finan-
cial and technical cooperation between African coun-
tries and Arab World countries. To achieve this objec-
tive, the Bank shall: (i) Participate in financing eco-
nomic development in African countries; (ii) Stimulate
the contribution of Arab capital in African Develop-
ment; (iii) Participate in providing the technical assis-
tance required for development in Africa.
Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development
The Fund shall contribute to the financing of economic
and social development projects in the Arab states and
countries.
Asian Development Bank The purpose of the Bank shall be to foster economic
growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the
Far East (hereinafter referred to as the ”region”) and
to contribute to the acceleration of the process of eco-
nomic development of the developing member coun-
tries in the region, collectively and individually.
Asian Development Bank
Special Funds
The purpose of the Bank shall be to foster economic
growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the
Far East (hereinafter referred to as the ”region”) and
to contribute to the acceleration of the process of eco-
nomic development of the developing member coun-
tries in the region, collectively and individually.
Caribbean Development
Bank
CDB intends to be the leading catalyst for develop-
ment resources into the Region, working in an efficient,
responsive and collaborative manner with our BMCs
and other development partners, towards the system-
atic reduction of poverty in their countries through
social and economic development.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
Central American Bank for
Economic Integration
The Bank’s objective shall be to promote the economic
integration and the balanced economic and social de-
velopment of the founding countries...
European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development
In contributing to economic progress and reconstruc-
tion, the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the
transition towards open market-oriented economies
and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative
in the Central and Eastern European countries com-
mitted to and applying the principles of multiparty
democracy, pluralism and market economics...
European Commission The Commission’s main roles are to: propose legis-
lation which is then adopted by the co-legislators, the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers; en-
force European law (where necessary with the help of
the Court of Justice of the EU); set a objectives and
priorities for action, outlined yearly in the Commission
Work Programme and work towards delivering them;
manage and implement EU policies and the budget;
represent the Union outside Europe (negotiating trade
agreements between the EU and other countries, for
example.).
European Development
Fund
The EDF funds cooperation activities in the fields of
economic development, social and human development
as well as regional cooperation and integration.
European Investment Bank We support projects that make a significant contribu-
tion to growth and employment in Europe. As part of
our counter-cyclical approach, our activities focus on
four priority areas: innovation and skills; access to fi-
nance for smaller businesses; climate action; strategic
infrastructure.
Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the UN
...for the purpose of: raising levels of nutrition and
standards of living of the peoples under their respective
jurisdictions; securing improvements in the efficiency
of the production and distribution of all food and agri-
cultural products; bettering the condition of rural pop-
ulations; and thus contributing towards an expanding
world economy and ensuring humanity’s freedom from
hunger.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
Global Alliance for Vac-
cines and Immunizations
The purpose of the GAVI Alliance is to promote health
by: (i) providing vaccines and the means to deliver
such vaccines to people in the poorest countries; (ii)
facilitating the research and development of vaccines
of primary interest to the developing world; and (iii) to
provide support in connection with achieving the fore-
going purposes by helping to strengthen health care
systems and civil societies supporting such purposes
in the developing world.
Global Environment Facil-
ity
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) addresses
global environmental issues while supporting national
sustainable development initiatives.
Global Fund The purpose of the Global Fund is to attract, manage
and disburse resources that will make a sustainable
and significant contribution to the reduction of infec-
tions, illness and death, thereby mitigating the im-
pact caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
in countries in need, and contributing to poverty re-
duction as part of the Millennium Development Goals
established by the United Nations.
Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank Special
Fund
The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the
acceleration of the process of economic and social de-
velopment of the regional developing member coun-
tries, individually and collectively.
Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank
The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the
acceleration of the process of economic and social de-
velopment of the regional developing member coun-
tries, individually and collectively.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
International Fund for
Agricultural Development
The objective of the Fund shall be to mobilize ad-
ditional resources to be made available on conces-
sional terms for agricultural development in developing
Member States. In fulfilling this objective the Fund
shall provide financing primarily for projects and pro-
grammes specifically designed to introduce, expand or
improve food production systems and to strengthen
related policies and institutions within the framework
of national priorities and strategies, taking into con-
sideration: the need to increase food production in the
poorest food deficit countries; the potential for increas-
ing food production in other developing countries; and
the importance of improving the nutritional level of
the poorest populations in developing countries and
the conditions of their lives.
International Bank for Re-
construction and Develop-
ment
The purposes of the Bank are: (i) To assist in
the reconstruction and development of territories of
members by facilitating the investment of capital
for productive purposes, including the restoration of
economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the recon-
version of productive facilities to peacetime needs and
the encouragement of the development of productive
facilities and resources in less developed countries...
International Development
Association
The purposes of the Association are to promote eco-
nomic development, increase productivity and thus
raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of
the world included within the Association’s member-
ship, in particular by providing finance to meet their
important developmental requirements on terms which
are more flexible and bear less heavily on the balance
of payments than those of conventional loans...
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
International Development
Association - Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative
The objective of the Initiative is to provide additional
support to HIPCs to reach the MDGs while ensuring
that the financing capacity of the IFIs is preserved.
Debt relief to be provided under the MDRI will be in
addition to existing debt relief commitments by IDA
and other creditors under the Enhanced HIPC Debt
Initiative. The MDRI provides a framework that com-
mits to achieve two objectives: deepening debt relief
to HIPCs while safeguarding the longterm financial ca-
pacity of IDA and the AfDF; and encouraging the best
use of additional donor resources for development by
allocating them to low income countries on the basis
of policy performance.
International Finance Cor-
poration
The purpose of the Corporation is to further economic
development by encouraging the growth of productive
private enterprise in member countries, particularly in
the less developed areas, thus supplementing the activ-
ities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (hereinafter called the Bank).
International Labor Orga-
nization
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is de-
voted to promoting social justice and internation-
ally recognized human and labour rights, pursuing its
founding mission that labour peace is essential to pros-
perity. Today, the ILO helps advance the creation of
decent work and the economic and working conditions
that give working people and business people a stake
in lasting peace, prosperity and progress. Its tripar-
tite structure provides a unique platform for promot-
ing decent work for all women and men. Its main aims
are to promote rights at work, encourage decent em-
ployment opportunities, enhance social protection and
strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
International Monetary
Fund (Concessional Trust
Funds)
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation
through a permanent institution which provides the
machinery for consultation and collaboration on in-
ternational monetary problems; (ii) To facilitate the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade,
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and main-
tenance of high levels of employment and real income
and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy;
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly
exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid
competitive exchange depreciation; (iv) To assist in
the establishment of a multilateral system of payments
in respect of current transactions between members
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade; (v) To give
confidence to members by making the general resources
of the Fund temporarily available to them under ad-
equate safeguards, thus providing them with oppor-
tunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of
payments without resorting to measures destructive of
national or international prosperity; (vi) In accordance
with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances
of payments of members.
Islamic Development Bank The purpose of the Islamic Development Bank (here-
inafter called the Bank), shall be to foster economic
development and social progress of member countries
and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly
in accordance with the principles of the Shari’ah.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
Joint United Nations Pro-
gramme on HIV/AIDS
UNAIDS is an innovative United Nations partnership
that leads and inspires the world in achieving universal
access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support.
UNAIDS fulfills its mission by: Uniting the efforts of
United Nations Cosponsors, civil society, national gov-
ernments, the private sector, global institutions and
people living with and most affected by HIV; Speak-
ing out in solidarity with the people most affected by
HIV in defense of human dignity, human rights and
gender equality; Mobilizing political, technical, scien-
tific and financial resources and holding ourselves and
others accountable for results; Empowering agents of
change with strategic information and evidence to in-
fluence and ensure that resources are targeted where
they deliver the greatest impact; and Supporting in-
clusive country leadership for comprehensive and sus-
tainable responses that are integral to and integrated
with national health and development efforts.
Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency
The objective of the Agency shall be to encourage
the flow of investments for productive purposes among
member countries, and in particular to developing
member countries, thus supplementing the activities
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (hereinafter referred to as the Bank), the
International Finance Corporation and other interna-
tional development finance institutions.
Nordic Development Fund The Nordic Development Fund (NDF) is the joint de-
velopment finance institution of the five Nordic coun-
tries. The objective of NDF’s operations is to facilitate
climate change investments in low-income countries.
OPEC Fund for Interna-
tional Development
The objective of the Fund is to reinforce financial coop-
eration between OPEC Member Countries and other
developing countries by providing financial support to
assist the latter countries on appropriate terms in their
economic and social development efforts.
Office of the Commissioner
for Human Rights
The mission of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is to work
for the protection of all human rights for all people;
to help empower people to realize their rights; and to
assist those responsible for upholding such rights in
ensuring that they are implemented.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe
The OSCE’s comprehensive view of security covers
three ?dimensions?: the politico-military; the eco-
nomic and environmental; and the human. The
OSCE’s activities cover all three of these areas, from
”hard” security issues such as conflict prevention to
fostering economic development, ensuring the sustain-
able use of natural resources, and promoting the full
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations
United Nations Peacekeeping helps countries torn by
conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. We are
comprised of civilian, police and military personnel...In
addition to maintaining peace and security, peacekeep-
ers are increasingly charged with assisting in political
processes; reforming judicial systems; training law en-
forcement and police forces; disarming and reintegrat-
ing former combatants; supporting the return of inter-
nally displaced persons and refugees.
UN Economic and Social
Council
ECOSOC, one of the six main organs of the United
Nations established by the UN Charter in 1946, is the
principal body for coordination, policy review, pol-
icy dialogue and recommendations on economic, social
and environmental issues, as well as for implementa-
tion of the internationally agreed development goals.
UN Office for the Coordi-
nation of Humanitarian Af-
fairs
OCHA’s mission is to: Mobilize and coordinate effec-
tive and principled humanitarian action in partnership
with national and international actors in order to al-
leviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.
Advocate the rights of people in need. Promote pre-
paredness and prevention. Facilitate sustainable solu-
tions.
United Nations Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo
Pooled Fund
The Democratic Republic of the Congo Pooled Fund
(DRCPF) is a pooled funding mechanism established
in 2006 for humanitarian activities in the DRC. Under
the overall authority of the Humanitarian Coordinator
(HC) for the DRC, the DRCPF is intended to give the
HC greater ability to target funds to the most crit-
ical humanitarian needs, encourage early donor con-
tributions and enable a rapid response to unforeseen
circumstances.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
United Nations Develop-
ment Program
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) is the UN’s global development network,
advocating for change and connecting countries to
knowledge, experience and resources to help people
build a better life.We are on the ground in 177 coun-
tries and territories, supporting their own solutions to
development challenges and developing national and
local capacities that will help them achieve human
development and the Millennium Development Goals.
Our work is concentrated on four main focus areas:
Poverty Reduction and Achievement of the MDGs;
Democratic Governance; Crisis Prevention and Re-
covery; Environment and Energy for Sustainable
Development. UNDP helps countries attract and use
aid effectively. In all our activities, we promote the
protection of human rights and the empowerment of
women.
United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) as a multilateral platform facilitates greater
economic integration and cooperation among its fifty-
six member States and promotes sustainable develop-
ment and economic prosperity through: policy dia-
logue, negotiation of international legal instruments,
development of regulations and norms, exchange and
application of best practices as well as economic and
technical expertise, technical cooperation for countries
with economies in transition. The UNECE contributes
to enhancing the effectiveness of the UN through the
regional implementation of outcomes of global UN
Conferences and Summits. Its terms of reference have
been defined by ECOSOC.
United Nations Interna-
tional Children’s Emer-
gency Fund
UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to advocate for the protection of chil-
dren’s rights, to help meet their basic needs and to ex-
pand their opportunities to reach their full potential.
UNICEF is guided by the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and strives to establish children’s rights as
enduring ethical principles and international standards
of behaviour towards children.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
United Nations Peace-
building Fund
...the following shall be the main purposes of the Com-
mission: (a) To bring together all relevant actors to
marshal resources and to advise on and propose in-
tegrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and
recovery; (b) To focus attention on the reconstruction
and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery
from conflict and to support the development of in-
tegrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for
sustainable development; (c) To provide recommenda-
tions and information to improve the coordination of
all relevant actors within and outside the United Na-
tions, to develop best practices, to help to ensure pre-
dictable financing for early recovery activities and to
extend the period of attention given by the interna-
tional community to post conflict recovery...
United Nations Population
Fund
The mandate of the UNFPA is (1) to build the knowl-
edge and the capacity to respond to needs in popu-
lation and family planning; (2) to promote awareness
in both developed and developing countries of pop-
ulation problems and possible strategies to deal with
these problems; (3) to assist their population problems
in the forms and means best suited to the individual
countries’ needs; (4) to assume a leading role in the
United Nations system in promoting population pro-
grammes, and to coordinate projects supported by the
Fund.
United Nations Relief and
Words Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near
East
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA
was established by United Nations General Assem-
bly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry
out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine
refugees...The Agency?s services encompass education,
health care, relief and social services, camp infrastruc-
ture and improvement, micro-finance and emergency
assistance, including in times of armed conflict.
World Food Programme The purposes of WFP are: (a) to use food aid to sup-
port economic and social development; (b) to meet
refugee and other emergency and protracted relief food
needs; (c) to promote world food security in accordance
with the recommendations of the United Nations and
FAO.
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Agency Mission
World Health Organization WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for
health within the United Nations system. It is respon-
sible for providing leadership on global health matters,
shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and
standards, articulating evidence-based policy options,
providing technical support to countries and monitor-
ing and assessing health trends.
Sources: Excerpts from agency documents. For each agency, the primary source
consulted was its charter. If the charter was not found, I examined other sources,
including agency websites and other agency documents.
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It is important to emphasize that my argument here does not assume that bilat-
eral aid is completely ineffective at promoting development. Indeed several studies
have demonstrated that bilateral aid has, under certain conditions, been success-
ful (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Radelet, 2006; Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray,
2005; Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004; Winters, 2010). However, if the primary
purpose of bilateral aid is to promote donor interests, then it is less likely that de-
velopment will be achieved as effectively or efficiently compared to instances when
aid is given primarily for developmental purposes. Aid given for geopolitical reasons
has often been found to provide little benefit for development, as it is likely to be
diverted to corrupt leaders, consumed by the government, or targeted towards donor
firms. Thus, even if bilateral aid does at times succeed in increasing economic growth
or improving quality of life in recipient countries, we can assume that had a greater
portion of it been given for developmental purposes, the results would have been
even more substantial.
In light of these arguments, I expect multilateral aid will be more effective at
promoting development because it is more likely to be motivated by development
concerns than bilateral aid. As such, multilateral aid is expected to “select” itself
into good developmental environments and therefore produce more effective aid. It
is also possible, however, that multilateral aid may be just as ineffective as bilateral
aid. In fact, several studies have suggested that despite the logic that multilateral aid
agencies should promote development, they are actually ineffective, or even possibly
even detrimental to development (Ram, 2003, 2004; Vreeland, 2003). If this is true,
then it suggests problems in the allocation policies of multilateral aid agencies, such as
the conditions it attaches to aid are too stringent and are actually harming recipient
economies. This is the argument advanced by Vreeland (2003) in his critique of
the IMF. However, despite these potential problems, I expect that multilateral aid
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in general to be more effective at promoting development because of its political
neutrality. I state this expectation formally in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 Multilateral aid will be more effective than bilateral aid because it is
more likely to be given without geopolitical motivations.
If confirmed, Hypothesis 1 would provide strong evidence that the best way to elim-
inate the political biases of aid is to channel more funding through multilateral
agencies. On the other hand, evidence that multilateral aid is no more effective than
bilateral aid poses a serious question as to the utility of such agencies.
3.2.2 Who Specializes?
The second reason that multilateral aid should be more effective than bilateral
aid is that it is more likely to be specialized. This expectation has been substantiated
by past research. A 2011 OECD Report on Division of Labor, for instance, examined
significant aid relationships among 23 DAC countries and 23 multilateral agencies
in 2009. Significant aid relationships are defined as either the donor providing a
higher share of aid to the recipient than its overall share of global aid, or the donor
being one of the larger donors in the recipient that cumulatively account for more
than 90% of the recipient’s total aid (4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,
2011, pp. 5-6). The report found that 45% of bilateral aid relationships with partner
countries were non-significant, compared to 34% of multilateral aid relationships (4th
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011). However, when using both criteria in
conjunction to define a significant aid relationship, multilateral agencies are ranked
lower than bilateral agencies. The best multilateral aid donors were the IDB, UN
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the
Caribbean Development Bank (CarDB). Another study of 21 bilateral aid agencies
and 8 multilateral agencies from 2005 to 2009 found little difference between bilateral
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and multilateral fragmentation levels, though this may be in part due to a smaller
sample than the previous study (Bu¨rcky, 2011). In this case, the author examined
the number of countries and sectors each donor was active in, as well as the size of
their donations to each recipient.
Two academic studies by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson
(2011) use similar approaches to examine the aid practices of bilateral and multilat-
eral aid agencies.4 In these studies, the authors use the Herfindahl index to measure
agency specialization in terms of both recipients and sectors. The studies find that
for bilateral aid agencies, “fragmentation is rampant,” both in terms of aid recipi-
ents and development sectors (Easterly and Williamson, 2011, p. 1936). This lack of
specialization is even true for relatively small bilateral donors, such as Luxembourg,
Ireland, and Belgium, who would be most likely to benefit from the reduced trans-
action and overhead costs of specialization. In regards to multilateral aid agencies,
the authors of both studies find somewhat mixed results. Overall, multilateral aid
agencies have higher Herfindahl scores compared to bilateral aid agencies, indicating
that they are more specialized. However, overall these specialization levels are still
quite low. For example, the average sector Herfindahl score for bilateral aid agencies
is 0.10, but is 0.29 for multilateral aid agencies and 0.50 for UN agencies (Easterly
and Williamson, 2011, p. 1936). Both studies also found that multilateral agen-
cies designed to address specific geographical regions, specifically the UNRWA and
the regional development banks, distributed less fragmented aid. In fact, Easterly
and Pfutze (2008) find that several regional development banks (the International
Development Agency (IDA), AfDB, AsDB, and IDB) have some of the best overall
4It is worth noting that the studies of Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson
(2011) are interested in aid practices rather than aid effectiveness. The authors also emphasize the
poor quality of the available data on each of the measures they study, and therefore caution that
their results must be interpreted carefully.
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practices of all aid agencies. The authors evaluated these agencies on measures of
fragmentation, as well as selectivity, ineffective channels, overhead, and transparency.
The four multilateral development banks mentioned before rank in the top five of
all aid agencies. In regards to sectoral specialization, the studies find less positive
support for the argument that multilateral aid agencies are more specialized than
bilateral aid agencies. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) find that bilateral aid is actually
better than multilateral aid, although neither of these groups perform very well.
Meanwhile, Easterly and Williamson (2011) find that multilateral aid agencies de-
signed to focus on a specific sector are better at providing specialized aid. Agencies
such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the Global Fund, the Joint United Na-
tions Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the Nordic Development Fund have
high Herfindahl scores in regards to their allocation sector aid. Several multilateral
aid agencies that are not specialized, however, do not score as well. In fact, multiple
UN agencies have some of the lowest Herfindahl scores of all aid agencies. Despite
the low scores of the UN agencies, according to the study by Easterly and Williamson
(2011), multilateral aid remains aggregately more specialized compared to bilateral
aid, although the authors find that neither of these groups is nearly as specialized as
they could be.
Other studies have compared bilateral and multilateral aid fragmentation levels
over time. In an OECD study of aid fragmentation, Frot and Santiso (2008) demon-
strate with the Herfindahl Index that aid donors have become much more fragmented
over time. Bilateral aid in particular, is highly fragmented, although multilateral aid
has also become more fragmented over time. With regard to multilateral aid agen-
cies, however, the authors state that there is widespread variation. Some multilateral
agencies, such as the UNRWA, Montreal Protocol, and CarDB are highly specialized
while others, such as the UNDP, UNTA, and UN Population Fund (UNFPA), are
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highly fragmented (Frot and Santiso, 2008, p.36). Expanding on this, Frot (2009)
investigates the relationship between aid fragmentation and the length of a donor-
recipient aid relationship. He finds that the longer an aid relationship has existed,
the greater share of aid the recipient receives from the donor. As a result, a large
part of the fragmentation that donors exhibit today is a consequence of adding new
recipients to their aid portfolios. These new recipients receive substantially smaller
portions of a donor’s budget, while recipients that entered into an aid relationship
early on continue to receive larger portions of the donor’s aid budget. Frot (2009)
establishes this relationship for DAC donors as well as multilateral aid agencies, and
finds that it is robust to the population size, income levels, and the colonial pasts
of recipient countries. Building on these previous studies, Frot and Santiso (2010)
examine fragmentation at the sector level, arguing that aggregate levels of fragmen-
tation at the recipient level do not accurately reflect actual fragmentation levels.
While a donor may appear to be highly fragmented in terms of its recipients, it may
contribute a large portion of its aid to a particular sector in a recipient country.
Additionally, by examining fragmentation on a sector level, the authors are able to
provide a more detailed picture as to exactly how donors need to coordinate their aid
efforts. Frot and Santiso (2010) find that donors have shifted their spending from
economic and production sectors to social sectors. Their study does not, however,
expand their findings to discuss changes in sectoral allocation based on agency type.
If we first consider the motivations and process of creating a multilateral aid
agency, the fact that they are more specialized than bilateral aid agencies should not
be surprising. When creating any international organization, states are addressing
collective action issues that they cannot resolve on their own. These organizations
are therefore created to address a particular concern that states have. Their purpose
may be to protect human rights, promote trade, or coordinate financial arrangements.
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Regardless of which issue they are designed around, the entire raison d’tre for the
organization is to address this particular issue. As a result, from their very incep-
tion, these organizations are specialized and have a clear, focused goal. For example,
the objective of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to promote global trade,
the objective of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is to pursue transnational
justice, and the objective of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)
is to promote and monitor the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Within the foreign
aid community, regional development banks and sector specific agencies all have nar-
row objectives they have been designed to achieve. The AfDB, for instance, focuses
specifically on development concerns within Africa, while the WHO is a global leader
on health issues. Not all multilateral aid agencies, however, are aid specialists. In-
deed, many multilateral agencies are aid generalists, designed to address development
in a broad sense. The UNDP is one such agency. The UNDP has four main areas
that it concentrates on in order to promote global development: poverty reduction,
democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and the environment and en-
ergy for sustainable development. In another example, the objectives of the World
Bank agencies, including the International Development Association (IDA) are to,
“...promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of
living in the less-developed areas of the world...” While these multilateral aid gen-
eralists are still addressing development concerns, they are not focused on a specific
region or sector.
In contrast to multilateral aid agencies, bilateral aid agencies will mostly consist
of aid generalists for two main reasons. The first is that these agencies are simply not
designed to target aid to a specific recipient, region, or sector in the same way that
some multilateral aid agencies are. That is, when these organizations were created,
they were not designed to be specialized. Instead, they are meant to focus on devel-
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opment in a broad sense by distributing aid across multiple sectors and recipients,
while simultaneously complimenting domestic foreign policy. This is exemplified in
the statement by USAID that, “USAID carries out U.S. foreign policy by promoting
broad-scale human progress at the same time it expands stable, free societies, cre-
ates markets and trade partners for the United States, and fosters good will abroad.”
With such a sweeping mandate, including goals of promoting democracy and human
rights, securing trading partners and key strategic allies, along with promoting devel-
opment, USAID is not well suited to focus on any single sector or recipient. The same
can be said of other bilateral aid agencies. The United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development (DFID), for example, is committed to improving develop-
ment, supporting the MDGs, increasing transparency, strengthening governance in
fragile states, improving the lives of women and girls, and promoting climate change.
Any move by the agency to become specialized, would therefore be contrary to their
intended purpose.
The second reason that bilateral aid is unlikely to specialize can be found in their
incentive structures. Even though bilateral aid agencies are not designed to be aid
specialists, it is possible that they may evolve and become specialists in response
to increasing demands from the intentional aid community. Sweden for example,
announced in 2007 that it would cut its number of aid recipients in half as a response
to growing international concerns of aid fragmentation (Frot and Santiso, 2008).
Australia and Japan are also known to be more geographically specialized aid donors
(Frot and Santiso, 2008). However, the majority of the time, such responsiveness of
a bilateral aid agency is unlikely to occur due to the pressure it receives from the
government to use aid to bolster foreign geopolitical interests. Additionally, bilateral
aid agencies must also respond to lobbying pressures from firms and interest groups,
who want aid to be targeted towards certain industries or issue areas. As a result,
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rather than focusing their activities on any one recipient or one sector, bilateral
donors consistently distribute highly fragmented aid, as this type of aid spending
reflects the overall preferences of their government and its constituents. This type
of behavior has been described by the World Bank as donors wanting to “plant
their flags,” in recipient countries (World Bank, 1998, p. 26). Essentially, it is
in the political and economic interests of bilateral donors to have a wide array of
aid programs in multiple recipients (Easterly and Williamson, 2011). As a result,
because multilateral aid agencies are more specialized than bilateral aid agencies, I
expect them to be more effective at promoting development, as stated in Hypothesis
2.
Hypothesis 2 Multilateral aid will be more effective than bilateral aid because it is
more specialized.
While past research indicates that specialization differences may be attributable
to agency type, they have also emphasized that specialization levels in general are
quite poor. Tracking trends in aid fragmentation patterns since the Paris Declara-
tion in 2005, the 2009 and 2011 OECD Reports on Division of Labor show little
improvement in the global trend of aid fragmentation (OECD, 2008, 2009; 4th High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011). If multilateral agencies are indeed more
specialized, this provides a strong policy prescription in that more aid should be
channelled through multilateral aid agencies. In this way, the aid community would
be able to able to distribute more effective aid funds, given the expected benefits of
specialized aid agencies.
3.3 Comparing within Multilateral Aid Agencies
Below, I apply my general theory of organizational effectiveness to my second
research question: What organizational factors make some multilateral aid agencies
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more effective than others? Past studies of aid effectiveness have rarely examined
multilateral aid agencies exclusively, and none have examined how differences within
this diverse group of organizations affect the outcomes they produce. Thus, the
primary goal here is to develop a theorize an effective multilateral aid agency. I argue
that specialized and autonomous multilateral agencies are more likely to promote
development compared to agencies that are not specialized and that lack autonomy.
I discuss each of these two arguments in more detail below.
3.3.1 Specialized Multilateral Agencies
The first factor that I argue will enhance multilateral aid effectiveness is spe-
cialization. As discussed above, specialization is important for development because
it allows the agency to devote a greater amount of resources to each of their tar-
gets, reduces transaction costs, and increases the knowledge and expertise of the
agency. Applying this argument to multilateral aid agencies exclusively is therefore
very straightforward: multilateral aid agencies with greater levels of specialization
will be more effective at promoting development than those with lower levels of
specialization. I state this expectation formally as Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3 Multilateral aid agencies that are specialized will be more effective
than multilateral agencies that are not specialized.
Differentiating among multilateral aid agencies in this manner highlights two main
points. The first is that even when comparing bilateral and multilateral aid agen-
cies, it is important to recognize that multilateral agencies are comprised of a large
and diverse set of organizations. By investigating the specialization levels among
multilateral aid agencies, I am able to provide a richer theory with regard to the
effective characteristics of an aid agency. Second, the ways in which multilateral aid
agencies specialize also varies substantially. Some focus their attention on a specific
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sector, while others concentrate on certain geographical areas. Examining how these
differences in specialization affect development will once again provide a deeper un-
derstanding of the nature of multilateral aid agencies, and the policies that are best
for effective development.
3.3.2 Autonomous Multilateral Aid Agencies
The second factor that will enhance multilateral aid effectiveness is the autonomy
of the agency. While political neutrality and specialization are key factors that con-
tribute to agency effectiveness, it is important to recognize that multilateral agencies
are, at their core, created by, and ultimately held accountable to donor governments.
As a result, the agency’s decisions as to where, when, and how to distribute their aid,
and thus ultimately their effectiveness, are dependent on their autonomy from donor
governments. While previous studies have examined when donor governments will
contribute to multilateral aid agencies (McLean, 2012; Schneider and Tobin, 2013),
as well as donor attempts to control agency behavior (Nielson and Tierney, 2003;
Buntaine, 2014; Vreeland, 2007), my contribution here is to highlight how auton-
omy is also a key factor in terms of agency effectiveness. Essentially, the ability of
the multilateral agency to pursue independent aid policies that reflect their political
neutrality and specialization is influenced by their relationship with their principals.
In particular, the preferences of both the multilateral agency and the donor govern-
ment determines how each actor ideally want the agency to spend its funds. Once the
donor government has delegated to a multilateral agency, autonomy determines the
agency’s ability pursue their own preferences. To examine the impact of autonomy,
we must therefore first account for the preferences of both actors regarding the use of
multilateral foreign aid. Here, I examine how the preferences of donor governments
and aid agencies interact along with autonomy to influence multilateral aid policies.
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I first discuss the preferences of donor government and multilateral aid agencies. I
then examine how the interactions of these preferences impact multilateral agency
policies according to varying levels of autonomy. While my primary focus here is on
establishing that a preference disjuncture exists between bilateral and multilateral
aid agencies, the ultimate impact of this disjuncture on agency policies is manifested
by the fact that multilateral agencies are responsible to multiple principals. I address
this in more detail in Section 5, which focuses on measuring agency autonomy.
3.3.2.1 Donor Preferences
What are the preferences of donor governments regarding multilateral aid spend-
ing? Examining past behavior suggests that an apparent contradiction exists between
donor preferences. On the one hand, donor governments consistently use their bi-
lateral aid as a foreign policy tool to help promote their domestic geopolitical and
commercial interests (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007,
2009; Tierney et al., 2011; Radelet, 2006; Younas, 2008; Lundsgaarde, Breunig and
Prakash, 2010). At the same time, however, donor governments create multilateral
aid agencies with the stated purposes of addressing critical development concerns.
How are we to reconcile these seemingly contradictory behaviors? There are three
potential answers to this question. The first is that governments are motivated to
promote development, but are unable to commit to such policies due to issues of
time inconsistency. They therefore delegate to multilateral aid agencies as a way to
lock in developmental aid policies that may come under public scrutiny or be altered
by future governments. The second is that governments are not interested in devel-
opment goals at all, and instead are merely using multilateral aid agencies as a form
of cheap talk, while simultaneously trying to undermine the developmental nature of
these organizations by using them to pursue their own domestic interests. The third
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is that multilateral aid agencies provide donor governments with an opportunity ad-
vance development goals as well their own geopolitical interests. I expand upon each
of these possibilities below.
The first potential preference of donor governments regarding multilateral aid
spending is that they genuinely prefer that aid be used to address development con-
cerns. However, knowing that domestic political constraints, such as special interest
groups, will resist government efforts to use bilateral aid solely for development pur-
poses, the government cannot be sure that its bilateral aid will not be used for
development purposes. The solution is for donor governments to use multilateral aid
agencies as credible commitment mechanisms. Rather than spending aid bilaterally,
the donor government instead allocates it to an agency which is known to have devel-
opment as their primary goal, thereby locking in their preference for developmental
aid programs. The problem is essentially that the government has a time-inconsistent
problem, in that they may currently prefer to distribute aid to promote development,
but they are unable to commit to these preferences over a longer time horizon. Sim-
ilar time inconsistency issues have been discussed widely in the context of domestic
monetary policy. Kydland and Prescott (1977) describe the problem in that the
optimal policy of lowering inflation is unlikely to be achieved, due to time inconsis-
tent preferences of the government. In this case, the government has a long term
objective to keep inflation low. At the same time however, the government also has
a short term objective to maintain lower levels of unemployment, in order to ap-
pease the public. Rational economic agents (labor and the firm) are knowledgable
of this discrepancy, and they incorporate the government’s expected inflation level
into their wage bargaining contract (Barro and Gordon, 1983a). This leads to in-
flation rates that are excessively high, forcing the government to use expansionary
monetary policy in order to promote economic growth (Barro and Gordon, 1983b).
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The result is that although the government prefers to maintain lower inflation rates,
rational economic actors are able to capitalize on the fact that governments also
have short term objectives of maintaining political office. While Barro and Gordon
(1983b) argue that government reputation can potentially mitigate this effect, Rogoff
(1985) describes how an independent central bank can help promote stable monetary
policy, as they will not be influenced by similar time inconsistency issues. Thus, by
delegating power to a third party, the government is able to insulate itself from this
time inconsistency problem.
International organizations are often utilized in manner similar to central banks,
allowing states to commit themselves to policies that may not be in their future inter-
ests (Fearon, 1997). For example, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) describe the
usefulness of international organizations in tying states hands for dispute resolution
mechanisms in international investment treaties. Bernhard, Broz and Clark (2002)
make an analogous argument in the context of exchange rates, as do Simmons and
Danner (2010) for the creation of the ICC. Milner (2006) applies credible commitment
theory to multilateral aid agencies, and describes how they provide a way for govern-
ments to signal that they are pursuing developmentally oriented aid policies. In her
study, Milner (2006) argues that governments allocate to multilateral aid agencies
as a way to signal to the public that they are in fact pursuing economic develop-
ment, rather than strategic interests. In doing so, governments are able to maintain
higher overall aid budgets. While Milner (2006) assumes that governments are pri-
marily interested in using aid for strategic purposes and use multilateral agencies
to facilitate their strategic spending, this does not always have to be true. Govern-
ments could instead be genuinely committed to promoting development, but fearful
that future governments may have different preferences. They therefore delegate to
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these agencies as a way to lock-in developmentally oriented goals, much the same as
governments delegate to an independent central bank to lock-in monetary policy.
The second possibility is that states are not genuinely committed to multilateral
aid agencies only pursuing developmentally oriented goals. In this case, delegating
to multilateral aid agencies can be seen as a form of “cheap talk.” As has been con-
sistently demonstrated by previous studies, national governments utilize their own
bilateral aid in order to further their domestic geopolitical and commercial inter-
ests. Past studies have also shown that this domestic self-interest seems suffuse the
principal-agent relationship in multilateral aid agencies. For example, some argue
that the creation of the AsDB in 1966 was motivated by a Japanese interest in its
less developed neighbors as potential trading partners and sources of raw materials
(Hicks et al., 2010), while the U.S. hoped to use the AsDB to support its military
in Vietnam (Kappagoda, 1995). Agencies such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are replete with anecdotes of donors pressuring and manipulating agencies
to adhere to their interests rather than established agency goals and policies. Vree-
land (2007) even argues that in order for the IMF to truly advance development,
its Executive Board needs to be insulated from political pressures. He states that,
“If the governance of the IMF is freed from pursuing foreign policy objectives, the
institution might be able to function more closely to its mandate” (Vreeland, 2007,
p. 136). Similarly, Stone (2008) describes how the U.S. can use its preponderance of
power within the IMF to “capture” the organization and manipulate conditionality
programs to suit its strategic interests during times of crisis in politically important
recipient countries, which undermines the long-term goals of the organization. In a
study of three multilateral development banks, Humphrey (2014) describes how the
composition of the agency in terms of borrowers and non-borrowers strongly influ-
ences the interest rates that are attached to these loans. Humphrey (2014) finds that
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the IDB, which is balanced between borrowers and non-borrowers, and the Andean
Development Corporation (CAF), which is controlled by borrowers, offer cheaper
loans compared to the World Bank, which is controlled by non-borrowers. Despite
being the largest development bank of the three, the World Bank sets higher interest
rates in order to boost their income and protect the interests of their donor states.
Thus, even though the World Bank has the potential to offer more developmen-
tally oriented loans than the other two development banks because it is wealthier, it
chooses not to do so because of the constraints imposed on it by its principals.
A third possibility is that donor governments prefer multilateral aid agencies
serve both functions. In this case, donors use multilateral agencies in order to satisfy
their dual desires of promoting development goals, as well as their own geopoliti-
cal interests. This blended view of donor preference for multilateral aid spending
reflects the motivations of the founding of the modern foreign aid regime. While
Lumsdaine (1993) argues that a sense of “humanitarian internationalism” was the
main driving force behind the Marshall Plan and subsequent aid programs, whereby
developed countries had a responsibility to assist those that were struggling with
poverty, others have argued that U.S. hegemony, the growing threat of communism,
and an acknowledgement of the potential domestic economic benefits foreign aid
would provide were also key motivations (Wood, 1986).5 From this viewpoint, donor
governments are not necessarily development adverse, nor are they entirely altruistic
in their motivations. Rather, their purposes are more complex. Donor governments
are supportive of development for the sake of alleviating poverty, but also recognize
the political and commercial benefits that development can provide, such as securing
military allies and gaining access to new trade partners.
5Lumsdaine (1993) disagrees with this, and continues to argue that each of these factors were
insufficient in explaining the foundation of the modern foreign aid regime. For more details on his
arguments, see Lumsdaine (1993, pp. 51-62).
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Having examined past studies of bilateral aid allocation, as well as attempts by
donor governments to influence multilateral aid policies in favor of their own domes-
tic interests, I argue that it is unlikely donor governments prefer that multilateral
aid agencies solely address development concerns. Instead, their preference is more
likely that these agencies pursue domestic interests in addition to addressing poverty.
While poverty concerns may have been a driving force for the creation of many mul-
tilateral agencies, as argued by Lumsdaine (1993), a substantial amount of evidence
suggests that donor governments have not maintained these altruistic motivations. It
is now common for donor governments to use foreign aid to support their own geopo-
litical and commercial interests, and given the many well-documented attempts of
donor governments to use multilateral aid in a similar manner, I conclude that their
preference is that multilateral aid be used in a similarly donor-oriented manner. This
is not to say that donor governments never want multilateral aid agencies to take
action relating to poverty, as in many cases they undoubtedly do. However, as de-
scribed in the credible commitment argument presented above, it is unlikely that
donor motives are able to remain altruistic for an extended period of time. I return
to this argument after discussing multilateral agency preferences.
3.3.2.2 Multilateral Preferences
What then are the preferences of multilateral agencies? While the above dis-
cussion indicates that donor governments have selfish, or at best, mixed motives
regarding multilateral aid spending, we must also ask if multilateral aid agencies
have variable preferences as well. According to Table 3.1, the charters and goals of
multilateral aid agencies are to promote development. This has been substantiated
by previous studies as well, which find that multilateral aid agencies generally provide
aid to poorer recipients and those with good political institutions (Alfred Maizels,
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1984; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Alesina and Weder, 2002).
This evidence suggests that a majority of the time, multilateral aid agencies act as
faithful agencies, and adhere to their mandates of addressing development concerns.
It is entirely possible however, for multilateral aid agencies to behave as unfaithful
agencies, acting in selfish ways that do not promote development. This argument
has long been made by public choice scholars, who argue that public officials act
according to their own self interests, rather than those of the public (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1967; William A. Niskanen, 1971). Elaborating on public
choice theory, Lowi (1979) as well as Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), describe how
bureaucrats are not necessarily irreproachable in that they only act to maximize
public goods. Instead, they can be highly opportunistic and, “may be motivated
as much by the desire to pursue their own policy goals, inflate their budgets, and
increase their scope of control as by their desire to follow congressional intent” (p.
8). It is therefore plausible that multilateral aid agencies are behaving in a similarly
unfaithful manner, by focusing on increasing their budget, staff, and influence, rather
than pursuing developmentally oriented goals. O¨hler and Nunnenkamp (2014), for
example, have sharply criticized multilateral aid agencies for being irresponsive to
issues of recipient need. William Easterly is also particularly vocal in his criticism of
multilateral aid agencies (and all aid agencies in general), equating them to “cartels”
that have “run amok” (Easterly, 2002).
The question then becomes: are multilateral agencies generally faithful or unfaith-
ful agencies? While acknowledging the problems that may accompany multilateral
aid agencies as described by Easterly (2002), I argue that these agencies are more
likely to be faithful rather than unfaithful agents. According to agency charters,
multilateral aid appears to strongly prefer that aid be spent on development. Al-
though this type of evidence does not necessarily imply that agencies are behaving
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according to their stated goals, it has been substantiated by multiple empirical stud-
ies of multilateral aid allocation. Furthermore, these statements also become highly
important if we consider that they are the metric against which agency behavior is
being evaluated, both internally by the agencies themselves, as well as externally by
donor governments and third parties. If we view multilateral aid agencies as indepen-
dent actors, as advocated by Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004), we should clearly
expect them to act in a manner that justifies their presence and demonstrates the
utility of their organization. Multilateral activities are therefore tailored to achieve
the goals set out in their mission statements. The annual reports of multilateral aid
agencies make clear references to their contributions. For example, the latest annual
report from the World Food Programme states that it provided food assistance to
80.9 million people across 75 countries, reduced or stabilized undernutrition for 7.2
million children under age 5, and goes on to highlight other agency achievements.
If multilateral aid agencies act contrary to their missions, they are not only acting
against their own interests, but they run the risk of losing donor funding, and being
openly criticized by their donors as well as by third parties. For example, in 2011
the United Kingdom ceased funding several multilateral organizations, citing prob-
lems of poor transparency and low “value for money” (Provost, 2013). In another
example, the World Bank faced a huge backlash from environmental NGOs against
several of its aid projects, which were seen as environmentally unsound (Hicks et al.,
2010). Given the strong stated preferences of multilateral aid agencies to promote
development, as well as the serious repercussions they potentially face if they deviate
from their mandates, I conclude that multilateral agencies generally prefer that they
spend their aid in a manner that addresses development concerns.
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3.3.2.3 Multilateral Aid Policies
The above two parts have established that a discrepancy exists between the pref-
erences of donor governments and multilateral aid agencies regarding the manner in
which multilateral aid funds should be used. While donor governments may at times
be motivated to address development concerns, they are also prone to trying to use
multilateral aid funds to secure geopolitical and commercial interests. Multilateral
agencies, on the other hand, are strongly oriented towards development. The result
is that a tension exists between the donor governments and the agencies. The result-
ing disjuncture between the government’s stated preferences for development and its
actual behavior is problematic because it sends a mixed message to the agency as to
what types of policies it should pursue. This is true even if the donor government
wants to use multilateral aid for dual purposes, since the stated mandates of the
agencies do not include references to the domestic political goals of their donors. Es-
sentially, there exists no internal incentive for the agency to pursue policies that do
not directly contribute to their mission. As a result, the expectations of the donor
government and the actions of the multilateral agency will be incongruent. How-
ever, while most of the literature on aligning principal-agent preferences focuses on
issues of agency slippage, whereby the agent is diverging from its mandates and the
stated preferences of its principals (McCubbins and Page, 1987), the exact opposite
is happening here. In this case, it is the principal, not the agent, who is ex post de-
viating from the initial contract, a concept I refer to as principal slippage. Although
donor governments establish aid agencies with the express purpose of addressing de-
velopment concerns, their actual preferences, whether altered over time by changing
political environments, or having been contrary to agency goals in the first place,
do not reflect those that they embedded in the agencies. By informally altering the
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agent’s mandate in this way, it is the donor government who has created drift.6 Gut-
ner (2005) voices this concern in his study of environmental aid, asking, “Yet what
if the problem comes from the delegation side, in the sense that the principals are
delegating tasks that do not easily conform to the institution’s mission and internal
incentive systems...?” (pp.20-21). A similar issue of principal slippage underlies the
relationship between governments and central banks. Although the bank is initially
created to help stabilize monetary policy, in times of economic downturn, the gov-
ernment would prefer that the bank pursue policies that directly counter its original
mandate (Rogoff, 1985). The trade-off is essentially one of short, versus long term
gains, much the same as that faced by donor governments in setting aid policy.
Given this disjuncture between the preferences of donor governments and multi-
lateral agencies, it becomes the actions that a multilateral agency should take become
unclear, as they face competing directives from their principals. On the one hand,
they can choose to disregard the principal’s altered preferences and adhere their orig-
inal mandate. On the other, they can adapt to the principal’s revised preferences
and alter their spending patterns accordingly. It is at this point that agency auton-
omy becomes critical. When autonomy is low, it is easier for donor governments to
pressure multilateral aid agencies to alter their behavior. As a result, they are more
likely to succumb to these pressures and ultimately alter their spending to reflect the
geopolitical concerns of their donors. This is a suboptimal outcome for both parties.
For the agency, their credibility as a development organization is undermined. For
the donor governments, although they are able to realize the short term gains of
promoting their geopolitical interests, they are also sacrificing the long term gains
that reducing poverty can provide. Numerous studies have linked a lack of economic
6Note here that I am not addressing instances of re-contracting (which happen quite rarely),
but instead instances of informal contract revision.
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development with an increased likelihood of conflict, terrorism, and autocracy (Col-
lier, 2003; Piazza, 2011; Barro, 1999). Therefore, while states may be achieving short
term gains, they are potentially sacrificing their own long term security.
If, however, autonomy levels are high, multilateral aid agencies will be able to
resist principal slippage, and can continue to spend their aid in a manner that en-
hances development. Multilateral aid agencies can offer positive benefits to donor
governments as well, and provide a potential solution to their time-inconsistent pref-
erences, so long as they have sufficient autonomy required to do so. In this case,
agency autonomy is beneficial for donor governments, as it allows them to pursue
their initial long term goals of development, goals that they otherwise would have
sacrificed for the sake of domestic interests. A similar result is expected with regard
to independent central banks. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) in particular
note that, “...central bank independence and an explicit mandate to pursue price
stability are generally regarded as important institutional devices for ensuring price
stability” (p. 354). In this way, the autonomy of the bank is directly contributing
to the government’s welfare, just not in the way that the government would prefer
given their short time horizon. Moreover, it is also arguable that the bank’s actions
are actually providing a greater benefit to the government than they would have
received had they realized their preference of raising inflation rates.
For both multilateral aid agencies and central banks then, the principal is alter-
ing their incentive structure, and thereby attempting to undermine the purpose of
the agency. Only when the bank or agency is autonomous is it able to resist these
attempts and implement its preferred policies, policies that are ultimately more op-
timal than those which their principals would have them pursue. This argument
becomes particularly important when we consider the fact that many studies have
documented instances of quid pro quo behavior in multilateral aid agencies, espe-
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cially with regard to the ability of strong states to manipulate aid agencies into
pursing political objectives. Stone (2004, 2008) and Vreeland (2007), for instance,
describe how the U.S. is able to manipulate IMF policies. This may seem to suggest
that multilateral aid policies can simply be overhauled by a single powerful donor,
making them little better than bilateral aid agencies. However, this conclusion is un-
warranted for two main reasons. The first is that agency autonomy can mitigate this
potentiality. That is, when multilateral agencies have a sufficient degree of indepen-
dence from donor governments, such instances are much less likely to occur. Second,
even when autonomy levels are low, it will be more difficult and time consuming for a
donor government to pressure and influence a multilateral aid agency in comparison
to their ability to direct their bilateral aid flows. In attempting to alter multilateral
aid policies, donor governments must convince the agency’s managers, and deal with
additional input and pressure stemming from other donor governments. Thus, while
multilateral aid agencies may at times be “captured,” the ability of a single donor
to utilize an agency to secure their own political goals will be much less pronounced
compared to bilateral aid, due simply to the costs of attempting to influence agency
behavior.
To conclude, I expect that multilateral aid agencies will generally behave as
faithful agents, acting to maximize the effectiveness of their development policies.
Donor governments, on the other hand, are expected to exhibit principal slippage,
whereby they establish multilateral aid agencies to address development concerns but
subsequently alter their expectations and pressure aid agencies to use their funds in
a manner that furthers their domestic geopolitical and strategic self interests. The
implications for such a relationship within the principal-agent framework are quite
profound. If national governments try to utilize multilateral aid organizations in
this manner, it poses a serious problem for the ability of the agency to effectively
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address development concerns. I therefore expect that more autonomous multilateral
agencies will be more effective, as stated in Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4 Multilateral aid agencies that are autonomous will be more effective
than multilateral agencies that are not autonomous.
If autonomy levels are low, governments are more likely to capture the multilateral
aid agency, essentially rendering it as a bilateral aid agency in disguise. However,
when autonomy is high, the aid agency should have the ability to resist such attempts
to alter their aid policies, resulting in effective development policies. Multilateral aid
agencies therefore offer a potential solution to the problem of national governments
utilizing aid for geopolitical purposes, but only so long as they are able to indepen-
dently pursue developmentally oriented goals.
3.3.2.4 Autonomy and Bilateral Aid
Before concluding, it is worth briefly revisiting the debate between bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies in light of my argument on agency autonomy. Although
I focus my discussion of autonomy on comparing among multilateral aid agencies,
autonomy can also be expected to vary among bilateral aid agencies as well. In
the principal-agent model, bilateral aid agencies are agents just as multilateral aid
agencies are. They are therefore held accountable to their principals (donor govern-
ments) in much the same way as multilateral agencies are. Similarly, the amount
of autonomy that bilateral aid agencies exhibit can also be expected to vary from
agency to agency. Such variation mimics that of central banks, which have also been
documented as having diverse levels of autonomy from their controlling governments.
This leads to the argument that if autonomy levels vary within both bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies, it is entirely possible for some bilateral aid agencies to have
greater autonomy than some multilateral aid agencies. Although this argument is
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not beyond the realm of possibility, I argue that it is unlikely due to differences in
the principal-agent relationship with donor governments that bilateral and multilat-
eral aid agencies have. While multilateral aid agencies are responsible to multiple
donor governments in the form of a collective principal, bilateral aid agencies are
only responsible to a single principal. Therefore, while multilateral aid agencies are
able to expand their autonomy as a result of the potential for conflict among their
collective principal, bilateral aid agencies cannot expect this (Lyne, Nielson and Tier-
ney, 2003). As a result, bilateral aid agencies must carefully adhere to the desires of
their donor governments, which generally prefer to use aid for political and strategic
gains. If bilateral aid agencies deviate from these preferences, they are much more
likely to face sanctions compared to a multilateral aid agency. In consideration of
these differences, I expect multilateral agencies to be more effective, due to increased
levels of organizational autonomy. However, it is entirely possible for a bilateral aid
agency to become sufficiently autonomous so that it surpasses other multilateral aid
agencies. Such a possibility, however, is beyond the scope of this research.
3.4 Conclusion
In this section, I have presented a general theory of aid effectiveness in which
organizational motivation, specialization, and autonomy are critical variables con-
tributing to organizational performance. Using this theory as a guideline, I then
applied it to my two previously stated research questions focusing on the issue of
foreign aid effectiveness. The first simply asks if multilateral aid is more effective
than bilateral aid. According to my theory, because multilateral aid agencies are
politically neutral and more specialized, they should be more effective than bilat-
eral aid. The second focuses exclusively on multilateral aid agencies, and asks what
traits make these agencies relatively more effective. I argue that specialization and
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autonomy are key factors that will determine the relative success of the multilateral
agency. Thus, from my general theory of organizational effectiveness, I am able to
extract four testable hypotheses regarding aid effectiveness. The remainder of this
dissertation is devoted to testing these hypotheses. In order to accomplish this, I
first describe these concepts in more detail and present original datasets measuring
them in Sections 4 and 5. I then empirically test my hypotheses in Sections 6, 7,
and 8. The results of these analyses ultimately provide a detailed description of the
utility of multilateral aid agencies, as well as the specific traits of aid agencies that
are most conducive to promoting development.
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4. MEASURING AGENCY SPECIALIZATION
The hundreds of foreign aid agencies operating today are incredibly diverse. These
agencies are comprised of bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, NGOs, regional
development banks, World Bank agencies, UN agencies, large agencies, small agen-
cies, issue specific agencies, regionally focused agencies, broadly focused agencies,
etc. Some agencies have small budgets, such as Iceland, which in 2012 provided just
over $11 million in aid funds. Others have incredibly large budgets that surpass the
GDPs of many independent countries. The U.S., for instance, in 2012 committed
itself to providing over $17.5 billion in aid funds. In another example, some agencies
deliver aid throughout the globe, such as the UNDP, which in 2012 distributed aid
to 136 recipients. Meanwhile, other agencies distribute aid to far fewer recipients,
such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which distributed aid
to only two recipients in 2012. Some agencies are designed to promote a single de-
velopment issue, such as the WHO, which focuses on global health issues. Others,
such as the World Bank, address every aspect associated with development, ranging
from water sanitation to general budget support.
In this section, I focus on a single aspect of aid agency variation: specialization.
As described in Section 3, specialization among aid agencies has received an increas-
ing amount of attention within the foreign aid community, as it is argued to provide
substantial benefits in terms of aid effectiveness. In fact, the aid community is so
convinced of the importance of specialization that they have repeatedly emphasized
it as one of the ways in which donors need to improve their aid practices. The Accra
Agenda for action specifically states that, “The effectiveness of aid is reduced when
there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially at country and sector levels”
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(OECD, 2008, p. 17). As a response, the OECD formed the Division of Labor
and Complementarity task team under the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to
specifically address issues of aid fragmentation, and continues to promote the idea
that donor fragmentation is bad for development. Previous work investigating spe-
cialization has made important progress, but has not yet thoroughly identified the
connection between agency type and specialization levels. Therefore, in this sec-
tion I emphasize the differences between bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, and
present detailed measurements of three potential types of agency specialization.
The remainder of the section proceeds as follows. First, I define specialization
and describe the various ways in which agencies can specialize. Second, I present
my measurement methods. I measure agency specialization in three ways: country
specialization, regional specialization, and sector specialization. After ranking aid
agencies in each of these areas, I then test my argument by using panel regression
analysis in order to determine if multilateral aid agencies are indeed more specialized
compared to bilateral aid agencies. My results present strong evidence that multilat-
eral aid is more likely to be specialized than bilateral aid. I conclude by discussing
the implications of this for multilateral aid effectiveness.
4.1 Conceptualizing Agency Specialization
As stated previously in Section 3, I define specialization as: the extent to which
an aid agency focuses its allocation on a single country, geographical region, or de-
velopment sector.1 I therefore refer to agencies that provide concentrated aid, as aid
specialists. An aid specialist may concentrate its spending either geographically, or
on a certain sector of development. For example, specialized agencies may focus their
aid on issues such as global health, the environment, or education; a geographical
1While my definition of specialization is similar to past studies, it is not identical. I discuss the
difference in greater detail in the following subsection.
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region, such as Africa or the Caribbean; or on a specific recipient country, such as
Tanzania. Specialization can either be designed into the aid agency or may simply
be the result of a conscious choice by the agency. Many multilateral aid agencies,
for instance, are designed to address specific aid sectors or regions. It is entirely pos-
sible, however, for bilateral or other multilateral aid agencies to specialize as well.
In order to accomplish this, the agencies need only to alter their allocation patterns
accordingly. Rather than being a by-product of institutional design, however, spe-
cialization in these instances reflects an active choice of the agency. A country with
a colonial past, for instance, may direct its aid towards its former colonies, while a
country that is particularly concerned about the environment may target its aid to-
wards environmental projects. A prime example of this is French foreign aid, which,
according to a draft law adopted in 2013, has prioritized 85% of its aid to be targeted
towards sub-Saharan Africa and the southern shore of the Mediterranean. This sort
of distinction can be viewed as a difference between de jure and de facto specializa-
tion. Agencies that are de jure specialists are those designed to address a certain
development issue or geographical region. Agencies that are de facto specialists are
those that do not have specialization designed into their institution, but nevertheless
allocate aid in a specialized manner. In this section, I examine both types.
Regardless of the origin of agency specialization (de jure or de factor), there are
two main types of aid specialists. The first type are agencies that address a specific
sector associated with development. These agencies focus their attention on a narrow
policy area. The WHO, for example, concentrates its activities on health matters,
including policy, research, and data analysis in that field (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2015). While the agency may enact multiple policies to achieve its goal, they all
fall within the agency’s area of specialization. In another example, in order to pro-
mote child welfare UNICEF undertakes a variety of policies and programs, focusing
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on issues such as child development and survival, basic education, gender equality,
HIV/AIDS in children, and child protection (UNICEF, 2015). Despite this array
of focal points, the agency remains specialized, as all of its activities are ultimately
geared towards improving child welfare. The second type of aid specialists are those
that focus their attention on a narrow geographical area. These agencies are mostly
comprised of regional development banks, but other agencies also fall in this category,
as they operate with a specific geographical focus. The objective of the AfDB, for
instance, is to “spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its re-
gional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction.”(African
Development Bank, 2015). This suggests that while the AfDB concentrates on a
specific region, it does not limit itself in terms of the types of sectors that it fo-
cuses on. Instead, this regional specialist still pursues general development goals,
however the regional scope of these goals is more limited. The UNRWA, while not
a regional development bank, can be considered both a geographical and an issue
focused agency, as it focuses its attention on refugees in Palestine. By narrowing the
number of potential recipients, both of these agencies can be considered geographical
specialists.
At the other end of the spectrum are what I describe as aid generalists. These
types of agencies have a broad array of goals they are hoping to address through
their aid programs, including development, trade, democracy, human rights, the
environment, health issues, gender equality, etc. Additionally, aid generalists tend
to distribute their aid globally rather than confining it to a specific geographical area.
My definition of specialization is designed to be flexible, and constitutes more of
a continuum rather than an absolute. This is especially true for those agencies that
are not explicitly designed to address a specific issue or geographical region. De-
pending on the types of aid policies an agency pursues over time, agencies can move
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up and down this continuum by becoming more or less specialized. For instance, a
country that initially pursued a broad scope of aid policies may change its priori-
ties and subsequently pursue a specialized aid portfolio. Thus, my classification of
agencies into categories of aid generalists and aid specialists is not static, but instead
responds to changes in agency behavior. The ability of agencies to move along this
continuum, however, will be influenced by whether the agency is de jure or de facto
specialized. Agencies that are de jure specialized will have more difficultly becoming
a aid generalists, as this is contrary to their organizational purpose, agencies that
are de facto specialized will be more mobile.
4.2 Measurement
In this subsection I measure agency specialization using multiple datasets on
foreign aid from the OECD. Although the datasets all originate from the OECD, they
measure aid in different ways. As noted by Dreher and Michaelowa (2010) and Mu¨rle
(2007), the data on which fragmentation indicators are calculated is important choice,
as different datasets will yield different results. Although the majority of aid studies
rely on the OECD’s ODA dataset, several aid fragmentation scholars have noted
that this aggregate measure may be inappropriate when measuring specialization.
Mu¨rle (2007), for instance states that only activities that are actually taking place
within the recipient country should be included in studies of aid fragmentation. He
therefore excludes debt relief, student costs, support to refugees, administrative costs,
and humanitarian aid in his analysis of fragmentation levels in European aid (Mu¨rle,
2007, pp. 9-10). Reflecting this logic, the OECD created a dataset of programmable
aid in order to more accurately capture the amount of planned funding that is actually
being transferred from the donor agency to the recipient. This dataset of Country
Programmable Aid (CPA) excludes unpredictable aid flows (i.e. humanitarian aid
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and debt relief), aid that entails no cross-border flows (i.e. administrative costs,
imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, research, refugees), aid
that is not part of cooperation agreements between governments (i.e. food aid, aid
from local governments), and aid that is not programmable by the donor (OECD,
2009, p. 19). CPA is measured in disbursements and covers the years 2000-2012
for aid recipients and from 2004-2008 for sectors. While CPA is obviously the more
preferred base data, it is quite limited in terms of its temporal coverage. Therefore
as a robustness check, I perform the same analysis presented below using ODA
commitment data, which is available from 1966-2013. The results are virtually the
same, and are included as Appendix A.
Table 4.1 lists the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies included in my analysis.
The CPA and ODA datasets contain information on 28 DAC donors, as well as 32
multilateral aid agencies.2 I choose to focus my analysis on DAC donors rather than
all available bilateral donors due to questions data consistency and reliability. With
regards to multilateral aid agencies, while the ODA and CPA do not cover the entire
universe of multilateral aid donors, the sample is quite representative of the major
multilateral aid donors operating today.
Capturing the concept of agency specialization is a complicated task. One way
to measure it is by simply examining the goals of the agency, which can be easily
found in their mission statements. These statements could subsequently be coded
according to whether they are concerned primarily with a specific development sector,
or if they have a regional focus. Using mission statements as a guide, the evidence
presented in Section 3 shows that multilateral aid agencies are often designed to
address a specific aspect of development. In this section, I examine three distinct
2The EU is also included as a member of the DAC. Here I classify it as a multilateral agency
because it is dependent on donor countries for its funding.
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Table 4.1: Aid Agencies in CPA and ODA Datasets
Bilateral Multilateral
Australia AfDB
Austria AfDF
Belgium Arab Fund (AFESD)
Canada AsDB Special Funds
Czech Republic BADEA
Denmark CarDB
Finland EBRD
France EU Institutions
Germany GAVI
Greece GEF
Iceland Global Fund
Ireland IAEA
Italy IBRD
Japan IDA
Korea IDB Sp.Fund
Luxembourg IFAD
Netherlands IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)
New Zealand Isl.Dev Bank
Norway Montreal Protocol
Poland Nordic Dev.Fund
Portugal OFID
Slovak Republic OSCE
Slovenia UNAIDS
Spain UNDP
Sweden UNECE
Switzerland UNHCR
United Kingdom UNFPA
United States UNICEF
UNPBF
UNRWA
UNTA
WHO
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types of specialization. The first two (country and region) are geographical types of
specialization. The third is sector specialization, which captures an agency limiting
its funding to fewer development areas. Table 4.2 list those multilateral aid agencies
that have a regional or sectoral focus according to their charter or mandate as shown
in Table 3.1. As can be seen, thirteen multilateral aid agencies are classified as
having a regional focus, while fourteen multilateral aid agencies specialize in a specific
sector. The UNRWA appears in both columns, as it address refugees in Palestine,
giving it both a regional and sectoral focus. In total, of the 32 multilateral aid
agencies included in the data, 26 of them are aid specialists according to their mission
statements. The multilateral aid agencies that are not aid specialists are the EU
Institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
and IDA (both of which are World Bank agencies), the IMF, and the UNDP. Each of
these agencies are aid generalists, and focus on overall economic growth in developing
countries.
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Table 4.2: Nominal Specialization Based on Agency Mission Statements
Geographic Sector
Agency Specialization Specialization
AfDB X
AfDF X
Arab Fund (AFESD) X
AsDB Special Funds X
BADEA X
CarDB X
EBRD X
GAVI X
GEF X
Global Fund X
IAEA X
IBRD X
IDA
IDB Sp.Fund X
IFAD X
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)
Isl.Dev Bank X
Montreal Protocol X
Nordic Dev.Fund X
OFID X
OSCE X
UNAIDS X
UNDP
UNECE X
UNHCR X
UNFPA X
UNICEF X
UNPBF X
UNRWA X X
UNTA
WHO X
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In spite of the usefulness of the examining agency mission statements to provide
guidance as to which agencies are more likely to be aid specialists, using this method
may be misleading for two key reasons. First, aid agencies often change their mission
statements along with their priorities. Second, agencies may not adhere to these
statements at all. As a consequence, mission statements admittedly are capturing
agency statements rather than actual agency behavior. To address this concern,
I measure specialization with actual agency behavior by examining how agencies
disburse their funds. As this behavior is clearly observable, it is more preferable
than relying on agency mission statements.
The subsequent question then becomes how to accurately capture agency special-
ization. As has been discussed in the aid fragmentation literature, specialization is
determined by both the number of targets an agency has, as well as the size of their
contributions to these targets. The ideal measure of agency specialization would
therefore capture both of these components. Drawing from the aid fragmentation
literature, I describe two potential measurements of specialization: the size of an
agency’s aid portfolio and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index.3 Below, I discuss the
benefits and shortcomings of each type of measurement.
The first measurement of specialization is an agency’s portfolio size. This is
simply a count of the number of recipients, regions, or sectors an agency contributes
3There are two other ways in which donor fragmentation is often measured that I do not consider
here: the Theil Index and a concentration ratio. The Theil Index is an inequality measurement
related to the Gini coefficient. The problem with the Theil index is that it does not reflect changes
in population. Thus, measuring donor specialization with the Theil Index would not take into
consideration the number of targets to which the agency is donating. The second method is a
concentration ratio, which is often used by the OECD. In order to determine whether or not an
aid relationship is significant, the the donor must provide a higher percentage of the recipient’s
aid compared to its share of total aid, and the donor must be one of the largest donors to the
recipient by cumulatively providing at least 90% of the recipient’s aid (OECD, 2009). An aid
concentration ratio is subsequently calculated for each agency depending on how many of their aid
relationships are significant. While useful, this measurement of aid fragmentation is more oriented
towards measuring fragmentation within the recipient rather than specialization of the agency. I
therefore do not include it in my analysis here.
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to. Higher counts indicate lower levels of specialization, as the agency has to divide
their funds over more targets. This measurement is often used by the DAC as a
baseline in evaluating aid fragmentation levels (Dreher and Michaelowa, 2010). While
these counts provide good descriptive statistics, they do not capture the relative share
of the agency’s contribution to each recipient or sector compared to its overall budget.
An agency dividing its aid equally among three recipients, for instance, would have
the same count as an agency that gives 90% of its aid to a single recipient and 5%
to two other recipients.
To address this shortcoming, I use an additional measure of specialization: the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (hereinafter referred to as the Herfindal Index or HHI).
Initially used in economics as a measure of market concentration, this measurement
is common in studies of aid fragmentation, and has been used in numerous studies
(Frot and Santiso, 2008; Kimura, Mori and Sawada, 2012; Knack and Rahman, 2007;
Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; Easterly and Williamson, 2011). The Herfindahl index
captures a firm’s share of the market by summing the squared proportions of each
firm’s share. The resulting values are bounded between 1/n2 and 1, with higher
values indicating greater levels of concentration. Below, I calculate three separate
HHI scores based on agency geographical and sectoral activities. The unit of analysis
is agency-year. The first is a geographical measure of agency specialization based
on donor contributions to recipient countries (Country Specialization). The second
measure is also a geographical measure of specialization, but uses regions rather than
individual countries (Region Specialization). The third measures sector specialization
and captures whether an agency concentrates their activities on a certain aid sector
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(Sector Specialization). These indices are calculated as follows:
Country Specializationit =
n∑
c=1
a2ct
Region Specializationit =
n∑
r=1
a2rt
Sector Specializationit =
n∑
s=1
a2st
where i represents each aid agency and t represents each year. The value a indicates
the amount of aid as a proportion of the agency’s total budget that is targeted to a
specific country, region, or sector. Thus, if an agency provides 75% of its total budget
to a single recipient country, a = 0.75. The values c, r, and s represent the countries,
regions, and sectors over which the agency is distributing aid, respectively. The
resulting measures of specialization can be interpreted as the probability that two
randomly selected aid dollars from a single agency-year are being directed towards
the same country, region, or sector, respectively. Higher HHI values indicate that
the agency has higher levels of specialization. Table 4.3 presents an example of
calculating agency specialization using the Herfindahl Index in more detail. The
table presents the expenditure patterns of two aid agencies who are funding four
potential development sectors. Agency 1 divides its funding equally among these
four groups, with a resulting HHI score of 0.25. Agency 2, on the other hand,
devotes a majority of its funding to sector 1, giving it a higher HHI score of 0.73.
Thus, the Herfindahl Index is able to capture the specialization levels of each agency.
The problem with the Herfindahl Index is that does not always accurately reflect
an aid agency’s portfolio size. In fact, as stated by Frot and Santiso (2008), the HHI
only reflects portfolio size through its lower bound (1/n2). As a consequence, two
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Table 4.3: Example Calculation of Specialization Herfindahl Index
Agency 1 Agency 2
Amount Proportion Amount Proportion
Given of Total Given of Total
Sector 1 $5 million 0.25 $17 million 0.85
Sector 2 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Sector 3 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Sector 4 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Total $20 million 1.00 $20 million 1.00
Calculation: 0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252 0.852 + 0.052 + 0.052 + 0.052
HHI: 0.25 0.73
Specialization Low High
aid agencies with different portfolio sizes may receive the same HHI score. I present
a concrete example of this problem in Table 4.4. In this example, two agencies
provide aid to a group of recipients. Agency 1 distributes its aid equally among three
recipients, while Agency 2 distributes more than half of its aid to a single recipient,
and them provides small portions of aid to another eight recipients. Despite the fact
that Agency 2 provides aid to three times as many recipients as Agency 1, their
HHI scores are nearly identical. Thus, while the HHI is more informative as to the
concentration of a donor’s aid portfolio, it is not without flaws.
Below, I use the size of an agency’s portfolio along with the Herfindahl Index to
measure country, region, and sector specialization. My analysis represents a depar-
ture from previous work in four ways. First, I examine more types of specialization.
Many studies, such as Acharya, de Lima and Moore (2006), Dreher and Michaelowa
(2010), and Frot and Santiso (2008) examine only country specialization, while the
studies by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) take this
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Table 4.4: Example of Herfindahl Index Shortcomings
Agency Recipient HHI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Agency A 0.33 0.33 0.33 - - - - - - 0.3333
Agency B 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.55 0.3338
one step further and examine sector specialization as well. None of these studies,
however, examine regional specialization. While related to country specialization,
region specialization captures the fact that specialization gains can be had at the re-
gional level as well as the country and sector level. Limiting aid activities to a single
region can reduce transaction costs and increase regional agency expertise. Addi-
tionally, it is common for a bilateral aid agency to have regional interests, and for a
multilateral aid agency to have a regional orientation. Thus, it makes intuitive sense
as to why regional specialization may also promote effectiveness. Second, I measure
specialization by using portfolio size and portfolio concentration. While each of these
methods has advantages, neither is a flawless measure. In previous work, Acharya,
de Lima and Moore (2006) use the Theil Index, while Easterly and Pfutze (2008)
and Easterly and Williamson (2011) use Herfindahl scores. By using two measure-
ments, I am able to provide more robust evidence regarding agency specialization
levels. Third, I calculate yearly specialization scores for each agency. Previous stud-
ies, Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) for instance,
only calculate a single specialization score for aid agencies. However, this provides
a static measure of a potentially dynamic process, as agencies can become more or
less specialized over time. I allow for this possibility in my measurements. Fourth, I
focus my analysis on comparing bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. While previ-
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ous studies have examined specialization levels among individual aid agencies, they
have not directed their attention to the fact that this may be attributable to simple
differences in agency type. For instance, Acharya, de Lima and Moore (2006) and
Frot and Santiso (2008) limit their focus to bilateral aid agencies; and although East-
erly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) do distinguish between
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, for the most part, the main focus of previous
studies has not been to focus on agency type as a determinant of specialization levels.
I argue that this is an oversight of the potential positive contributions multilateral
aid can provide.
4.2.1 Country Specialization
The first type of specialization I investigate is country specialization. By lim-
iting their funding to fewer aid recipients, agencies are able to focus more of their
resources on each of these recipients and can potentially provide them with more
effective development assistance. Figure 4.1 compares the portfolio sizes of bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies. The data indicate that on average from 2000-2012,
bilateral aid agencies consistently provided aid to more recipients compared to mul-
tilateral aid agencies. However, as shown in Figure 4.2, the average Herfindahl scores
of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies over the same time period suggest that af-
ter accounting for the size of agency contributions, multilateral aid may not be as
specialized compared to bilateral aid.
In order to provide more detailed information on country specialization for each
donor agency, I also rank them based on their portfolio sizes and their portfolio
concentration. In order to do this, I proceed in several steps. First, I sort the agencies
from best to worst on each dimension. Second, I calculate their percentile rank, which
indicates the percentage of agencies with specialization scores less than or equal to the
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Figure 4.1: Bilateral v. Multilateral Recipients, CPA Data
agency in question, with higher percentile rankings indicating greater specialization
levels relative to the specialization levels of all other agencies. Acknowledging the
fact that agencies may become more or less specialized over time, I calculate these
rankings for each year. To summarize this information, I average these yearly scores
and rank agencies accordingly. The rank of the average percentile rank is therefore
presented in Table 4.5. Smaller counts or portfolio sizes indicate greater levels of
country specialization, while higher Herfindahl scores indicate greater specialization.
Table 4.5, ranks aid agencies based on their country specialization levels. For the
count variable, multilateral aid agencies are much more specialized, as these agencies
occupy nine of the top ten rankings. However, multilateral aid agencies also occupy
five of the bottom ten rankings, with UNTA ranked at the very bottom. For the
Herfindahl scores, the distinction between bilateral and multilateral aid agencies is
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Figure 4.2: Bilateral v. Multilateral Recipients Herfindahl Scores, CPA Data
not as pronounced. Multilateral agencies only comprise half of the top ten most
specialized aid agencies, but make up nine of the least specialized aid agencies. The
most specialized aid agency in both cases is the UNECE. However, the data provide
only a single observation for this agency, in which they provide all of their funding to
a single recipient (Albania). Therefore, it may be inappropriate to label the UNECE
as being the most specialized aid agency. On the other hand, the UNRWA, which
is ranked second and third in count and Herfindahl scores respectively, consistently
provides specialized aid across the entire time period. Designed to address the issue
of Palestinian refugees, the UNRWA distributes aid to only three countries: Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria. The Montreal Protocol, another multilateral aid agency that is
not regionally focused, is also highly specialized. Designed to promote environmental
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issues in developing countries, the Montreal Protocol focuses its distribution on a
smaller group of recipients, averaging 12.92 recipients each year.
In addition to the graphical evidence and rankings provided above, I also sta-
tistically test the difference in country specialization levels between bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies using a difference of means test. The results for these
two tests, along with summary statistics for agency counts and Herfindahl scores
by agency type, are presented in Table 4.6. As Table 4.6 demonstrates, on average
multilateral aid agencies provide aid to fewer recipients compared to bilateral aid
agencies, and this difference is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. For agency
Herfindahl scores, however, this difference is not apparent. The means and medians
of both agency types are quite similar, and the t-test indicates that there is not a sta-
tistically significant difference between bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. This
indicates that while multilateral aid agencies may provide aid to fewer recipients,
once we account for the size of their contributions to these recipients, they are not
any more specialized than bilateral aid agencies.
Overall, the variables measuring country specialization indicate that both bilat-
eral and multilateral aid agencies are not nearly as specialized as they could be.
This result supports those found by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and
Williamson (2011), who found little difference in country specialization levels be-
tween bilateral, multilateral, and UN aid agencies.4 Thus, although multilateral aid
agencies do appear to provide aid to fewer recipients, the general trend is that donor
agencies still need to make reforms in their spending patterns if they are to conform
to DAC goals of increasing specialization levels in the future.
4Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) separate UN agencies from
other multilateral aid agencies. I do not make the same distinction here but do address this in my
analysis.
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Table 4.5: Agency Rankings: Country Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
UNECE 1 1.00 1 1.00
UNRWA 2 3.00 3 0.40
CarDB 3 9.92 6 0.18
Iceland 4 11.08 7 0.20
Montreal Protocol 5 12.92 2 0.43
Arab Fund (AFESD) 6 11.80 13 0.14
UNPBF 7 12.50 14 0.21
EBRD 8 15.67 17 0.12
Nordic Dev.Fund 9 19.08 21 0.09
OSCE 10 16.00 12 0.13
IDB Sp.Fund 11 24.62 8 0.16
Slovak Republic 12 26.45 10 0.25
AfDB 13 23.00 18 0.11
AsDB Special Funds 14 27.38 16 0.12
BADEA 15 31.91 32 0.06
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 16 32.77 22 0.10
AfDF 17 37.92 27 0.06
Slovenia 18 39.20 11 0.14
Portugal 19 42.00 5 0.20
Isl.Dev Bank 20 44.15 34 0.06
OFID 21 60.15 47 0.03
GAVI 22 68.17 33 0.06
New Zealand 23 69.77 24 0.07
Luxembourg 24 67.54 28 0.06
Poland 25 70.08 4 0.29
IDA 26 75.69 38 0.05
Ireland 27 73.08 20 0.10
IFAD 28 77.00 51 0.03
Greece 29 73.69 9 0.21
Denmark 30 80.08 39 0.05
Czech Republic 31 77.77 19 0.12
Belgium 32 82.85 29 0.07
Australia 33 83.54 15 0.13
GEF 34 86.83 37 0.06
Austria 35 88.00 30 0.06
IAEA 36 93.86 57 0.01
Netherlands 37 97.69 44 0.04
Finland 38 97.92 35 0.06
Italy 39 98.77 36 0.05
Switzerland 40 98.69 48 0.03
Sweden 41 100.08 41 0.04
Global Fund 42 100.00 46 0.03
Spain 43 101.08 45 0.04
Canada 44 103.08 40 0.04
Norway 45 104.77 43 0.04
UNAIDS 46 104.63 55 0.02
WHO 47 105.00 56 0.02
United Kingdom 48 111.08 31 0.06
Korea 49 118.69 26 0.07
UNICEF 50 118.54 50 0.03
UNFPA 51 118.77 54 0.02
Germany 52 127.46 49 0.03
UNDP 53 128.77 53 0.02
France 54 130.00 42 0.04
United States 55 132.62 23 0.09
EU Institutions 56 135.92 52 0.02
Japan 57 138.46 25 0.07
UNTA 58 139.56 58 0.01
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics: Country Specialization, CPA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 88.77 93 32.47 4 141 354
Multilateral Count 60.80 45 44.72 1 142 299
T-test : t = 9.00(533), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.63 354
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.01 1.00 299
T-test : t = −1.13(527), p = 0.259
Notes : The null hypotheses for each of the two difference of means tests is
that the means of bilateral and multilateral specialization scores are equivalent
(H0 : µB = µM). The alternative hypothesis is that they are not equivalent
(Ha : µB 6= µM). The t-tests assume unequal variances, therefore I report
Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. P -values indicate a two-tailed test,
Pr(|T | > |t|).
4.2.2 Region Specialization
While country specialization scores are quite low for both bilateral and multilat-
eral aid agencies, it may be unfair to evaluate aid agencies on a recipient basis. With
over 100 developing countries in need of assistance, asking aid agencies to focus their
spending on only of few of these countries is perhaps overly ambitious. Nevertheless,
policy reports by the OECD (OECD, 2009) as well as academic studies (Easterly
and Williamson, 2011; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008) continue to evaluate aid agencies
along measures of country specialization. But the evidence of country specialization
is quite poor. Instead of expecting aid agencies to limit their focus to a few individ-
ual recipients, it may be more appropriate to promote and examine levels of regional
specialization. There are several reasons for this. Bilateral donors are often keen to
maintain their regional sphere of influence. Alternatively, a regional focus may be
suitable for those countries with a colonial past. Multilateral donors are also often
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designed around a regional focus. Column 1 of Table 4.2 lists 14 agencies in the
CPA and ODA datasets that have a regional focus. While regional specialization
does not allow donors to capitalize on all the benefits provided by specialization,
as they will still have to divide their resources and pay the costs of operating in
multiple countries, it is undoubtedly more preferable than an agency contributing to
recipients spread all over the globe. By having a regional focus, donors are able to
capitalize on regional knowledge and trends, and can more easily transport resources
and personnel among recipient countries.
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Figure 4.3: Bilateral v. Multilateral Count of Regions, CPA Data
To examine regional specialization, I divide aid recipients into five major regional
groups following the divisions of the OECD. These geographical regions are: Asia,
Africa, America, Europe, and Oceania. Figure 4.3 shows that on average from 2000-
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Figure 4.4: Bilateral v. Multilateral Herfindahl for Regions, CPA Data
2012, bilateral aid agencies provide aid to at least one additional recipient region
compared to multilateral aid agencies. Turning to the the Herfindahl scores of donor
agencies, Figure 4.4 shows that the average scores of multilateral aid agencies have
consistently surpassed those of bilateral aid agencies in the past fourteen years. Over-
all, the graphical evidence suggests that multilateral agencies have higher levels of
region specialization compared to bilateral aid agencies.
In Table 4.7, I rank donor agencies using the same method as country special-
ization. The results indicate that for both variables, multilateral aid agencies are
more specialized than bilateral aid agencies. In terms of the number of regions
that agencies provide funding to, multilateral aid agencies comprise the top fifteen
most specialized agencies. For the Herfindahl scores, multilateral aid agencies are
also ranked very high, and make up the top ten most specialized agencies. How-
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ever, multilateral aid agencies are also ranked low in both variables. For counts,
the GEF, Global Fund, UNAIDS, and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immuniza-
tions (GAVI) are the worst four donors. Multilateral agencies also have four of the
lowest five Herfindahl scores, including the GEF, WHO, UNTA and IAEA. While
the graphical evidence and rankings would indicate that multilateral aid agencies
are more regionally specialized, it is important to recognize that not all multilateral
agencies have high levels of regional specialization.
Last, I test the difference between agency types for region specialization. Table
4.8 presents summary statistics and the difference of means tests for each type of
agency. Both the count and Herfindahl variables suggest that multilateral aid is
more specialized than bilateral aid, and that this difference is statistically significant.
For instance, bilateral aid agencies provide aid to an average of 4.59 regions while
multilateral aid agencies on average provide aid to only 3.59 regions. Moreover,
the distribution of this aid is substantially more concentrated for multilateral aid
agencies, as demonstrated through the differences in their Herfindahl scores. To
conclude, the results here strongly support the argument that multilateral aid is
more specialized than bilateral aid agencies.
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Table 4.7: Agency Rankings: Region Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
UNRWA 1 1.00 1 1.00
IDB Sp.Fund 1 1.00 1 1.00
CarDB 1 1.00 1 1.00
AfDF 1 1.00 1 1.00
BADEA 5 1.00 5 1.00
AfDB 6 1.00 6 1.00
EBRD 7 2.00 13 0.57
AsDB Special Funds 8 2.00 8 0.95
Arab Fund (AFESD) 9 2.00 15 0.60
UNECE 9 2.00 7 0.98
OSCE 11 2.00 18 0.61
UNPBF 12 2.33 9 0.85
Nordic Dev.Fund 13 3.00 36 0.42
Isl.Dev Bank 14 3.38 23 0.51
Montreal Protocol 15 3.62 10 0.83
Slovak Republic 16 3.64 35 0.43
Iceland 17 3.46 19 0.63
Luxembourg 18 4.08 45 0.36
Portugal 19 4.08 22 0.54
New Zealand 20 4.15 17 0.55
IAEA 21 4.14 58 0.26
Poland 22 4.23 29 0.51
Czech Republic 23 4.23 37 0.42
Slovenia 24 4.20 12 0.72
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 25 4.31 24 0.52
Italy 26 4.38 48 0.34
Belgium 27 4.46 16 0.59
Denmark 28 4.46 33 0.44
IFAD 29 4.54 38 0.41
WHO 30 4.50 55 0.32
Greece 31 4.54 31 0.50
Spain 32 4.62 51 0.33
Netherlands 33 4.62 41 0.38
Sweden 34 4.69 47 0.35
OFID 35 4.77 39 0.41
Ireland 36 4.77 11 0.73
Canada 37 4.85 49 0.34
Finland 38 4.92 43 0.37
Norway 39 4.92 42 0.37
Switzerland 39 4.92 57 0.28
UNTA 41 5.00 56 0.30
UNICEF 42 5.00 26 0.47
Japan 42 5.00 14 0.59
Australia 42 5.00 25 0.46
UNDP 42 5.00 34 0.43
United States 42 5.00 44 0.37
Germany 42 5.00 52 0.33
France 42 5.00 28 0.47
EU Institutions 42 5.00 50 0.34
United Kingdom 42 5.00 30 0.45
IDA 42 5.00 32 0.45
Austria 42 5.00 53 0.32
UNFPA 42 5.00 40 0.39
Korea 42 5.00 20 0.57
GEF 55 5.00 54 0.31
Global Fund 56 5.00 27 0.46
UNAIDS 57 5.00 46 0.37
GAVI 58 5.00 21 0.54
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Table 4.8: Summary Statistics: Region Specialization CPA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 4.59 5 0.58 1 5 354
Multilateral Count 3.35 4 1.64 1 5 305
T-test : t = 11.55(368.64), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.45 0.41 0.14 0.27 1.00 354
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.61 0.47 0.27 0.23 1.00 305
T-test : t = −9.12(437.48), p = 0.000
Notes : The null hypotheses for each of the two difference of means tests is
that the means of bilateral and multilateral specialization scores are equivalent
(H0 : µB = µM). The alternative hypothesis is that they are not equivalent
(Ha : µB 6= µM). The t-tests assume unequal variances, therefore I report
Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. P -values indicate a two-tailed test,
Pr(|T | > |t|).
4.2.3 Sector Specialization
The third and final type of specialization I investigate is sector specialization.
When a development issue is particularly salient, aid donors will target their spend-
ing towards that issue and/or create multilateral agencies to focus specifically on that
policy. As has been documented by Hicks et al. (2010), many bilateral aid donors
have recently focused more environmental aid, as it is of growing global concern. In
addition, donor countries have created several multilateral aid agencies to specifi-
cally focus on environmental aid, such as the GEF, the Global Fund, the Montreal
Protocol, and the Nordic Fund. Other multilateral agencies similarly focus on other
development issues, as illustrated in column 2 of Table 4.2. By focusing on a single
sector, donor agencies are able to maximize their expertise on the subject, and can
potentially use their resources in a more efficient manner.
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Below, I use CPA data to present count and Herfindahl specialization scores for
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies on their levels of sector specialization. While
CPA data is limited both temporally (data is only available from 2004-2008) and
in terms of the multilateral agencies that it covers, it is the more preferred base
data for calculations of agency specialization. I therefore present results using CPA
data here, but note that the results using ODA data are highly similar.5 Table
4.9 lists the twelve sectors along which CPA aid is classified.6 Comparing this list
with the sector specialized multilateral agencies listed in Table 4.2, there is a strong
similarity between the sectors along which aid is divided and the types of specialized
agencies that exist. For example, health is obviously a highly salient development
issue, as GAVI, UNAIDS, and the WHO all focus on health issues, while the UNFPA
focuses on reproductive issues, an even more specific aspect of health. Other sectors
such as agriculture, the environment, and refugees are also addressed by specialized
multilateral aid organizations.
Figure 4.5 shows the average count of sectors to which bilateral and multilateral
agencies distribute aid from 2004-2008. Clearly, on average multilateral aid agencies
contribute to far fewer aid sectors compared to bilateral aid agencies. We can draw
the same conclusion when considering the Herfindahl scores of these agencies. As
shown in Figure 4.6, bilateral aid agencies appear to on have on average a signifi-
cantly lower sector specialization score compared to multilateral aid agencies. This
graphical evidence implies that not only are multilateral aid agencies contributing
aid to fewer development sectors, but that they are also concentrating their aid more
in these areas.
5See Appendix A for the ODA results.
6For a list of sectors specified in the ODA data, see Table A.7. To facilitate a comparison between
the two datasets, I aggregate the ODA data based on CPA data sector classifications. However,
one could perform other analyses using different sector categories.
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Table 4.9: Aid Sectors in CPA Data
Agriculture
Economic Infrastructure
Education
Environment
General Budget Support
Government and Civil Society
Health
Multi-sector
Other Production Sectors (Forestry, Fishing, Industry,
Mining, Construction, Trade Policy and Tourism)
Other Social Infrastructure
Population Policies and Reproductive Health
Water Supply and Sanitation
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Figure 4.5: Bilateral v. Multilateral Count of Sectors, CPA Data
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Figure 4.6: Bilateral v. Multilateral Sector Herfindahl Scores, CPA Data
In Table 4.10, I rank each agency according to their average percentile ranks
each year. The results support the graphical evidence: multilateral aid agencies
distribute aid to fewer sectors on average compared to bilateral aid agencies. Of
all bilateral agencies, only South Korea ranks in the top ten of the count variable.
For the Herfindahl measure, New Zealand is the only bilateral agency present in
the top ten. Not surprisingly, many of the top sector specialists are issue specific
agencies. These agencies all score highly in terms of sector specialization, including
the UNFPA, UNAIDS, GAVI and the Global Fund for health issues; and the GEF
for the environment.
Finally, I statistically test the difference between bilateral and multilateral agen-
cies for sector specialization in Table 4.11. The results indicate that multilateral
aid agencies are significantly more likely to be specialized compared to bilateral aid
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Table 4.10: Agency Rankings: Sector Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 1 1.00 3 1.00
UNFPA 1 1.00 2 1.00
GAVI 3 1.00 1 1.00
UNAIDS 4 1.25 4 1.00
GEF 5 1.50 5 1.00
Global Fund 6 2.00 8 0.52
UNRWA 7 2.00 6 0.63
UNPBF 8 2.00 7 0.93
UNICEF 9 8.50 13 0.21
Korea 10 11.00 15 0.19
Luxembourg 11 11.00 20 0.16
UNDP 11 11.00 9 0.38
Austria 13 11.20 35 0.13
IDA 14 11.25 21 0.15
Switzerland 15 11.50 29 0.14
Greece 16 11.50 14 0.22
Finland 17 8.67 17 0.27
France 18 11.80 33 0.12
New Zealand 19 11.75 10 0.24
Belgium 20 12.00 31 0.13
Germany 20 12.00 22 0.14
Denmark 20 12.00 36 0.12
Netherlands 20 12.00 32 0.13
Italy 20 12.00 23 0.14
Norway 20 12.00 18 0.15
AfDF 26 12.00 30 0.14
Ireland 26 12.00 25 0.15
Australia 26 12.00 11 0.22
Portugal 26 12.00 16 0.19
Sweden 26 12.00 27 0.14
Japan 26 12.00 12 0.21
Canada 26 12.00 26 0.14
EU Institutions 26 12.00 28 0.15
Spain 26 12.00 34 0.14
United States 26 12.00 24 0.14
United Kingdom 26 12.00 19 0.15
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agencies. Furthermore, this difference is quite sizable. While bilateral agencies pro-
vide aid to an average of 11.74 sectors, multilateral agencies provide aid to only an
average of 5.05 sectors. Taking into consideration the amount of funding that each
sector receives only amplifies this result. The probability that two randomly chosen
aid dollars from a bilateral agency are being directed towards the same sector is 0.16,
while the same probability for a multilateral agency is 0.62. This is strong evidence
supporting the argument that multilateral agencies are significantly more specialized
in terms of development sectors compared to bilateral aid agencies.
Table 4.11: Summary Statistics: Sector Specialization, CPA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 11.74 12 1.05 2 12 101
Multilateral Count 5.05 2 4.66 1 12 41
T-test : t = 9.10(41.64), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.54 101
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.62 0.61 0.36 0.12 1.00 41
T-test : t = −8.08(40.72), p = 0.000
Notes : The null hypotheses for each of the two difference of means tests is
that the means of bilateral and multilateral specialization scores are equivalent
(H0 : µB = µM). The alternative hypothesis is that they are not equivalent
(Ha : µB 6= µM). The t-tests assume unequal variances, therefore I report
Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. P -values indicate a two-tailed test,
Pr(|T | > |t|).
4.3 Discussion
While the above analysis and discussion indicates a strong tendency for multilat-
eral agencies specialize more often compared to bilateral agencies, there are nuances
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to this conclusion. In this subsection, I discuss two issues in more detail. First, I
examine the relationship among agency specialization scores in order to determine
if agencies must make some sort of tradeoff in order to specialize in one area rather
than another. Second, I empirically test whether specialization levels could be driven
by factors other than agency type. The results suggest that
4.3.1 Relationship among Specialization Types
When an agency chooses to specialize–either by focusing on a specific country, re-
gion, or sector–it is quite possible that they must sacrifice being similarly specialized
in other areas. For instance, by specializing on environmental policy, an agency may
be unable or unwilling to limit their scope even further by focusing their activities
geographically as well. Indeed, the nominal examination of multilateral agency mis-
sion statements in Table 4.2 found only one instance of an agency that specialized
on a specific development sector and geographic region: the UNRWA. However, it
may also be easier for an agency that specializes in a specific region to also limit
their focus to In order to examine this in more detail, I provide the pairwise correla-
tion coefficients between agency specialization scores in Table 4.12, and graphically
present this evidence in Figure 4.7. In both Table 4.12 and Figure 4.7, I examine
the percentile scores and overall rankings of the agencies separately. I also separate
my analysis by agency type.
In general, the results indicate a mostly positive relationship. This is especially
true for the country and regional specialization scores, whose pairwise correlation
coefficients range from moderate to strong for both types of agencies whether exam-
ining percentiles or rankings. As an agency focuses their activities on fewer recipient
countries, they are also more likely to limit their activities in terms of geographic
regions, and vice versa. As a result, not only is the agency benefitting from more
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country specific knowledge, they are also able to transfer the regional aspects of this
knowledge to other recipient countries.
A more complicated picture emerges when examining the relationship between
sector specialization scores and other types of specialization. While sector count
specialization percentiles and rankings have a moderate to weak relationship with
country and region specialization scores for bilateral agencies, this relationship is
less pronounced for multilateral agencies. This indicates that while bilateral agen-
cies that specialize in a specific sector may also tend to specialize geographically,
the same cannot be said about multilateral agencies. Rather, when these agencies
have higher specialization count scores, their relationship with other types of spe-
cialization is very weak. This indicates that focusing on fewer sectors may come at
a cost of not specializing geographically for multilateral agencies. This relationship
is more pronounced for both bilateral and multilateral agencies when examining sec-
tor Herfindahl scores. In this case, sector specialization has a very weak, and at
times even negative relationship with other specialization scores (with the exception
of sector counts). For example, for multilateral agencies the pairwise correlation
coefficient between sector HHI and region HHI is -0.151 and -0.158 for percentiles
and rankings respectively. Although relatively weak, these coefficients nonetheless
suggest that multilateral agencies may have to make a decision as to whether they
become geographical or sector specialists. The tradeoffs for bilateral aid agencies, on
the other hand, do not appear to be as pronounced.
To conclude, the pairwise correlation evidence presented here provides two general
conclusions. First, country specialization and region specialization appear to be
mutually reinforcing for both agency types. Second, a greater tradeoff appears in
terms of agencies specializing either in terms of geography or sectors, especially for
multilateral aid agencies. Thus, it is important that specialization studies account
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Table 4.12: Pairwise Correlations for Agency Specialization
Percentiles
Bilateral
Country Country Region Region Sector Sector
Count HHI Count HHI Count HHI
Country Count 1.000
Country HHI 0.690 1.000
Region Count 0.923 0.561 1.000
Region HHI 0.487 0.670 0.370 1.000
Sector Count 0.492 0.487 0.448 0.172 1.000
Sector HHI -0.004 0.429 -0.030 0.379 0.364 1.000
Multilateral
Country Count 1.000
Country HHI 0.918 1.000
Region Count 0.875 0.813 1.000
Region HHI 0.696 0.762 0.782 1.000
Sector Count 0.146 0.134 0.044 0.076 1.000
Sector HHI 0.035 -0.002 -0.084 -0.151 0.781 1.000
Rankings
Bilateral
Country Count 1.000
Country HHI 0.673 1.000
Region Count 0.877 0.522 1.000
Region HHI 0.488 0.656 0.336 1.000
Sector Count 0.471 0.461 0.482 0.125 1.000
Sector HHI 0.020 0.470 0.010 0.418 0.332 1.000
Multilateral
Country Count 1.000
Country HHI 0.903 1.000
Region Count 0.879 0.783 1.000
Region HHI 0.723 0.796 0.750 1.000
Sector Count 0.172 0.150 0.100 0.091 1.000
Sector HHI 0.055 0.000 -0.048 -0.158 0.797 1.000
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Figure 4.7: Correlations of Agency Specialization
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for different types of agency specialization, as they have important implications for
other aspects of agency behavior.
4.3.2 Predicting Specialization Levels
The second issue I address is the potentiality that specialization is driven by fac-
tors other than agency type. In this subsection, I empirically analyze this possibility.
The unit of analysis is agency-year. The key independent variable is Multilateral, a
simple dummy variable that captures whether or not the agency is a multilateral.
Other factors, however, could also influence the specialization levels of the agency.
Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) suggest that special-
ization levels may be driven by the size of the agency’s budget: smaller aid agencies
may specialize simply because they do not have the resources to finance an expan-
sive aid portfolio. As a result, specialization may be determined by the amount
of funds an agency can distribute rather than their type. I therefore include the
logged total amount of aid disbursed by the agency in a given year as a measure of
agency budget (Log Budget). It is also possible that other characteristics of multilat-
eral agencies may be driving differences in specialization levels. I therefore include
dummy variables for regional development banks (RDB) which may be more geo-
graphically specialized, World Bank agencies (World Bank), and UN agencies (UN ),
both of which may focus on certain development sectors. The dependent variables I
analyze are the sizes of the agency’s aid portfolios and the Herfindahl scores of the
agencies. I discuss the results below.
The first set of dependent variables I analyze are the counts of the number of
recipients which an aid agency provides funding to, or their portfolio size. More
specialized aid agencies should have smaller portfolio sizes. Because the dependent
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variable is a count, I use a negative binomial regression.7 The results are presented
in Table 4.13. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include only the multilateral dummy variable
and agency budget, while columns 2, 4, and 6 add the dummy variables on agency
type. Overall, the results indicate that multilateral aid agencies are significantly more
likely to provide aid to fewer targets, whether those targets be countries, regions, or
sectors. Additionally, the result is robust to the inclusion of other factors, such as the
agency’s budget and various types of multilateral aid agencies. Column 2, however,
shows that UN agencies provide aid to more countries, while Column 4 shows that
the World Bank provides aid to a greater number of regions. Regional development
banks, on the other hand, provide aid to fewer regions, which is to be expected. In
general, the results provide strong support for the claim that multilateral aid agencies
are more specialized than bilateral aid agencies.
The second set of dependent variables are the Herfindahl scores capturing agency
portfolio concentration. I use panel data analysis with year fixed effects and robust
standard errors. The results are presented in Table 4.14. The first two columns
estimate country specialization. In this case, the model is poorly fit, as none of the
results are significant. This confirms the evidence presented earlier that in terms of
country Herfindahl scores, multilateral agencies are not more specialized than bilat-
eral agencies. The next two columns estimate regional specialization. In this case,
multilateral agencies do have a positive and statistically significant effect on levels of
specialization. This result holds even when controlling for other agency characteris-
tics. Agency budgets do not appear to influence specialization levels, indicating that
the size of the agency does not necessarily drive its decision to specialize. As ex-
7Another option would have been to use a Poisson model. This is appropriate for the dependent
variable for country specialization because it is over dispersed. While the dependent variables for
region and sector specialization are not over dispersed, a negative binomial model is still acceptable
as it converges to the Poisson model, as shown in the values of α in Table 4.13.
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Table 4.13: Negative Binomial Analysis of Portfolio Size, CPA Data
Country Region Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multilateral -0.311** -0.496*** -0.264*** -0.264** -0.796*** -1.072**
(0.149) (0.170) (0.090) (0.117) (0.267) (0.548)
Log Budget 0.198*** 0.206*** 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.082*** 0.064***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.014) (0.012) (0.030) (0.024)
RDB -0.351 -0.574*
(0.283) (0.303)
UN 0.697** 0.157 0.267
(0.264) (0.186) (0.659)
World Bank -0.244 0.228* 0.872
(0.184) (0.133) (0.562)
Constant 3.233*** 3.192*** 1.143*** 1.240*** 1.921*** 2.045***
(0.264) (0.271) (0.096) (0.083) (0.214) (0.166)
α 0.323 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 653 653 659 659 142 142
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by agency in parentheses. Yearly fixed
effects omitted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.14: Panel Analysis of Herfindahl Scores, CPA Data
Country Region Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multilateral 0.021 0.007 0.151*** 0.121* 0.455*** 0.554***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.055) (0.069) (0.092) (0.152)
Log Budget -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.056*** -0.055***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
RDB -0.008 0.241*
(0.044) (0.127)
UN 0.062 -0.011 -0.126
(0.079) (0.113) (0.189)
WB -0.032 -0.135* -0.421***
(0.055) (0.078) (0.156)
Constant 0.145* 0.134* 0.448*** 0.433*** 0.521*** 0.518***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.089) (0.092) (0.073) (0.076)
Observations 653 653 659 659 142 142
Groups 58 58 58 58 36 36
R-Squared 0.112 0.045 0.126 0.185 0.615 0.656
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by agency in parentheses. Yearly fixed
effects omitted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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pected, regional development banks have a positive and significant effect on regional
specialization levels. Meanwhile World Bank agencies have a negative effect on region
specialization levels, reflecting their global orientation. The last two columns esti-
mate sector specialization. Once again, the dummy variable for multilateral aid has
a positive and significant effect in both estimations. In these estimations, however,
agency budgets have a negative and statistically significant impact on specialization
levels. This confirms the suspicions of Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly and
Williamson (2011), who suggest that smaller agencies may specialize due simply to a
lack of funding. World Bank agencies also appear to have lower specialization levels,
once again reflecting their broad mandate. Overall, the results provide strong sup-
port for the argument that multilateral aid is more specialized than bilateral aid in
the case of regional and sector specialization. The results for country specialization,
however, fail to support this.
4.4 Conclusion
In this section, I began with the observation advanced by multiple policymakers
and scholars that aid fragmentation is a severe problem that needs to be addressed.
The lack of specialization by aid donors increases their transaction costs, places
undue burdens on recipients, and ultimately diminishes the effect that aid can have
in contributing to development. As a first step in addressing this concern, I examined
levels of aid agency specialization using portfolio size, Herfindahl scores, and rankings
along three types of specialization. The data provides strong evidence that in most
cases, multilateral aid is indeed more specialized than bilateral aid. This is true
regardless of whether the agency is a de jure or de facto aid specialist, and provides
a strong policy prescription for the aid community. If specialization is truly as
effective at promoting development as it is argued to be, then donors should provide
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more of their aid to these specialized multilateral agencies. By doing so, donors
would be providing aid in a more effective manner, and would therefore promote
better development results. Similarly, bilateral agencies should continue to endeavor
to become more specialized, as focusing their funding on a certain country, region, or
sector could drastically improve their aid effectiveness. Overall, the aid community
as a whole should continue to emphasize increased levels of specialization.
With regard to multilateral agencies, it is important to note that the decision
of whether or not they are in fact aid specialists can sometimes be outside of their
control. Acharya, de Lima and Moore (2006) specifically note this, stating that
multilateral aid agencies often have no real flexibility with regard to their levels of
specialization, while bilateral agencies do have this flexibility. Multilateral agencies
are, at their core, international organizations that are controlled by their member
states. Merely acknowledging the specialization levels of multilateral agencies is
therefore not sufficient. We must also examine how member states can influence
spending patterns within these agencies, making them aid specialists or aid gener-
alists. In the next section, I examine this issue of agency autonomy both for the
important consequences it has for agency specialization, and for the consequences it
has for overall agency practices and aid effectiveness.
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5. MEASURING MULTILATERAL AGENCY AUTONOMY
As discussed in Section 3, autonomy is a critical factor for multilateral aid effec-
tiveness as it determines the ability of the aid agency to pursue politically neutral
and specialized aid policies. While multilateral agencies are established with the
ultimate goal of promoting global development, their donor governments suffer from
principal slippage, which can potentially limit their ability to enact effective devel-
opment policies. Within the context of international organizations, the importance
of autonomy is not new. International relations scholars first studied autonomy as
it related to state sovereignty and the role of international organizations in the state
system. As described by Haftel and Thompson (2006), the concept of autonomy
and the salience of international organizations are inextricably linked: “The inde-
pendence of an institution largely determines its authority and influence–in short,
its ability to shape international politics”(p. 254). The realist viewpoint is that as
international organizations are both created and controlled by states, they have no
independent voice and therefore no real impact on international politics. Alterna-
tively, neoliberals view them as forums through which states can consolidate their
preferences (Krasner, 1983; Strange, 1997), and constructivists view consider them
actors that can alter state interests and values (Wendt, 1999). More recently, the
role of international organizations remains debated, although increasing evidence
suggests that they do, in fact, matter.1
Moving beyond studies of the salience of international organizations, scholars have
more recently used principal-agent models to demonstrate the benefits that delegat-
ing to an autonomous agency can provide. Given the strong benefits that delegation
1See for instance, Hawkins and Jacoby (2003) and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).
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can provide, states have consistently utilized international organizations to pursue
global cooperation on issues such as trade, finance, human rights, the environment,
as well as development. The highly influential work of Hawkins et al. (2006) draws
on the insights developed in American Politics to provide a detailed principal-agent
theory in the international context using a functionalist approach. The authors de-
scribe how states create international organizations and then delegate certain powers
and responsibilities to them in order to reap the gains of international cooperation.
States delegate because they anticipate the benefits that agents provide: manag-
ing policy externalities, facilitating collective decision making, resolving disputes,
enhancing credibility and creating policy bias (Hawkins et al., 2006, p. 13). How-
ever, these studies also demonstrate that principals must provide their agents with
a sufficient amount of autonomy in order for them to effectively serve their purpose.
My argument regarding multilateral agency autonomy follows in a similar vein: only
autonomous agencies will be able to promote development effectively.
Before empirically analyzing this argument, I first describe and measure the con-
cept of autonomy. In this section, I emphasize how the presence of multiple principals
in multilateral aid agencies impacts their autonomy though agency voting structures
and agency funding by determining the ability of a single principal to influence agency
policies. Voting structures are ex ante forms of control, that are determined when
the agency is created, while agency funding is a form of ex post control that can be
altered over time. Below, I describe these two characteristics in more detail. I then
present an original dataset that measures multilateral agency autonomy along these
two dimensions. I conclude by ranking multilateral aid agencies according to their
autonomy levels and discussing my findings.
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5.1 Multiple Principals and Agency Control
The argument that autonomy is critical for aid effectiveness begs the question of
when agencies can act autonomously and where this autonomy comes from. Sum-
marizing the literature on bureaucratic autonomy in American Politics, Hammond
and Knot (1996) describe three reasons why bureaucracies can become autonomous
political actors. The first is that the President and Congress are indifferent as to the
agency’s policies, arguing that bureaucratic outcomes are of little interest to their
constituents. For multilateral aid agencies, I argue that it is unlikely that donor gov-
ernments are indifferent as to the policies they pursue. If donor governments were
indeed indifferent, we would not observe efforts by donor governments to alter agency
behavior, or to match their preferences to those various agencies. However, both of
these behaviors have been well documented (Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Buntaine,
2014; Vreeland, 2007). The second reason that agents can become autonomous is
that the President and Congress have asymmetric information regarding the agency’s
policies. Agencies can engage in “hidden action” or can disguise their actions through
“hidden information” (Arrow, 1985). In order to avoid this, principals can monitor
their agents and attempt to avoid issues of asymmetric information through police
patrol and fire alarm mechanisms (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). Police patrol
mechanisms require the principal to actively monitor the agent’s behavior, while fire
alarm mechanisms utilize third parties interested in the agent’s behavior to alert
the principal of undesirable behavior (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Nielson and
Tierney (2003), for example, describe how donor governments were able to enact
environmental reform at the World Bank through methods such as screening and
selection, oversight, checks and balances, as well as creating new contracts. While
similar police patrol mechanisms may be difficult and costly for donor governments
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to pursue, there are many useful third parties which donors can rely on to help them
evaluate the actions of multilateral aid agencies. For example, the World Bank In-
spection Panel investigates claims of World Bank policies being disregarded during
policy implementation, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) offers civil
society groups the opportunity to file complaints when one of their projects has a
negative environmental or social consequence. A study by Buntaine (2014) also de-
scribes how states can work with civil society groups to monitor and sanction the
World Bank in order to constrain undesirable behavior. Through these monitoring
activities, donors are able to check the actions of multilateral aid agencies. The rise
of third party NGOs that work with and monitor multilateral aid agencies, as well
as the increasing emphasis on transparency and accountability among aid donors,
therefore makes the argument that asymmetric information leads to increased levels
of agency autonomy less persuasive, as it is has become more difficult for agencies
to hide their actions from donor governments.
The third potential reason that agents can become autonomous actors, and the
argument I focus on here, is that bureaucracies are responsible to multiple principals.
As each principal has their own distinct interests, the agent is able to balance and
maneuver around these divergent preferences in order to pursue their own policies
(Bryner, 1987; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Wilson, 1989). As there is weak evidence
that multilateral agency autonomy stems from either donor indifference or asym-
metric information, I argue that it is the presence of multiple principals–in this case
multiple donor governments–and their ability to control agency behavior that is truly
responsible for agency autonomy. The logic of this argument stems from the liter-
ature on congressional oversight and control of bureaucratic agencies.2 When an
2The literature also highlights three other reasons why bureaucratic control can be difficult.
First, sanctioning is costly to the principal (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Hawkins et al., 2003).
As a result, principals are often tolerant of a certain amount of agency slack, knowing that it would
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agent is responsible to multiple principals, it is more difficult for each principal to
effectively influence agency behavior, as these actors must coordinate their actions
in order to sanction undesirable agent behavior. As the group of principals grows
larger, so do problems of collective action. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989)
succinctly describe this problem in that as long as one of the principals benefits from
agency shirking, they have an incentive to block attempts to sanction the agency.
Furthermore, the agent can also observe situations in which the principals have con-
flicting preferences and exploit them in order to avoid sanctions (Pollack, 1997). As
described in studies of congressional delegation, when bureaucracies are responsible
to multiple principals, they are able to pursue independent action by balancing the
diverse preferences of their principals against each other and maneuvering among
them (Bryner, 1987; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Wilson, 1989). Therefore when the
principals do not share the same preferences, it is easier for the agent to engage in au-
tonomous behavior, as it is more difficult for their principals to effectively coordinate
their actions and impose sanctions. A similar logic can be applied to multilateral aid
agencies. When an agency is responsible to a greater number of donor governments,
the amount of influence each single donor government has over agency behavior will
diminish. Additionally, when the preferences of the donor governments diverge, the
more difficult it will be for them to coordinate their actions and attempt to sanction
agency behavior. As a result, the agency will have greater levels of autonomy when
it is responsible to a greater number of donor governments.
A potential counterargument to this is that having a single, dominant donor
government may actually enhance agency effectiveness. Rather than enhancing an
often be more costly for them to try and reign in the agent. Second, informational asymmetries
within the principal-agent model often strongly benefit the agent, and make evaluation and control
by the principal difficult (Pollack, 2003). Third, principal threats may not be credible, due to the
fact that the implementing agency is the only available option outside of creating a completely new
agency.
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agency’s ability to pursue independent policies, more members voicing their opinion
could actually constrain their activities. For instance, in the context of economic
reform, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argue that the greater amount of fractional-
ization there is within the party system, the less likely it is that economic reform
will take place. However, this argument has been challenged by several recent works.
Gehlback and Malesky (2010) in particular present a formal model and empirical
evidence on how more veto players can enable economic reform by weakening the
power of special interest groups. Other research on market reform in Latin America
by Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007), and on policy adjustments by Tommasi,
Scartascini and Stein (2010), also find beneficial effects on having more veto players.
In the context of foreign aid, the consequences of having multiple member preferences
within an agency is demonstrated by Schneider and Tobin (2013), who find that the
more donors a multilateral agency has, the greater autonomy they have in their aid
distribution decisions. Because the members are focused on solving collective action
problems, they are unable to effectively control the actions of the agency itself. Thus,
the agency benefits by being able to pursue policies based on its own criteria, rather
than those of its members.
In this subsection I focus on two mechanisms through which agency autonomy
is affected by the presence of multiple principals: (1) agency voting procedures and
(2) agency funding. Voting procedures are formal mechanisms of control established
through ex ante decisions of donor governments, which can restrict the amount of
discretion an agency has (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999), and provide principals with
greater control over the agency (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). In this way, agency
autonomy can be restricted at the very beginning due to ex ante decisions related
to institutional design. For instance, the voting power of each donor government, as
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well as the size of the majority needed to pass agency policies, are all organizational
factors through which donors can restrain agency autonomy.
The actual influence of agency voting procedures may at times, however, be quite
small. It is not uncommon, for instance, for much of the debate and negotiation of
multilateral aid policies to be concluded long before they are formally voted on. In
this way, focusing solely on voting procedures may be capturing largely pro forma
activities. In consideration of this, I examine informal sources of autonomy as well
in the form of agency funding.3 Unlike voting procedures, agency funding is a form
of ex post autonomy. This can vary over time depending on the amount of funding
the agency receives, as well as the number of sources it receives funding from. As
the agency is dependent upon donor governments for funding, cutting funds is a
key way in which they can sanction agency behavior (Pollack, 2003).4 This type of
sanctioning is likely to be particularly effective when the agency is highly dependent
on a small group of donor governments. Therefore, although voting procedures and
funding patterns affect agency autonomy in different ways, they are both mechanisms
through which donor governments can attempt to limit agency autonomy. I discuss
both voting procedures and funding patterns in more detail below.
5.2 Voting Procedures
The first source of autonomy that I argue will either enhance or detract from
multilateral aid agency effectiveness are the voting procedures of the agency. When
donor governments can easily check agency actions through voting procedures, this
is will be detrimental for agency autonomy. Thus, voting procedures are critical
facets of aid policies, as they collectively serve as a system of checks and balances for
3The importance of informal influences on agency behavior is also reflected in studies of central
bank independence by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
4Other potential sanctions include dismissing personnel, overruling the agency, refusing to com-
ply with agency decisions, or dissolving the agency (Pollack, 2003, p. 45).
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donor governments against agency behavior, and provide them with an opportunity
to influence agency policies. When donors disagree with proposed policies, voting
procedures determine their ability to reject them.5 This argument becomes clearer
when viewed in the context of the veto player literature. As articulated by Tsebelis
(2002), a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary
in order to change the status quo. The addition of each veto player shrinks the range
of available win sets that are able to overcome the status quo. As a result, when
the number of veto players increases, the more difficult it is to alter the status
quo. Tsebelis (2002) therefore argues that more veto players will result in greater
bureaucratic independence, and consequently greater policy stability. This has been
empirically demonstrated by Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003), who
show that when more veto players present, political interference in central banks is
less likely.
As mentioned above, voting procedures are ex ante sources of autonomy that are
laid out in the founding documents of multilateral agencies, along with other rules
that the agencies must adhere to, including mission, purpose, hierarchy, structure,
decision-making procedures, and oversight processes.6 Voting procedures are a key
5The danger of an agency being captured by selfishly motivated donor states is not the only
issue that may arise due to voting rules. Recipient countries can also coordinate their actions to try
and influence the policies that the agency pursues. Christensen, Homer and Nielson (2011) argue
that the increasing power of less developed countries on the Executive Boards of these agencies may
allow them to implement policies that lack the constraints or selectivity the agency might otherwise
want to pursue in the quest for better development results. This argument, however, is beyond the
scope of my study.
6These documents are similar to those used to create domestic bureaucratic agencies. Public
administration scholars Christiansen (1999) and Verhoest et al. (2004) describe how these types
of agreements impact agency policies through the amount of “managerial autonomy” and “policy
autonomy” that the agency possesses. Managerial autonomy encompasses, “financial management
(e.g. shifting budgets between line items or over years), human resources management (e.g. the
selection of employees) or the management of other production factors like logistics, organization
and housing” (Verhoest et al., 2004, p. 105), while policy autonomy refers to, “the (sub)processes
and procedures it has to conduct to produce the externally prescribed goods or services; the policy
instruments to use to implement the externally set policy and the quantity and quality of the goods
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characteristic for multilateral aid agencies because they must have their aid projects
approved by a supervisory entity. Generally, this approval comes from a Board
of Directors or Executive Board, who are themselves acting on behalf of a higher
entity.7 For example, in the Asian Development Bank, the Board of Governors is
the highest organizational body, but only meets once a year. In order to supervise
the daily functioning of the Bank, authority is delegated to a Board of Directors,
which has the authority to, “...supervise ADB’s financial statements, approve its
administrative budget, and review and approve all policy documents and all loan,
equity, and technical assistance operations” (Asian Development Bank, 2015). These
Boards have a strong role within the agency, and can use their power to strongly guide
and even alter agency policies (Bøa¨s and McNeill, 2003). When discussing agency
voting procedures, I am therefore referring to the rules that govern the agency’s
Board of Directors, or equivalent body.
Generally, I expect that the presence of more donor governments will increase
the agency’s autonomy. To clarify this argument, consider the process of passing an
aid policy as a strategic game between the agency and their Board of Directors. The
multilateral agency makes the first move and proposes an aid policy reflecting its
preferences of promoting development. The Board of Directors must then approve
the aid policy or coordinate their actions to reject it. When there are a large number
of Board members, it is more difficult for them to agree as to the types of policies
that the agency should pursue. Each member has their own domestic interests, and
reaching an agreement as to how the multilateral aid agency should distribute their
aid will thus be difficult to achieve when more members are involved (McCubbins,
or services to be produced; and the target groups and societal objectives and outcomes to be reached
by the policy” (Verhoest et al., 2004, p.105).
7Throughout the remainder of this study I refer to such entities generally as Boards of Directors
or Boards, but acknowledge that within each official aid agency their actual title may differ slightly.
148
Noll and Weingast, 1989; Nielson and Tierney, 2003). As a result, because the
Board members are unable to coordinate their preferences, the agency’s proposed
policy is passed. Lyne, Nielson and Tierney (2003) describe this quite succinctly
in the context of international organizations more generally, stating that, “...conflict
among the principals allows the agents to pursue their independent preferences much
more than if they had been accountable to a single principals or multiple principals
that had similar preferences” (p. 50). Applying the same logic here, when the agency
is accountable to a greater number of Board members, the more difficult it is for them
to coordinate their action and restrict the actions of the multilateral agency.
In addition to the number of Board Members that govern an aid agency, there are
two other components of agency voting procedures that need to be considered. The
first is whether the Board of Directors must approve an aid policy by a majority or
a supermajority vote. This varies quite substantially within aid agencies. For exam-
ple, the Arab Fund is governed by majority rule, while GAVI requires a two-thirds
majority vote in order to approve their aid policies. For convenience, I categorize all
aid agencies which require more than a simple majority as being “supermajorities.”
I expect that agencies will have more autonomy when fewer votes are needed to pass
an aid policy. That is, I expect agencies with majority voting systems to have more
autonomy than agencies with supermajority systems. When agencies require a su-
permajority, it is easier for the policy to be blocked, as it takes fewer Board members
voting against the policy for it to fail. For example in a majority vote system, more
than half of all Board members would have to vote against the proposed policy. On
the other hand, in an agency requiring a three-fourths majority, only little more than
a quarter of the Board members would have to coordinate in order to successfully
block the aid policy.
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The second component is how voting power is distributed. There are typically two
forms of voting power distributions within multilateral aid agencies: one-member-
one-vote systems and proportional systems. In the one-member-one-vote systems,
each member of the Board of Directors is allotted a single vote. UNICEF, for exam-
ple, has an Executive Board of 36 members that are elected from the UN’s Economic
and Social Council. Within the Executive Board, each member is able to cast a single
vote. Alternatively, in a proportional system, voting power is distributed in a manner
roughly equivalent to the amount of funding that the donor government provides or
the number of capital subscriptions that they hold. In the IDB, for instance, “Each
member country shall have 135 votes plus one vote for each share of ordinary capital
stock of the Bank held by that country...” (IADB, 2015). Other agencies have simi-
lar, though not identical proportional voting systems. The AfDB, for instance, allots
its members 625 votes in addition to one vote for each share of capital the member
holds. For agencies with one-member-one-vote systems, the presence of more Board
members should enhance the agency’s autonomy, as there are more preferences that
must be balanced within the agency. For proportional voting systems however, the
implications of more Board members are not quite as straightforward. When voting
power is based on funding patterns, then the ability of a single donor government
to influence agency policies may either be enhanced or diminished. If the donor
government provides a substantial portion of the agency’s funding, then the agency
will have a greater influence on voting procedures, whereas the donor may have a
small or negligible influence on the agency if they only provide a small portion of
the agency’s funding. Generally, I expect that agencies with proportional voting
systems will have less autonomy compared to agencies with one-member-one-vote
systems. Proportional systems allow Board members the possibility of increasing
their voting power, and therefore their influence over multilateral agencies. One-
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member-one-vote systems, on the other hand, maintain a limited range of influence
for each Board member. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that Board members can
use their vote share to influence agency policies in a proportional voting system.
5.2.1 Measurement
In order to examine levels of agency autonomy, I create an original dataset focus-
ing on the voting structures of forty multilateral aid agencies. The sample of agencies
are those included in the OECD’s aid datasets. In order to measure the voting pro-
cedures of multilateral aid agencies, I create variables based on the rules that govern
the agency’s Board of Directors using the agency’s founding document as a guideline.
If information on Board members is not included in this document, I use information
available on the agency’s website. The first variable I create is Board Members, a
count of the members on an agency’s Board of Directors or equivalent body. More
Board members are expected to result in greater agency autonomy. Table 5.1 lists
each agency and the number of Board members it has.8 Generally, agencies with
smaller Boards are regional development banks, whereas agencies with larger Boards
include the World Bank and UN agencies. The agency with the largest Board is
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is governed
by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (UNESCO). This implies that autonomy
levels within World Bank and UN agencies should generally be higher compared to
those of regional development banks.
The next variable capture how many votes are needed in order to pass day-to-
day aid policies. Of the forty aid agencies that I examine, approximately half of
8I list the number of Board members that an agency has currently. In several cases, however, the
number of Board members on an agency has changed. For instance, the IBRD, IDA, IDA Special
Funds, IFC, and MIGA all originally had 12 Board members, but this number has subsequently
increased to 25. Interestingly these agencies generally all share the exact same Board members,
although each Board operates individually. Unfortunately, this type of information is not often
available. Therefore I use the current number of Board members whenever possible.
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Table 5.1: Multilateral Aid Agency Board Members
Agency Board Members
African Development Bank 20
African Development Fund 14
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 11
Arab Fund (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development) 8
Asian Development Bank 10
Asian Development Bank Special Funds 10
Caribbean Development Bank 18
Central American Bank for Economic Integration 9
EU Institutions –
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 23
European Commission –
European Development Fund –
European Investment Bank 29
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations 10
Global Environment Facility 32
Global Fund 15
IDB Special Fund 14
Inter-American Development Bank 14
International Fund for Agricultural Development 18
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 25
International Development Association 25
International Development Association - Multilateral Debt Relief Ini-
tiative
25
International Finance Corporation 25
International Monetary Fund (Concessional Trust Funds) 20
Islamic Development Bank 10
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 22
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 25
Nordic Development Fund 8
OPEC Fund for International Development –
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 54
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 14
United Nations Democratic Republic of Congo Pooled Fund –
United Nations Development Program 36
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe –
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 36
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 31
United Nations Population Fund 36
United Nations Relief and Words Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East
27
World Food Programme 36
World Health Organization 34
Notes: I only include Board Members who represent states. For example,
GAVI has 18 Board Members, but only 10 of them are states.
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them require a simple majority to pass their aid policies. These agencies include a
number of development banks, as well as most of the UN agencies. Fifteen agencies,
however, require more than a simple majority. The Caribbean Development Bank,
for instance, requires a two-thirds majority, the UNECE requires a three-fourths
majority, while the Nordic Development Fund, UNICEF, and the UN Peacebuiliding
Fund (UNPBF) require a consensus. Table 5.2 lists these agencies that require more
than a simple majority and states the number of votes required for them to pass an aid
program. To code this component of agency voting procedures, I create two different
variables on the majority rules of the agency. The first, Majority Rule, Dummy,
is a dummy variable which is coded as one for all agencies in which a majority is
required, and zero for all agencies that require a more than a simple majority, which
I refer to as “supermajority.” The second, Majority Rule, Categorical, is a categorical
variable that entails a more detailed coding of agency voting requirements. Agencies
which require a simple majority vote are coded as three, while agencies which require
sixty-percent or two-thirds majority are coded as two, agencies which require a three-
fourths majority are coded as one, and agencies which require a consensus are coded
as zero. For each of these two variables, higher values indicate higher levels of
autonomy.
The fourth variable is whether the agency has a one-member-one-vote system or
a proportional voting system. This variable, Vote System is a categorical variable,
coded as two for agencies with a one-member-one-vote system, one for agencies with
both a one-member-one-vote system and a proportional system, and zero for agen-
cies with a proportional voting system. Once again, the variable is coded so that
higher values indicate greater agency autonomy. Most agencies with one-member-
one-vote systems are UN agencies, or other issue specific aid agencies, such as the
GAVI or the Global Fund, whereas most agencies with proportional systems are de-
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Table 5.2: Multilateral Aid Agencies Requiring a Supermajority
Agency Majority Required
Global Environment Facility Sixty percent
African Development Bank Two-thirds
Asian Development Bank Two-thirds
Asian Development Bank Special Funds Two-thirds
Caribbean Development Bank Two-thirds
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations Two-thirds
OPEC Fund for International Development Two-thirds
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Two-thirds
African Development Fund Three-fourths
IDB Special Fund Three-fourths
Inter-American Development Bank Three-fourths
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Three-fourths
Nordic Development Fund Consensus
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund Consensus
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Consensus
velopment banks or other financial funds. The GEF is distinct in this area in that
its encompasses both types of voting systems.
Table 5.3 classifies each of the agencies in my sample according to the variables
Vote System and Majority Rule, Dummy. The first column lists those agencies that
have a one-member-one-vote system, and the second column lists agencies which
have a proportional voting system. The first row are agencies that have a majority
voting system while the second row includes agencies with a supermajority voting
system. The Table shows that slightly more than half of the agencies in my dataset
are proportional voting systems, compared to fifteen agencies with one-member-
one-vote systems. Majority voting systems are also slightly more prevalent, with
twenty agencies compared to fifteen which require a supermajority. Clearly, there
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Table 5.3: Summary of Agency Voting Procedures
One-Member-One-Vote Proportional Voting
Majority Majority
UNAIDS AFESD
UNDP BADEA
UNFPA CABEI
UNHCR EBRD
UNRWA EIB
WFP IBRD
WHO IDA
IDA-MDRI
IFAD
IFC
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)
Isl. Dev Bank
MIGA
Supermajority Supermajority
GAVI AfDB
GEF* AfDF
Nordic Dev. Fund AsDB Special Fund
OFID Asian Dev. Bank
OSCE CarDB
UNECE GEF*
UNICEF IDB
UNPBF IDB Sp. Funds
*In the GEF, votes are based on membership and funding.
Notes: The Global Fund is a one-member-one-vote system
but is missing data on vote majorities needed.
Information is fully missing for the EC, EDF, EU Institutions,
and UN Fund for Congo.
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is significant variation within multilateral aid agencies when classified according to
their voting procedures.
5.3 Agency Funding
The second source of autonomy that I argue will impact agency effectiveness is
agency funding. While voting structures capture the official role that donors have
in approving agency policies, agency funding also plays an important role. Since the
agency must continue to receive funds from donor governments in order to maintain
their aid operations, the threat of a donor government reducing or eliminating fund-
ing to the agency can have an important impact on the agency’s policies, regardless of
the voting procedures of the agency. In exchange for funding, donor governments can
attempt to extract policy concessions from multilateral agencies such as revising their
operating procedures, using domestic firms from donor governments to implement
aid projects, distributing more aid to recipients who are strategically or economi-
cally important to the donor government, or removing conditionality constraints of
aid projects in order to placate friendly recipient governments. Essentially, donor
governments can use financial contributions in order to secure their own interests
rather than promoting those of the multilateral agency.
The influence of budgets has been highlighted previously by scholars of public
administration as well international relations. Christiansen (1999); Verhoest et al.
(2004), for example, describe how financial autonomy influences the ability of the
principals to constrain the behavior of bureaucratic agencies. Financial autonomy is
defined as the extent to which the agency is dependent on the government for funding,
or if it is able to generate its own revenue. Within the European Commission, Pollack
(2003) discusses how one of the key ways governments can sanction the organization
is through budget cuts. As the agency needs funds in order to operate, monetary
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sanctions are one of the most severe and effective ways to entice the agency to adopt
policies preferred by the donor. A prime example is the influence of the U.S. in
World Bank environmental reform as described by Hicks et al. (2010). The authors
specifically state that, “As the largest shareholder, the US government learned very
quickly that the most effective way to influence the Bank’s behavior is to threaten
the flow of its money” (p. 194). When the World Bank did not acquiesce to U.S.
demands regarding access to GEF project documents, $30 million of funding was
redirected to USAID (Hicks et al., 2010). Martens (2005) also describes how donor
funding can influence agency behavior, stating that, “most agencies take care not to
approve a budget that runs counter to the interests of the major donors” (p. 659).
Agency funding can be either a formal or informal source of autonomy, depending
upon the agency’s voting procedures. For agencies with a proportional voting system,
funding patterns are a formal means of agency control, as voting power is distributed
based on funds provided to the agency. For agencies with one-member-one-vote
systems, donors can also informally influence agency policies through their monetary
contributions.
The ability of a donor government to use their funds as a way to influence agency
policies also depends on the number of other donor governments the agency receives
funding from, as well as the size of these contributions. Unlike a domestic bureau-
cracy, multilateral aid agencies do not depend on a single source for their funding.
Rather, they can potentially receive contributions from dozens of donor governments.
As a result, the funding of a single donor government becomes less important as the
number of other donor governments increase. If an agency receives contributions
from fifty donor governments, it is less likely to alter its policies if a single one
threatens to reduce or stop their funding, as the agency will still be supported by
forty-nine others. On the other hand, if the agency is only funded by a handful of
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donor governments, a loss of any one of those will have a much more substantial im-
pact. An increased number of donor governments funding the agency also increases
the likelihood that the donor governments will disagree about the types of policies
that they want the agency to pursue, allowing the agency greater levels of autonomy.
In addition to the number of donors that an agency receives funding from, it is
also important to consider the distribution of this funding across donor governments.
If a multilateral agency receives a majority of its funding from a single or small group
of donor governments, there is a greater possibility that the agency will have lower
autonomy. When agency funding is concentrated, the agency is more likely to alter
their policies to fall in line with those donor governments providing the majority of
their funding. When agency funding is more equally dispersed among donors, the
agency is less beholden to each government, and can pursue autonomous aid policies.
Consider, for example, an agency that receives 90% of its funding from a single donor
government, while another ten donor governments provide 1% each. The agency will
clearly value the large donor the most, giving it a strong degree of influence over
agency policies. This is true regardless of the agency’s formal voting procedure.
Alternatively, a single donor government is unable to have this degree of influence
when agency funding is more equally dispersed. Thus, it is not only the number of
donor governments that we must consider, but also the amount of funding that each
of them provides relative to the others.
This argument regarding funding concentration is also helpful because it accounts
for the potential presence of a dominant donor government. For example, in 2014 the
U.S. had a 16.75% vote share in the IMF (IMF, 2015). Although most IMF policies
only require a simple majority to be passed, in some instances they require an 85%
supermajority to pass a resolution, effectively providing the U.S. with veto power
over IMF policies. The consequences of this have been described by Stone (2004)
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and Stone (2008), who shows how the preponderance of U.S. power within the IMF
allows it to remove conditionality constraints for recipients that it considers to be
strategically important. The U.S. also acts as a dominant donor government in the
Inter-American Development Bank, as it holds approximately 30% of the agency’s
vote share, and a three-fourths majority is required to approve agency policies (IADB,
2015). In this way, the U.S. actually has veto power over the agency. When donors
have a substantial amount of voting power within an aid agency, then the autonomy
of the agency suffers. In order to gain approval of their aid programs, agencies with
a veto player will have to ensure the policy is acceptable to their dominant member.
5.3.1 Measurement
I next examine agency funding patterns. In order to capture budgetary forms of
control, I use OECD data on donor contributions to multilateral aid agencies from
1968-2013. The unit of analysis is agency-year and all aid values are commitments
measured in constant 2012 USD million. While the dataset does not include fund-
ing information for all forty aid agencies included in my sample, it does provide
information for twenty-five of these agencies.9 These are listed in Table 5.4.
To examine my arguments, I create two variables related to agency funding.
The first, Number of Donors, is a count of the number of DAC donor governments
contributing to each agency.10 Figure 5.1 shows the average number of donor gov-
ernments that provide aid to each multilateral aid agency. In the graph, I separate
agencies into “international” and “regional” types in order to highlight the differ-
9Unfortunately the sample size here is much smaller than the universe of all multilateral aid
agencies. Future work should endeavor to document in greater detail the sources of all multilateral
agency funding.
10The OECD data has significantly limited data on funds received from non-DAC donors. How-
ever, as DAC members are generally the largest aid donors, and those who we would most expect to
try and pressure multilateral agencies to alter their aid policies, I do not believe excluding non-DAC
donors posses a problem for my argument here.
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Table 5.4: Multilateral Agencies with Funding Information
Af. D B
African Dev. Fund
AsDB Special Funds
Asian Dev. Bank
CABEI
Caribbean Dev. Bank
EC
EDF
EIB
IBRD
IDA
IDA-MDRI
IDB
IDB Special Oper. Fund
IFAD
IFC
IMF
MIGA
UN Fund For Congo
UNDP
UNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNRWA
WFP
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ences between them. Most of the UN agencies, with the exception of the UN Fund
for Congo, receive contributions from at least seventeen donor governments, whereas
several development banks receive funding from only a few. Generally, although
multilateral agencies receive on average funding from approximately twelve donor
governments each year, regional agencies appear to receive funding from slightly less
than average, while international agencies receive funding from more than average.
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Figure 5.1: Average Number of Donors by Agency
The second variable captures the concentration of agency funding. In order to
create this variable, I use the Herfindahl Index which, as discussed in the previous
section on specialization, is commonly used in economics to calculate market share.
The unit of analysis is agency-year. The variable is calculated as follows:
Funding Concentrationit =
n∑
d=1
a2dt
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where i represents each multilateral aid agency, d represents each donor government,
and t represents each year. The value adt indicates the proportion of aid a donor
government provides to an agency in a given year compared to total of contributions
to the agency in that year. The variable Funding Concentration can be interpreted as
the probability that two randomly selected aid dollars being given to an agency are
from the same donor government. Higher values indicate that the agency’s funding
is concentrated among fewer donor governments, while lower values indicate that
the agency’s funding is more equally distributed. Table 5.5 presents an example
of this calculation similar to Table 4.3 in Section 4. In this case, however, we are
examining agency funding rather than agency expenditure. In the Table, Agency
1 is funded equally by four different donor governments, whereas Agency 2 receives
most of its funding from a single donor government. The final HHI value captures
this difference, as the HHI for Agency 1 is much lower than the HHI for Agency
2. Therefore, I expect Agency 1 to be more autonomous, as its funding is not as
concentrated as that of Agency 2.
Figure 5.2 shows that on average, multilateral aid agencies have relatively well
dispersed aid funding. Funding Concentration generally varies between 0.2 and 0.4.
Figure 5.3 shows the average level of Funding Concentration for each agency. Once
again, I separate agencies into “international and “regional” groups. As can be ex-
pected from their high number of donor governments funding them, UN agencies have
low levels Funding Concentration. Meanwhile, contributions to regional agencies are
generally more concentrated. For instance, the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI) has the highest average level of Funding Concentration.
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Table 5.5: Example Calculation of Autonomy Herfindahl Index
Agency 1 Agency 2
Contribution Proportion Contribution Proportion
Amount of Total Amount of Total
Donor 1 $5 million 0.25 $17 million 0.85
Donor 2 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Donor 3 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Donor 4 $5 million 0.25 $1 million 0.05
Total: $20 million 1.00 $20 million 1.00
Calculation: 0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252 0.852 + 0.052 + 0.052 + 0.052
HHI: 0.25 0.73
Autonomy: High Low
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Figure 5.2: Average Yearly Funding Concentration
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Figure 5.3: Average Funding Concentration by Agency
Table 5.6: Summary Statistics of Agency Funding Variables
Variable Mean Median Variance Min Max N
Number of Donors 11.91 12 41.25 1 26 920
Funding Concentration 0.31 0.21 0.06 0.08 1.0 920
Table 5.6 presents summary statistics for the two variables described above. The
data clearly indicate that there is substantial variation within multilateral aid agen-
cies with regards to their funding patterns. While some agencies receive relatively
well distributed funding from a large number of donor governments, others receive
much more concentrated funding from a smaller number of donor governments. From
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my argument above, the implications of this are that the agencies with more donors
and aid which is relatively less concentrated will have substantially more autonomy,
and should be able to deliver better results on development policies.
5.4 Comparing Agency Autonomy
Having collecting information regarding both agency voting procedures and agency
funding, in this subsection I combine these variables in order to rank and compare the
expected autonomy levels of multilateral aid agencies. I begin by creating a subindex
based solely on the voting procedures of each agency. Unlike agency funding patterns,
these characteristics are constant over time. In order to create this index, I calculate
the percentile rank of the variables Board Members, Majority Rule, Categorical, and
Vote System, where higher percentile ranks indicate higher levels of autonomy. I
then average these three variables to create a subindex of the agency’s overall level
of voting procedure autonomy.11 The results are presented in Table 5.7. According
to the rankings, the most autonomous agency is the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the UN. In fact, with the exception of the European Investment Bank, the
top ten most autonomous agencies based on voting procedures are all UN affiliated
agencies. Meanwhile, the regional development banks and funds are ranked as the
least autonomous agencies, with the Inter-American Development Bank scoring the
lowest.
I next create a subindex for multilateral aid agencies based on their funding pat-
terns using the two agency funding variables created above, Number of Donors and
Funding Concentration. In order to rank agencies according to their funding pat-
terns, I transform the variable Funding Concentration so that higher values indicate
greater levels of autonomy. The resulting variable, Funding Distribution is there-
11This method of using percentile rankings is also used by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Easterly
and Williamson (2011) in their ranking of aid agency practices.
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Table 5.7: Subindex for Agency Voting Procedures
Board Vote Overall
Number Majority System Percentile
Agency Rank Percentile Percentile Percentile Rank
FAO 1 97% - 79% 88%
UNHCR 2 100% 73% 79% 84%
UNFPA 3 90% 73% 79% 81%
WFP 3 90% 73% 79% 81%
UNDP 3 90% 73% 79% 81%
WHO 6 83% 73% 79% 78%
ILO 7 72% - 79% 76%
UNRWA 8 69% 73% 79% 74%
UNAIDS 9 50% 73% 79% 67%
EIB 10 75% 73% 28% 58%
UNICEF 11 90% 6% 79% 58%
Global Fund 12 36% - 79% 58%
GEF 13 81% 33% 55% 56%
OFID 14 - 33% 79% 56%
UNPBF 15 78% 6% 79% 54%
IDA-MDRI 16 61% 73% 28% 54%
MIGA 16 61% 73% 28% 54%
IFC 16 61% 73% 28% 54%
IDA 16 61% 73% 28% 54%
IBRD 16 61% 73% 28% 54%
EBRD 21 53% 73% 28% 51%
IMF 22 46% 73% 28% 49%
UNECE 23 - 16% 79% 47%
OSCE 24 29% 33% 79% 47%
IFAD 25 40% 73% 28% 47%
GAVI 26 15% 33% 79% 42%
BADEA 27 22% 73% 28% 41%
Isl.Dev Bank 28 15% 73% 28% 39%
CABEI 29 8% 73% 28% 36%
Af. D B 30 46% 33% 28% 35%
AFESD 31 4% 73% 28% 35%
Caribbean Dev. Bank 32 40% 33% 28% 34%
Nordic Dev. Fund 33 4% 6% 79% 30%
AsDB Special Funds 34 15% 33% 28% 25%
Asian Dev. Bank 34 15% 33% 28% 25%
African Dev. Fund 36 29% 16% 28% 24%
IDB 36 29% 16% 28% 24%
IDB Special Oper. Fund 36 29% 16% 28% 24%
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fore simply calculated as 1 – Funding Concentration. This can be interpreted as the
probability that two randomly selected aid dollars will have originated from different
donor governments. Next, because these two variables change over time, I first ob-
tain the average of both variables. I then calculate the agency’s percentile rank for
each of these variables, and average the percentile ranks in order to determine the
agency’s final ranking on funding patterns.12 The results are presented in Table 5.8.
Once again, many of the UN agencies are ranked highest, with the UNDP, UNICEF,
and UNFPA claiming the top three spots. Unlike the subindex on voting procedures,
however, regional development banks are not all ranked at the bottom. The African
Development Fund, for example, ranks sixth in terms of agency funding autonomy.
On the other hand, CABEI is ranked the lowest, indicating that it relies heavily on
few donors for its funding.
12As a robustness check, I also used an alternative method by calculating agency percentile ranks
for each year and averaging across those values. The results are highly correlated to those presented
here (r = 0.988).
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Table 5.8: Subindex for Agency Funding Patterns
Number Funding Overall
of Donors Distribution Percentile
Agency Rank Percentile Percentile Rank
UNDP 1 100% 100% 100%
UNICEF 2 96% 96% 96%
UNFPA 3 88% 92% 90%
IDA 4 80% 88% 84%
UNRWA 5 92% 64% 78%
UNHCR 6 84% 68% 76%
WFP 6 76% 76% 76%
IFAD 6 72% 80% 76%
African Dev. Fund 6 68% 84% 76%
EC 10 56% 72% 64%
AsDB Special Funds 11 64% 60% 62%
IBRD 12 44% 52% 48%
IDA-MDRI 13 48% 44% 46%
Asian Dev. Bank 14 60% 28% 44%
EDF 14 32% 56% 44%
IMF 16 52% 32% 42%
Af. D B 17 40% 40% 40%
IFC 18 28% 48% 38%
IDB 19 36% 36% 36%
IDB Special Oper. Fund 20 24% 24% 24%
EIB 21 16% 20% 18%
Caribbean Dev. Bank 22 12% 16% 14%
MIGA 22 20% 8% 14%
UN Fund For Congo 24 8% 12% 10%
CABEI 25 4% 4% 4%
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Last, I combine the subindices on agency voting procedures and funding patterns
to create a composite index of agency autonomy. To create the final rankings on
agency autonomy, I averaged the percentile ranks of voting patterns and agency
funding patterns and ranked the agencies accordingly. The results are presented in
Table 5.9. The agency ranks presented in the second column only rank those agencies
for which I have complete data, while I include rankings for agencies with incomplete
data in the final column.13 Examining the agencies with complete data, the most
autonomous agency according to my index is the UNDP. Other UN agencies also
score quite high, occupying the next five highest positions. The World Bank agencies
(IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA) are scattered throughout the rankings, with the IDA being
ranked 7th, while MIGA is ranked 18th. Regional development banks and funds are
generally expected to have lower levels of autonomy, as most of them are in the
lower half of the index rankings. This observation holds even if we examine rankings
including agencies with missing data. The rankings based on missing data also
confirm that UN agencies are generally expected to be more autonomous than World
Bank agencies, regional development banks or funds, and issue specific agencies.
Interestingly, issue specific agencies are either ranked in the middle, such as the
Global Fund, or more towards the bottom, such as GAVI.
13In effect, the final ranking assigns weights of 0.167 to each of the voting procedure variables
and weights of 0.25 to each of the funding variables. As a robustness check, I also calculated each
agency’s rank allowing the variables to have equal weight (0.20). The results are essentially the
same (r = 0.986).
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Table 5.9: Composite Index of Agency Autonomy
Overall Vote Funding Alternative
Agency Rank Percentile Percentile Percentile Rank
UNDP 1 90% 81% 100% 1
UNFPA 2 85% 81% 90% 3
UNHCR 3 80% 84% 76% 4
WFP 4 78% 81% 76% 6
UNICEF 5 77% 58% 96% 7
UNRWA 6 76% 74% 78% 8
IDA 7 69% 54% 84% 10
IFAD 8 61% 47% 76% 13
IBRD 9 51% 54% 48% 19
African Dev. Fund 10 50% 24% 76% 20
IDA-MDRI 11 50% 54% 46% 21
IFC 12 46% 54% 38% 24
IMF 13 45% 49% 42% 25
AsDB Special Funds 14 44% 25% 62% 27
EIB 15 38% 58% 18% 31
Af. D B 16 38% 35% 40% 32
Asian Dev. Bank 17 35% 25% 44% 34
MIGA 18 34% 54% 14% 35
IDB 19 30% 24% 36% 36
IDB Special Oper. Fund 20 24% 24% 24% 38
Caribbean Dev. Bank 21 24% 34% 14% 39
CABEI 22 20% 36% 4% 40
FAO - - 88% - 2
WHO - - 78% - 5
ILO - - 76% - 9
UNAIDS - - 67% - 11
EC - - - 64% 12
Global Fund - - 58% - 14
GEF - - 56% - 15
OFID - - 56% - 16
UNPBF - - 54% - 17
EBRD - - 51% - 18
UNECE - - 47% - 22
OSCE - - 47% - 23
EDF - - - 44% 26
GAVI - - 42% - 28
BADEA - - 41% - 29
Isl.Dev Bank - - 39% - 30
AFESD - - 35% - 33
Nordic Dev. Fund - - 30% - 37
UN Fund For Congo - - - 10% 41
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5.5 Conclusion
In this section, I have described in more detail how agency autonomy impacts aid
effectiveness in the context of multilateral aid agencies. Focusing on how multilateral
agencies are accountable to multiple principals, I emphasize how voting procedures
and agency funding are important sources of agency autonomy, and present an orig-
inal dataset with five variables capturing these factors for forty aid agencies.
Examining overall levels of agency autonomy, the general trend presented here is
that UN agencies should be more autonomous than other types of multilateral aid
agencies. This autonomy stems from two main sources: the larger Boards of Directors
that the agency has, as well as the greater number of donors providing funding to
the agencies. With such a diffusion of power within the agency, it is difficult for any
single donor or group of donors to control agency behavior. The opposite trend is
apparent for regional development banks. These agencies are generally beholden to
a smaller group of Directors and donor governments, enhancing each actor’s ability
to control agency behavior.
The next step is to test whether agencies with higher levels of autonomy are in fact
more effective at promoting development. Drawing together my previous theoretical
work, I proceed in the next three sections to test my argument that multilateral aid
is more effective at promoting development. In these empirical tests of my argument,
I examine how a key development outcome, economic growth, is affected by agency
type and agency characteristics. Using the variables created here and in Section 4 on
agency specialization, I examine their impact on aid effectiveness. Taken together,
these studies will provide concrete evidence as to not only the overall effectiveness
of multilateral aid compared to bilateral aid, but also the importance of accounting
for the varying institutional characteristics of these agencies.
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6. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID: AGENCY MOTIVATION
In this section, I test my first hypothesis related to aid effectiveness. As discussed
in Section 3, multilateral aid agencies are expected to be more effective at promoting
development than bilateral aid agencies because of their politically neutral motiva-
tions. As a result, the aid that multilateral agencies provide to recipient countries
should be more effective because it will target poorer countries and target countries
with better institutions, reduce transaction costs. While numerous studies have ex-
amined the relationship between aid and development, my study differs from these
previous works in by focusing on the distinction between bilateral and multilateral
aid agencies, and examining how agency characteristics impact aid results.
Although there are numerous indicators along which development progress could
be measured, the key indicator that I focus on is economic growth, as this is the pre-
dominant indicator of development among studies of aid effectiveness. As numerous
researchers have noted, estimations of aid and economic growth are plagued with
empirical challenges, most notably the issue of endogeneity between aid allocation
and a recipient country’s economic growth rate. Before beginning my analysis, I
review this literature and discuss these estimation problems in the context of my
theoretical approach. This review has several benefits. First, as much of the litera-
ture on aid and growth involves replications and extensions, it is helpful to provide
a more detailed discussion of these foundational studies. Second, the literature re-
view provides guidance as to the potential methodological approaches that can be
undertaken. Finally, this review further illustrates the gaps in the literature that I
am able to fill here.
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The results of my analysis are quite striking. First, they indicate that multilateral
aid is more effective than bilateral aid at promoting economic growth. Additionally,
my results indicate that there is a significant statistical difference between the effect
of bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Overall, the results support Hypothesis 1
regarding the impact of agency motivation on aid effectiveness.
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. First, I present a literature
review of past studies that have empirically estimated the relationship between for-
eign aid and economic growth. I focus my discussion on the various methodological
approaches that previous scholars have used, as well as the benefits and drawbacks
of each approach. Second, I describe my methodological approaches and how my
estimation methods address concerns specific to models of economic growth and for-
eign aid. Third, I describe my data and sources. In particular, I discuss how I
separate aid, both by agency type and specialization levels. By breaking down aid in
this manner, I am able to more accurately identify the types of agencies and agency
characteristics that are best for aid effectiveness. Fourth, I empirically test my first
hypothesis that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid because it is al-
located without geopolitical motivations. To conclude, I summarize my results and
discuss their implications for the debate over aid effectiveness.
6.1 Past Studies of Aid and Economic Growth
I begin my literature review with the work of economist Peter Boone from the
mid-1990s.1 In his work, Boone argues that different political regimes will spend aid
in a manner that will benefit their supporters. He then demonstrates that elitist
governments can be expected to waste aid funds, as they will use aid to maximize
their own welfare (Boone, 1996). To conduct his analysis, Boone treats aid as an
1For additional reviews on the relationship between aid and growth see Dalgaard, Hansen and
Tarp (2000), Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008), and Roodman (2014).
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endogenous variable that is determined by primarily by the size of the aid recipient,
as well as various political factors. He therefore uses the following variables as in-
struments for aid flows: the recipient country’s population; whether the recipient is
a friend of the U.S., OPEC, or France; and past inflows of aid that have been lagged
twice. His sample covers 96 countries and his time period uses three year averages
from 1971-1973 and 1988-1990. Although he uses a variety of estimation techniques
including ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and fixed effects regression,
his results generally reach the same conclusion: as government consumption rises
due to aid inflows, there is no evidence that it results in increased benefits to the
poor, as measured by infant mortality, primary schooling, and life expectancy. He
concludes that while aid may increase the size of government, it has no significant
impact on combating poverty.
The next major study of aid and growth was conducted by Craig Burnside and
David Dollar. In their article, Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that aid does have
a positive impact on growth, but that its impact is conditional on good economic
policies in the recipient country. In order to demonstrate this, the authors create a
policy index comprised of the weighted impact on growth of the following variables:
the Sachs and Warner dummy variable for trade openness, inflation, budget surplus,
and government consumption. Similar to Boone, the authors use an instrumental
variable approach in their estimation. Specifically, they use their policy variable, the
population of the recipient, arms imports relative to total imports, and a series of
dummy variables capturing the political interests of various donor governments as
instruments for aid allocation. Burnside and Dollar’s sample included 56 countries
and uses four year averages from 1970-1973 to 1990-1993. Using both OLS and two-
staged least squares, the authors find that the interaction of aid with their policy
variable has a positive impact on economic growth. Studies by Collier and Dollar
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(2001, 2002) bolstered these results, as they also found a positive relationship be-
tween aid and good policy environments. Other studies, however, sharply criticized
these findings. Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2002) in particular presented a study
in which they maintained Burnside and Dollar’s methodology, but extended their
data to include the time period of 1993-1997, as well as an additional six recipient
countries. Once this data was added, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2002) pro-
duce results that contradict those of Burnside and Dollar (2000). In particular, the
positive effect of aid in recipients with good policy environments disappears, leading
the authors to conclude that aid has no discernible impact on growth in recipient
countries.
A further progression in the aid and growth literature was allowing aid to impact
growth patterns in a non-linear manner. By including aid squared in their studies,
the work of Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenaway (1998),
and Lensink and White (1999) indicated that aid has a positive effect on growth, but
that this effect has a diminishing return. Hansen and Tarp (2001) then combined
the insights of these studies with the logic advanced by Burnside and Dollar (2000)
that aid is only consequential for growth in good policy environments by including a
quadratic aid variable and aid’s interaction with the policy variable. In order to ana-
lyze their theory, the authors use OLS as well as an instrumental variables approach.
Initially, the aid variable is instrumented in much the same ways as it was in Easterly,
Levine and Roodman (2002), although Hansen and Tarp (2001) lag all aid regressors
by one period and also add the squared value of aid. However, the authors argue
that their insignificant findings are due to a lack of exogeneity of the instrumented
aid variables. Additionally, the authors posit that ignoring country specific effects
is also leading to inaccurate results. To remedy these problems, Hansen and Tarp
(2001) instead suggest using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation.
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The authors describe that while an instrumental variables approach is able to model
endogeneity (as long as the chosen instruments are valid), any country specific effects
are subsumed into the error term, leading to inconsistent estimation since growth
(the dependent variable) will be correlated with the error term. Using a fixed effects
model to address this issue is problematic because it assumes that the independent
variables are exogenous to the error term. The benefit of GMM estimation is that
it offers a way to include country fixed effects along with potentially endogenous
regressors. Estimation using GMM differences the data to remove the fixed effects,
and then uses lagged observations to instrument the endogenous variables. Given
these benefits, Hansen and Tarp (2001) use GMM regression models in their anal-
ysis and find that aid has quite a substantial effect on economic growth. However,
when comparing OLS and GMM estimations, the authors find that the results are
quite sensitive to estimation techniques. Although their results in regards to aid and
growth are are variable, their analysis of the impact of aid on investment is more
robust, leading them to conclude that aid is able to increase economic growth both
directly and indirectly through increasing investment flows.
An article by Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) contributes to the literature
by adding geographical factors that they argue are structural characteristics with
a direct impact on economic growth. In particular, geographical factors such as
tropical land area, tropical diseases, and being landlocked have been shown to be
detrimental for growth. By including an interaction of aid along with the proportion
of tropical land, the authors demonstrate that the significant finding by Burnside
and Dollar (2000) regarding the interaction of the aid and policy variable disappears,
while the new interaction term is significant and negative. These findings also hold
when including a squared value of aid, as estimated in Hansen and Tarp (2001). The
authors investigate this relationship using a series of OLS and GMM regressions,
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and consistently find that when the proportion of tropical land is included, aid has
a positive and significant impact on rates of real GDP per capita growth. Thus,
the authors conclude that it is geography, rather than policy, that is is driving aid’s
influence on growth.
Returning to the issue of endogeneity, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) argue that
past studies of aid and growth have used inappropriate instruments. In particular,
the authors are critical of the use of aid and policy variables as valid instruments,
stating that it is unlikely that they are truly exogenous to growth patterns in the
recipient country. The authors further argue that including lagged aid and pol-
icy variables as instruments essentially “amounts to claiming that contemporaneous
policy affects growth directly but lagged policy does not” (Rajan and Subramanian,
2008, p. 648). A similar argument can be made with regards to including a lagged
value of aid as an instrument. Responding to these instrumentation problems, the
authors suggest using variables that focus on donor rather than recipient character-
istics, thus modeling the supply side of aid allocation. Aid is therefore estimated
for each donor-agency pair using variables such as colonial past, common language,
the population ratio of the donor to the recipient, and various interactions of these
variables. The resulting estimates are then summed across donors for each recipi-
ent and each time period. Using this alternative method of instrumenting for aid,
the authors then investigate aid and growth using OLS, instrumental variables, and
GMM regressions. Throughout their analyses, however, the authors find no positive
significant relationship between aid and growth. They suggest that one potential av-
enue for future research is to investigate more direct evidence of the channels through
which aid can impact growth.
In another study, Clemens et al. (2012) also criticize the use of weak instruments
and further argue that past work has not adequately considered the timing effects
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of aid. First, the authors argue that the instruments used for aid in Boone (1996),
Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) are quite weak. The
authors then demonstrate that population size is the primary determinant, while the
political ties variables add little power to the instrument. In light of the problems
associated with valid instrumentation of the aid variable, Clemens et al. (2012) take
a different approach. First, they re-estimate past aid and growth regressions using
original (or highly similar) data and methods. Second, they perform the same regres-
sions, but first difference them in order to remove country specific effects, and include
a lagged aid variable. Finally, the authors restrict the aid variable to funds that can
be expected to have a short term impact on aid, and exclude funding related to more
long term goals. The authors then replicate past studies and demonstrate that with
these alterations, the effect of aid on growth becomes positive and significant, and is
robust to multiple specifications.
Testing the fragility of many of these previous studies, Roodman (2007) demon-
strates how changes in periods, control variables, definitions of aid, definitions of
policy, removing outliers, and sample size can alter results. To do this, Roodman
(2007) performs 77 robustness checks on seven prominent studies of aid and growth.
He ultimately concludes that the past decade of cross-country empirical analyses of
aid and growth have not produced any robust results indicating the effectiveness of
aid. Roodman (2007) suggests that one reason for such a lack of success is that the
heterogeneity of aid funds make the data quite noisy, and therefore drown out any
indication of overall aid effectiveness. To this end, other studies have approached the
aid-growth question using more disaggregated data. Indeed, Kilby and Dreher (2009)
argue that past studies of aid and growth have incorrectly assumed that donor mo-
tivations do not have an impact on aid effectiveness. As a consequence, the authors
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argue that interpretations of aid effectiveness suffer from a homogeneity assumption
that does not hold in the real world.
Taking this rejection of the homogeneity assumption as their starting point,
Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring (2013) attempt to discern the effect of geopolit-
ical aid from overall aid on economic growth. Using temporary membership on the
UN Security Council as the main determinant of increases in geopolitical aid, the
authors interact the aid term with a UN Security Council dummy variable. Dreher,
Eichenauer and Gehring (2013) then add this variable to the OLS regressions of Burn-
side and Dollar (2000), Rajan and Subramanian (2008), and Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith (2010). Additionally, the authors first difference their equations, similar to
Clemens et al. (2012), in order to remove the potential for omitted variable bias in
the form of country fixed effects. Their results indicate that once geopolitical aid is
accounted for, the effects of overall aid on growth become positive and significant,
while aid interacted with the UN Security Council dummy variable has a negative
and significant coefficient. These results hold across other specifications as well, lead-
ing the authors to conclude that aid granted for political reasons is less effective than
other types of aid.
Other studies have addressed aid effectiveness in specific development sectors.
Michaelowa and Weber (2006), for instance, use GMM estimation to investigate the
effect of education aid on primary school enrollment and completion rates. Their
results indicate that education aid does have a positive effect on these two outcomes,
although this effect appears to be relatively small. The work of Dreher, Nunnenkamp
and Thiele (2008) supports this finding, as the authors also conclude that education
aid leads to increases in primary school enrollment rates. In the health sector, Mishra
and Newhouse (2007) find that while health aid has had a positive and significant
impact on infant mortality rates, the effect is once again small. A later study by
179
Wilson (2011), however, reaches a different conclusion, and argues that health aid
has no discernible effect on infant mortality. Instead, the author argues that health
aid is following success rather than causing it.
To summarize, there remains a substantial debate among scholars and practition-
ers regarding the most appropriate methodological approach for analyzing foreign aid
and growth. However, two conclusions stand out. First is the issue of endogeneity
and the problem of finding appropriate instruments foreign aid flows. While re-
searchers have attempted to find valid instruments for aid, this is often difficult to
do. This suggests alternative estimation methods should be preferred to those that
rely on potentially invalid instruments. Second, is the argument that different aid
types can have different impacts on development. This finding, supported by Kilby
and Dreher (2009), supports my underlying logic, and may also account for the lack
of a consensus regarding the effects of aid. I use both of these conclusions as a
starting point for my analysis.
6.2 Methodology
As shown from the literature review above, there are several potential methods for
estimating the relationship between aid and economic growth. I begin my discussion
with a basic regression model of economic growth drawing largely from Hansen and
Tarp (2001), shown below.
gi,t = βyyi,t0 + βaai,t +
k∑
j=1
βjxj,i,t + ωt + ui,t. (6.1)
In Equation 6.1, i indicates recipient countries and t denotes four year time periods.
The dependent variable, gi,t, is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita. The
initial level of GDP per capita in the country during the four year panel is captured
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in yi,t0 , while ai,t captures the aid variable, and other regressors are indicated by k.
The error term is indicated by ui,t.
The first problem with this approach is that the error term encompasses country
fixed effects in addition to random noise, as shown in Equation 6.2:
ui,t = υi + i,t (6.2)
This results in inconsistent estimates due to the fact that the error term and the
initial level of GDP per capita yi,t0 are correlated. The second problem is that
this model does not address the potential endogeneity that exists between aid flows
and economic growth. Rather than aid driving growth, aid may in fact be given
as a result of growth, with donors targeting their aid to faster or slower growing
economies. This implies that many of the same control variables that drive growth
may also be driving aid allocation. If this is the case, then Equation 6.1 suffers
from simultaneity bias. In order to address this, a common strategy has been to
use an instrumental variables approach, or two-stage least squares (2SLS). In this
case, aid is first estimated using variables that are expected to be exogenous to
growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000), for instance, instrument for aid using initial
income levels, population, arms imports, economic policy, and dummy variables for
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc zone, Egypt, and Central America. The resulting
estimates of aid are then stored and used in the growth equation.
While such estimation strategies are beneficial in that they address the endogene-
ity of aid and growth, they are problematic for two main reasons. The first is that
it is difficult to find appropriate instruments for the aid equation. As discussed by
Clemens et al. (2012), many of the instruments used by past studies are quite weak.
The authors demonstrate that aside from population, the instruments used in studies
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by Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008)
are quite weak. Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2000) also discuss the difficulty of in-
strumenting for aid, as economic factors determining aid allocation are also likely
driving growth rates, and therefore cannot be used as valid instruments.
I follow the method proposed by Clemens et al. (2012) to solve these dual prob-
lems of endogeneity and country fixed effects. Their approach is to lag the aid
variable and then first difference the results, as shown in Equation 6.3.
gi,t − gi,t−1 =βy(yi,t0 − yi,t−10) + βa(ai,t−1 − ai,t−2) +
k′∑
j=1
βj(xj,i,t − xj,i,t−1)
+ (ωt − ωt−1) + (i,t − i,t−1).
(6.3)
The authors argue that this process solves multiple problems. First, it allows aid
to have an effect over a longer time period. Second, first differencing accounts for
many country specific effects that may not be captured by existing models. Third, it
makes no assumption regarding instrumentation. Issues of instrumentation have been
particularly problematic in past research that has used 2SLS methods to examine
the relationship between aid and growth. Compounding this fact is the nature of
my research. I am interested in disaggregating aid based on various factors: agency
type, specialization, and autonomy. Thus, my research implies that different types
of aid are driven by different factors. This suggests that the instrumentation of aid
in past work is inappropriate due to the large heterogeneity of different aid flows.
For multilateral aid in particular, I expect income levels to be particularly important
for determining levels of aid allocation, but this is clearly an invalid instrument.
Instrumenting for other types of aid, such as specialized agencies and autonomous
agencies, becomes even more complicated. Rather than attempting to predict aid
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levels with weak, and potentially incorrect variables, I choose to restrict my analysis
from making any assumptions regarding instrumentation.
6.3 Data Description
The unit of observation is recipient-year and the dataset covers 128 low and
middle income countries from 1973-2012.2 In order to account for the cyclical nature
of both aid allocations and business cycles, the unit of analysis is four-year averages
of all variables, except the initial level of GDP per capita, which is specific to year
one of each panel. The resulting dataset covers ten time periods ranging from 1973-
1977 to 2009-2012. This use of four year averages is standard in the aid literature.
However, by creating my own dataset rather than replicating the results of past
studies, I am able to examine a wider and more recent time period. The analysis by
Burnside and Dollar (2000), for instance, ends in 1993, while Easterly, Levine and
Roodman (2002) expand this temporal coverage to 1997. Since many subsequent
studies used these original datasets as a base, their temporal scope is automatically
limited. While replication is helpful in many respects, by not including more recent
years, analyses of aid and growth may be presenting an inaccurate picture due to
recent global changes. For instance, the end of the Cold War substantially altered
aid policies, as has the rise of terrorism and the global financial crisis. In terms
of aid policy, states are now more fully committed to addressing poverty concerns
than they ever have been, as evidenced by the implementation of the Millennium
Development Goals. In light of this, I examine a more complete time period than
past studies.
The dependent variable is economic growth. This is measured as the real growth
rate of per capita GDP and is obtained from the World Bank. I also include control
2See Appendix B for a full list of countries, their income classifications, and their temporal
coverage.
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variables that are standard in empirical growth models and past studies of foreign
aid and growth. First, I include the initial level of GDP per capita for each period in
order to capture convergence effects. Logged inflation is included to address monetary
policy, while government consumption is included to account for fiscal policy. To
account for the effects of global trade, I include measures of imports, exports, and
foreign direct investment. Following past models, I also include a lagged measure
of broad money (M2) relative to GDP, in order to control for the development of a
recipient country’s financial system.
I also include an estimate of the economic losses a recipient country may experi-
ence due to natural disasters. Natural disasters are undoubtedly costly for recipient
countries. While most past research has used loss of life to proxy for natural disaster
costs, recent work by Neumayer, Plumper and Barthel (2014) questions this connec-
tion. Specifically, the authors describe loss of life and economic losses may not be
entirely related. For instance, the authors discuss how early warning systems can
dramatically reduce the mortality of a disaster, but this results in underestimating
the economic costs of a disaster if it drastically reduces infrastructure. Using data
from a re-insurance company Munich Re, the authors present new evidence on nat-
ural disasters using estimated economic losses due to tropical cyclones, earthquakes,
and flooding. I use an average of these costs a country endured in each observation
year in my data.
Various political variables that may affect a country’s growth rate are also in-
cluded. I use Polity IV to capture political institutions, with negative scores in-
dicating more autocratic regimes while positive variables indicate more democratic
regimes. The number of assassinations are included to capture civil unrest. War and
civil war are included to account for the negative impact that conflict can have on
a country’s economic system. Logged population is included to control for country
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size. I also include several time invariant measures, including a measure of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and dummy variables for the regions of East Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa.
The key independent variables in my analysis are various measures of foreign aid.
All aid variables are measured as aid commitments in constant 2012 USD and are
obtained from the OECD’s ODA database. Again following past literature, I scale all
aid variables by recipient country GDP. In order to demonstrate the differences that
exist based on agency type, the first aid variable that I include is total aid a country
receives. I then disaggregate this figure based on agency type into either bilateral or
multilateral aid. This disaggregation allows me to investigate Hypothesis 1. Table
6.1 provides summary statistics for each of the variables described above.
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics: Base Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth 2.19 3.15 -10.51 22.56
Initial GDP Per Capita 6.95 0.98 4.82 9.27
Total Aid 10.26 12.38 0.03 120.31
Bilateral Aid 6.38 8.04 0.02 72.46
Multilateral Aid 3.88 5.25 0.00 50.85
M2 39.46 26.88 7.82 239.49
Population 16.22 1.60 12.82 21.02
Inflation 2.12 1.08 -1.60 8.01
FDI 0.34 1.61 -8.37 3.74
Consumption n 14.23 7.14 2.80 93.69
Imports 41.23 23.05 0.00 143.94
Exports 32.53 19.29 4.09 112.54
Polity 1.34 6.25 -10.00 10.00
Ethnic 0.50 0.26 0.00 0.93
Assassinations 0.30 0.99 0.00 11.50
War 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Civil War 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
East Asia 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Sub Saharan Africa 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
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6.4 Analysis: Agency Type
Using the lagged differenced approached advocated by Clemens et al. (2012), in
Table 6.2, I test my first hypothesis. The unit of analysis is country-period, where
variables are averaged over each four year period. Column 1 tests the effect of total
aid on development with no additional covariates. Contrary to the findings of East-
erly, Levine and Roodman (2002), Roodman (2007), and Rajan and Subramanian
(2008), all of whom also find no positive relationship between aid and growth, the
results here indicate that increases in aid do have a positive impacts on economic
growth rates in developing countries. If we separate aid based on agency type as
shown in columns 2 and 3, however, this result only holds for multilateral aid agen-
cies, Increases in bilateral aid, on the other hand, are found to have no significant
impact in promoting development. Column 4 builds on this base analysis by in-
cluding both bilateral and multilateral aid, as well as adding the economic control
variables. The results again confirm the utility of multilateral aid, which has a posi-
tive and significant coefficient while bilateral aid’s effect is negative and insignificant.
Examining other variables, increases in foreign direct investment have a strong pos-
itive effect on economic growth rates, whereas excessive government consumption is
detrimental for development. In column 5, I add the political variables of regime
type and assassinations. In this regression, neither bilateral nor multilateral aid has
a significant effect on economic growth rates. In column 6, I eliminate the natural
disaster costs variable, as it is temporally limited to 1980-2008. When this variable
is excluded, the results once again hold. It is worth noting, however, that even
in column 5, the coefficients on bilateral and multilateral aid are still as expected.
Thus, while my hypothesis is not confirmed in column 5, the positive findings of the
other regressions lend stronger support to my hypothesis. It is also worth noting,
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however, that the positive impact of multilateral aid is quite limited. In column 6, a
1% increase in multilateral aid as a percentage GDP only results in a 0.1% increase
in economic growth rates. Thus, while multilateral aid may be providing positive
results, they are not as strong as desired.
In addition to the regressions in Table 6.2, I also conduct a coefficient equality
test between bilateral and multilateral aid when both variables are included in the
equation. Coefficient equality tests are useful in that they are able to test additional
hypotheses regarding specific variables. In this case, Hypothesis 1 states that multi-
lateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid. This implies that not only should the
coefficient for multilateral aid be positive and significant, but it should also be statis-
tically different than the coefficient for bilateral aid. This is easily accomplished by
using a Wald Test. The null hypothesis is that βBilateralAid = βMultilateralAid.
For columns 4 and 6, the results clearly reject the null and support Hypothesis 1.
While the coefficient equality test fails to reject the null in column 5, again this may
be attributable to the limited temporal scope of the natural disaster variable.
In Table 6.3, I investigate the impact of bilateral and multilateral aid more ex-
tensively by examining different subsamples based on geographic region and income
levels. If multilateral agencies are truly motivated by recipient need, they should
be more effective in these country groups. Similarly, if geopolitical factors are moti-
vating the allocation and policies of bilateral aid agencies, I expect bilateral aid to
be less effective in low income countries or countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa.
This is due largely to the fact that such countries offer little strategic incentive to
donor countries. This expectation is clearly supported in columns 1 and 2, which
examine aid to Sub-Saharan African and low income countries, respectively. In both
cases, the results of the regression analysis and coefficient equality tests indicate that
multilateral aid is better at promoting economic development compared to bilateral
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Table 6.2: Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial GDP PC -10.630*** -12.047*** -11.060*** -6.625*** -6.364** -7.850***
(1.598) (1.653) (1.808) (2.445) (2.786) (2.258)
Total Aid 0.086**
(0.034)
Bilateral Aid 0.050 -0.046 -0.058 -0.049
(0.035) (0.038) (0.041) (0.036)
Multilateral Aid 0.073** 0.092* 0.067 0.106*
(0.036) (0.051) (0.059) (0.056)
M2 0.006 -0.002 -0.010
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Population 2.140 -0.850 -4.556
(4.079) (4.800) (4.495)
Inflation -0.191 -0.338 -0.297
(0.207) (0.218) (0.188)
Gov. Consumption -0.213*** -0.140** -0.084
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059)
FDI 0.670*** 0.687*** 0.542***
(0.165) (0.161) (0.152)
Disaster Costs -0.046 0.009
(0.063) (0.064)
Democracy 0.027 0.037
(0.049) (0.047)
Assassinations -0.171 -0.113
(0.106) (0.121)
Constant 0.776* -1.062** 0.738* -0.007 -0.583 -0.910
(0.419) (0.532) (0.430) (0.573) (0.768) (0.868)
Observations 782 801 783 439 381 465
R-squared 0.226 0.234 0.206 0.251 0.252 0.259
Countries 123 123 124 105 92 92
Coefficient Equality Tests for Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
H0 : βB.Aid = βM.Aid
Ha : βB.Aid 6= βM.Aid
F = 2.73 F = 1.91 F = 3.33
p = 0.099 p = 0.168 p = 0.069
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
189
Table 6.3: Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid: Sub-Samples
Sub Lower Upper
Saharan Low Middle Middle
Africa Income Income Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial GDP PC -9.739*** -7.773*** -2.867 -7.453
(2.428) (2.794) (2.691) (5.943)
Bilateral Aid -0.115** -0.154*** -0.037 -0.120
(0.052) (0.056) (0.062) (0.313)
Multilateral Aid 0.145** 0.174** -0.080 0.442
(0.067) (0.073) (0.073) (0.882)
M2 0.053 0.086 -0.040 -0.008
(0.053) (0.074) (0.025) (0.035)
Population 3.162 3.876 2.657 -18.437
(4.545) (5.113) (8.710) (16.451)
Inflation -0.286 -0.190 -0.573* -0.007
(0.371) (0.392) (0.298) (0.402)
Gov. Consumption -0.143* -0.063 -0.189* -0.138
(0.075) (0.138) (0.096) (0.119)
FDI 0.579** 0.450* 0.654*** 0.970**
(0.272) (0.255) (0.215) (0.436)
Disaster Costs 0.079 0.215* -0.065 -0.039
(0.085) (0.127) (0.073) (0.139)
Democracy 0.071 0.081 -0.030 0.081
(0.070) (0.072) (0.068) (0.172)
Assassinations -0.830 -1.504* 0.062 -0.198
(1.108) (0.849) (0.177) (0.166)
Constant -0.535 -0.216 -1.468 0.575
(0.960) (1.155) (1.141) (1.996)
Observations 149 102 158 121
R-squared 0.316 0.372 0.267 0.338
Countries 39 27 38 27
Coefficient Equality Tests for Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
H0 : βB.Aid = βM.Aid
Ha : βB.Aid 6= βM.Aid
F = 5.18 F = 6.97 F = 0.15 F = 0.38
p = 0.024 p = 0.010 p = 0.695 p = 0.541
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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aid, which is harmful to economic growth. Such a distinction is not borne out in
columns 3 and 4, which examine middle income countries. In these cases, neither
bilateral nor multilateral aid has a significant effect on growth rates.
LD.Bilateral Aid
LD.Multilateral Aid
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Base Model Sub Saharan Africa
Low Income
Comparing Aid Coefficients
Figure 6.1: Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid: Regression Coefficients
Figure 6.1 plots the aid coefficients and confidence intervals of the results pre-
sented in column 6 of Table 6.2 and columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.3. Taken together,
the results in Tables 6.2 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Not only does
multilateral aid have a positive and significant impact on economic development, its
effect is also statistically different than the effect of bilateral aid. These results are
especially pronounced for poor and sub-Saharan African countries.
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6.4.1 Robustness Check: GMM Estimation
As a robustness check, I also estimate the models above using difference and sys-
tem GMM estimation methods developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). These methods provide an alternative solution the issues of endo-
geneity and country specific effects discussed above. Using Equation 6.1 as the base
regression model, tthe issue of country fixed effects is solved by using the Anderson
and Hsiao (1981) transformation for dynamic panel models. Using this approach,
Equation 6.1 is transformed through first differences. This results in Equation 6.4:
gi,t − gi,t−1 =βy(yi,t0 − yi,t−10) + βa(ai,t − ai,t−1) +
k∑
j=1
βj(xj,i,t − xj,i,t−1)+
(ωt − ωt−1) + (i,t − i,t−1).
(6.4)
While this transformation solves the issue of correlation between the country fixed
effects and lagged dependent variable, the issue of endogeneity remains. Specifically,
we can expect that yi,t−10 and xi,j,t−1 will be correlated with i,t−1. However, this
can be remedied by recognizing the fact that lagged observations of the regressors
can be used as valid instruments. This is true for both exogenous and endogenous
variables, we simply must use different lag lengths. For instance, if xi,j,t is exogenous,
then xi,j,t−1 is a valid instrument. If xi,j,t is endogenous, xi,j,t−2 is a valid instrument.
GMM estimation methods take advantage of this.3 In difference GMM, developed by
Arellano and Bond (1991), lagged levels of the variables are used as instruments for
the differenced equation. The Blundell and Bond (1998) approach, known as system
GMM, takes this a step further by creating a level equation as well by using lagged
differences as instruments. The level equation is then used in conjunction with the
3For a more technical explanation of GMM estimation, see Roodman (2006).
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lagged levels to instrument for the endogenous variables. In this way, both difference
and system GMM are able to address issues of unobserved country heterogeneity
and ensure that the regressors are exogenous. While GMM methods are potentially
better for modeling endogeneity, they still rely on instrumentation and GMM tests
for instrumentation are quite weak Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Additionally,
system GMM can create large upwards biases in the independent variables. More-
over, these methods are quite computationally intense, and require the researcher to
make a series of relatively subjective decisions such as the lag level to be employed,
as well as which variables are to be treated as endogenous.
In each of the GMM regressions, economic growth, initial income levels, aid,
as well as the economic and political variables are treated as being endogenous.
The exogenous variables used to determine the levels equation in system GMM are
population, ethnic fractionalization, the East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa dummy
variables, and the time period dummy variables. Due to gaps in the panel, I use
orthogonal deviations rather than first differences, although my results are robust
to using first differences instead. In terms of lag length, the convention in GMM
estimation is to use lags two and above to instrument for the endogenous variables
Roodman (2007). This, however, assumes that the error term is not serially cor-
related. If it is, then the instruments are no longer valid and deeper lags must be
used. To check this, I use the Arrellano Bond test for second order serial correlation.
The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the residuals. If this null
hypothesis is rejected, I use lags three and above. I report the number of lags used,
as well as the p-values of the Arrellano Bond test in each regression.
The other diagnostic test I perform is the Hansen test for over identifying re-
strictions. A critical assumption for GMM models is that the instruments used are
exogenous (Roodman, 2007). Using a Wald test, the Hansen J test statistic examines
193
Table 6.4: Comparing Bilateral and Multilateral Aid: GMM Estimation
Difference GMM System GMM
(1) (2)
Initial GDP PC -1.627 -1.122
(1.184) (1.043)
Bilateral Aid 0.002 -0.177**
(0.081) (0.087)
Multilateral Aid 0.126 0.302***
(0.092) (0.108)
L.m2 0.018 0.020*
(0.039) (0.011)
Population 5.177 0.349
(3.325) (0.248)
Inflation -0.557** -0.363
(0.275) (0.356)
Gov. Consumption -0.059 0.047
(0.066) (0.099)
FDI 0.415 0.559*
(0.295) (0.315)
Democracy 0.057 -0.010
(0.074) (0.070)
Disaster Costs 0.006 0.015
(0.062) (0.084)
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.012**
(1.020)
East Asia 0.326
(1.110)
Ethnic Frac. -2.041
(1.288)
Assassinations -0.048 -0.221
(0.258) (0.318)
Observations 379 493
Countries 90 98
Hansen Test† 0.649 0.207
AB Test‡ 0.107 0.241
Number of Lags 2 3
Number of Instruments 79 83
Coefficient Equality Tests for Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
H0 : βB.Aid = βM.Aid
Ha : βB.Aid 6= βM.Aid
χ2 = 0.55 χ2 = 7.15
p = 0.459 p = 0.008
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time period dummies omitted. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,* p<0.1
† This is the p-value for the Hansen J Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions. The null
hypothesis is that the instruments are jointly exogenous.
‡ This is the p-value for the Arrellano Bond Test for second or third level autocorrelation in
first differences. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. If only two lags are
used I report the AR(2) p-values. If three lags are used, I report the AR(3) p-values.
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the null hypothesis that the regressors in the model are jointly exogenous. The prob-
lem with the Hansen test is that it is weak in the presence of too many instruments.
Therefore, unusually high p-values indicate an underlying problem with the model.
I report the number of instruments used, as well as the p-values for the Hansen test
in my results. While I initially estimated GMM models for the restricted samples of
sub-Saharan Africa and each of the three income groups, the p-values for the Hansen
test were all unreasonably high (in many cases they were reported at 1.000). The un-
derlying cause of this was the fact that the number of instruments was much greater
than the number of countries in the panel, and GMM models should have fewer in-
struments than the number of panels across which they are estimating (Roodman,
2007). As the sub-Saharan Africa and income group regressions drastically reduced
the number of countries in the sample, the number of instruments was at times more
than three times larger than it should be. I therefore do not report the results of
these subsample regressions, as they are appropriate for GMM estimation.
In Table 6.4, I implement both difference and system GMM in order to demon-
strate the robustness of my findings across multiple specifications. The findings are
mixed. While the results for difference GMM presented in column 1 find no support
for Hypothesis 1, the results for system GMM presented in column 2 strongly support
this hypothesis. Multilateral aid has a strong, positive impact on economic growth
rates, while bilateral aid has a similarly strong negative impact. This distinction is
supported by the coefficient equality test as well.
6.5 Conclusion
In this section, I have demonstrated how the motivation and specialization of aid
agencies impact their effectiveness. Although past research has found inconsistent
evidence regarding the effectiveness of aid, I demonstrate that simply by disaggre-
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gating aid based on agency type produces important differences in the results. While
the effect of bilateral aid is either negative or indistinguishable from zero, multilat-
eral aid has a consistently positive effect on growth rates. These findings hold across
empirical specifications specifically designed to address two key problems known to
plague estimates of aid and growth: endogeneity and unobserved country heterogene-
ity. Both the approach advocated by Clemens et al. (2012) and the GMM methods
advanced by Arellano and Bond (1991); Blundell and Bond (1998) are empirically
rigorous, and estimations using these methods provide support for my arguments.
The implications of my results are quite profound. If multilateral aid is truly
a more effective pathway for promoting development, this offers a strong policy
prescription to the aid community. Namely, more aid should be channeled through
multilateral institutions. It is also important to highlight the limitations of these
findings. Although the coefficients for multilateral aid and specialized multilateral
aid are generally positive, they are also usually quite small. Thus, while multilateral
aid may be comparably more effective than bilateral aid, it is not producing as
strong of a positive result as desired. Accordingly, there still remains much to do
in designing and implementing more effective aid policies, among both bilateral and
multilateral aid agencies alike.
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7. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID: AGENCY
SPECIALIZATION
In this section, I test Hypotheses 2 and 3 related to agency specialization. Hy-
pothesis 2 states that multilateral aid will be more effective than bilateral aid because
it is more likely to be specialized. Similarly, Hypothesis 3 states that specialized mul-
tilateral aid agencies will be more effective compared to less specialized multilateral
aid agencies. Specialization is beneficial for aid agencies because it allows the agency
to contribute more resources to each target area, reduces transaction costs, and in-
creases levels of agency expertise.
In order to test these arguments, the remainder of this section proceeds in the
following manner. First, I describe my data and methodology. Specifically, I describe
how I incorporate agency specific characteristics into the analysis conducted in Sec-
tion 6. Second, I build on my original analysis and examine how country, region,
and sector specialization levels impact aid effectiveness. I use the lagged difference
approach advocated by Clemens et al. (2012). I then discuss my findings, which are
contrary to my expectation that specialization improves aid effectiveness. I conclude
by discussing the implications of my results for the aid community.
7.1 Data Description
In order to empirically investigate my hypotheses, I incorporate a measure of
agency specialization into my original analysis. In Section 4, I presented a compre-
hensive dataset on the country, region, and sector specialization levels of bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies. There are a total of six specialization measures: coun-
try portfolio size, country Herfindahl score, region portfolio size, region Herfindahl
score, sector portfolio size, and sector Herfindahl score. However, these variables
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are observed at the agency-year level, whereas the unit of observation for my anal-
ysis is recipient-year. Therefore, the first task is to transform these agency specific
characteristics. In order to accomplish this, I proceed as follows. I first calculate
the percentage of aid that the agency contributes to a recipient country in a given
year, based on total contributions to the recipient in that year. This is represented
in Equation 7.1, where a indicates agencies, r indicates recipients, and y indicates
year.
PercentAida,r,y =
Aida,r,y
TotalAidr,y
∗ 100 (7.1)
As percent aid increases, the agency is of greater importance for the recipient country.
I then interact this percentage with the percentile scores for each of the agency
specialization variables. The percentile scores range from 0 to 100, with higher values
indicating greater levels of specialization. Thus, the resulting interaction creates an
indicator of the specialization of the agency weighted by their relative importance to
a recipient country. To reduce this variable to the recipient-year level of analysis, I
simply calculate the mean of this interaction. This process is described formally in
Equation 7.2, where i represents a specific specialization measure.
SpecializationIndexi,r,y =
∑
SpecializationPercentilei,a,y ∗ PercentAida,r,y
na,y
(7.2)
This results in a weighted index of specialization for each recipient. Countries re-
ceiving large portions of their aid from highly specialized donor agencies will have
high specialization index scores. Conversely, agencies with low specialization scores
are receiving more of their aid from less specialized agencies. I calculate two esti-
mates of the specialization index: one for bilateral agency specialization and another
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for multilateral agency specialization. To account for skewness, I also log all the
specialization indices.
For sector specialization, I add an additional to this process by removing multi-
lateral aid agencies that are not expected to contribute directly to economic growth
rates. Expecting aid from agencies that focus their activities on issues such as health
and the environment to have an immediate impact on growth levels is unrealistic.
For many of these agencies, economic growth is not their priority, although it may be
a positive byproduct. Instead, these agencies aim to provide social services and im-
prove reduce environmental degradation. I therefore exclude from the analysis agen-
cies with nominal sector specialization that does not contribute to economic growth.
These agencies include GAVI, GEF, the Global Fund, IFAD, IAEA, the Nordic De-
velopment Fund, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNPBF, UNRWA, UNHCR, and the
WHO. In Table 7.1 I provide summary statistics for the agency specialization indices,
which are used in the regressions below.
Of particular note in Table 7.1 are the negative minimum values for each mul-
tilateral agency specialization index. As these variables are log transformed, they
imply that the specialization indices for multilateral aid agencies are often quite
small, falling below a value of one. Thus, while the evidence presented in Section 4
concluded that multilateral aid was substantially more specialized than bilateral aid,
when factoring in the importance of this aid, the effect of agency specialization may
be mitigated.
7.2 Analysis: Agency Specialization
In Table 7.2, I empirically estimate the effect of agency specialization on economic
growth. I use the same methodological approach described in Section 6, where I lag
the aid variables and first difference the equation. To incorporate agency specializa-
199
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics: Specialization Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bilateral Country Count 4.79 0.80 3.02 8.57
Multilateral Country Count 6.03 1.07 -1.17 9.21
Bilateral Country HHI 5.38 0.69 3.53 8.99
Multilateral Country HHI 5.49 1.29 -1.87 9.06
Bilateral Region Count 5.22 0.61 3.74 8.07
Multilateral Region Count 6.13 1.06 -1.55 9.19
Bilateral Region HHI 5.40 0.71 2.43 8.75
Multilateral Region HHI 6.22 1.04 -1.17 9.19
Bilateral Sector Count 5.44 0.72 2.60 9.14
Multilateral Sector Count 6.21 1.13 -0.76 8.58
Bilateral Sector HHI 5.67 0.73 2.56 8.85
Multilateral Sector HHI 6.10 1.07 -1.05 8.51
tion, I include a lagged value of the specialization index for bilateral and multilateral
aid agencies, as well as the interaction of these variables with aid amounts. If spe-
cialization does indeed lead have a positive impact on development, we should expect
a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction terms.
As the results show, I find very little support for this expectation. In columns
1 and 2, I examine country specialization. Agencies that focus their resources on
fewer countries should be able to deliver better results for economic growth rates.
Specifically, country specialization allows an agency to devote more of their time and
energy into researching, designing, implementing, and monitoring their aid policies
in each recipient. Effective aid policies must identify not only the countries that need
aid the most, but also the type of aid that would be most conducive to encouraging
development in each country. Accurate and thorough research of aid policies and
their ramifications for recipient countries is therefore a time intensive task. When
agencies have fewer recipients over which they must divide their time, their aid
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Table 7.2: Economic Growth and Agency Specialization
Country Region Sector
Count HHI Count HHI Count HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial GDP PC, -6.848** -6.582** -6.856** -6.668*** -8.411** -8.949***
(2.837) (2.618) (2.647) (2.534) (3.841) (3.201)
Bilateral Aid -0.137 -0.278 -0.635* -0.104 -0.160 0.012
(0.205) (0.245) (0.370) (0.201) (0.301) (0.325)
B. Spec. Index -0.392 1.493** -2.250** -1.711*** -1.504** -2.106*
(0.559) (0.735) (1.021) (0.659) (0.726) (1.204)
B.Aid*B.Spec.Index 0.012 0.038 0.111 0.009 0.019 -0.012
(0.041) (0.046) (0.072) (0.039) (0.056) (0.067)
Multilateral Aid 0.974** 0.446 1.017** 0.854* 0.228 0.319
(0.404) (0.292) (0.422) (0.462) (0.257) (0.280)
M. Spec. Index 0.409* 0.162 0.119 0.057 -0.058 -0.077
(0.208) (0.177) (0.283) (0.250) (0.207) (0.192)
M.Aid*M.Spec.Index -0.142** -0.060 -0.138** -0.118* -0.023 -0.037
(0.064) (1.021) (0.061) (0.069) (0.038) (0.042)
M2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 -0.011 -0.003
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)
Population 1.130 1.362 1.408 0.373 7.433 6.914
(4.486) (4.438) (4.252) (4.471) (6.715) (5.980)
Inflation -0.404* -0.394* -0.419** -0.375* 0.074 0.039
(0.219) (0.215) (0.213) (0.216) (0.273) (0.249)
Gov. Consumption -0.142** -0.140** -0.139** -0.125** -0.105 -0.119*
(0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.067) (0.067)
FDI 0.661*** 0.647*** 0.659*** 0.695*** 0.504*** 0.545***
(0.163) (0.160) (0.161) (0.163) (0.190) (0.191)
Natural Disasters 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.108
(0.065) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.096) (0.074)
Democracy 0.029 0.014 0.026 0.022 0.053 0.045
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.058) (0.057)
Assassinations -0.146 -0.088 -0.143 -0.184* -0.449** -0.316
(0.109) (0.110) (0.112) (0.103) (0.216) (0.234)
Constant -0.037 -0.011 -0.197 -0.318 1.069 -1.089
(0.701) (0.661) (0.687) (0.680) (0.921) (0.934)
Observations 368 368 368 368 212 212
R-squared 0.284 0.294 0.303 0.310 0.360 0.379
Countries 91 91 91 91 85 85
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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policies should improve. Additionally, focusing on fewer countries allows agencies
to build better contacts with government officials and firms that are active in each
country. With fewer tasks and contacts to juggle, the agency is essentially able to
streamline the production of their aid policies.
I examine these claims in columns 1 and 2. Using country portfolio size as
the specialization index, column 1 finds a positive and significant coefficient for
multilateral aid and the specialization index, but a negative and significant coefficient
for the interaction term. Kam and Franzese (2007) highlight that these coefficients
cannot be interpreted on their own, as the effect of x on y in an interactive model
is not constant, but rather depends on the values of z, the intervening variable. To
parse out these effects, I calculate the derivative of my regression to be:
∂yˆ
∂M.Aid
= βM.Aid + βM.Aid∗M.Spec.Index(M.Spec.Index) (7.3)
where ∂yˆ/∂M.Aid represents the effect of multilateral aid on economic growth rates.
Using the coefficient results from column 1, we see that ∂yˆ/∂M.Aid = 0.974 −
0.142(M.Spec.Index). Thus, the effect of multilateral aid on the dependent vari-
able is decreasing as the specialization index increases. In Figure 7.1 I present this
graphically by plotting the marginal effects of multilateral aid on economic growth
rates. The fitted line demonstrates the negative influence of agency specialization
on multilateral aid’s effect on economic growth. However, the confidence interval for
these estimates is quite wide. Thus, while the coefficients suggest a negative effect
of multilateral aid in this case, we cannot conclude that such an effect is statistically
different than zero.
Column 1 also shows that the results for bilateral aid and when using country
count as the specialization index produces no significant findings. As the analysis
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Marginal Effects: Multilateral Country Count Specialization
Figure 7.1: Marginal Effects of Multilateral Aid on Economic Growth Rates: Country
Portfolio Size
performed in Section 6 found a null effect for bilateral aid, this is result is not entirely
surprising, but it does suggest that even greater specialization levels among bilateral
aid agencies do not lead to improvements in economic growth rates. Once again,
agency specialization does not appear to be contributing to development. Column
2 uses country Herfindahl scores as the specialization index. For multilateral aid
agencies, this produces no significant coefficients at all. For bilateral aid agencies,
the coefficient for the specialization index is positive and significant. After calculating
the effect of increases in specialization levels on economic growth rates however, I
find no significant positive results. Generally, it appears that increases in country
specialization levels by aid agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, do not produce
better results in terms of economic development.
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Columns 3 and 4 examine regional levels of agency specialization. As discussed
in Section 4, it may be too much to expect donors to specialize on fewer countries.
Donors funding patterns are motivated by a variety of factors including recipient
need, institutional environments, geopolitical concerns, and colonial histories. But
perhaps one of the greatest motivating factors is to increase their own importance by
being active in a number of aid recipients. Thus, asking aid agencies to reduce their
activities in recipient countries runs counter to their organizational goal of being a
large and influential member of the aid community. To remedy this, one potential
solution is to have agencies focus their activities regionally. This allows agencies
to still provide aid to a number of recipients, but still allows them to capitalize on
the benefits of specialization. Past research has clearly demonstrated that economic
trends have a spatial component. That is, if your neighbor is poor, you are also more
likely to be poor. Moreover, issues such as tariffs, immigration, and refugees, all
of which are central to improvements in development, are not country specific but
rather are more regional issues. Regional specialization would thus allow agencies
to address these concerns in a more comprehensive manner rather than focusing on
single countries scattered throughout the world.
While Table 7.2 finds a positive and significant coefficient for multilateral aid
in columns 3 and 4, the interaction terms have negative and significant coefficients.
Similar to the case of multilateral aid when using country portfolio size as the spe-
cialization index, specialization appears to have a negative effect on economic growth
rates. Figure 7.2 displays the marginal effects of multilateral aid on economic growth
when the specialization index used is region Herfindahl scores. Similar to Figure
7.1, the slope implies a negative association between multilateral aid and economic
growth rates as agency specialization levels increase, although this relationship is
never statistically significant.
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Figure 7.2: Marginal Effects of Multilateral Aid on Economic Growth Rates: Region
Herfindahl Score
The results for region specialization when examining bilateral aid are null as well.
In both columns 3 and 4, both bilateral aid and the specialization index are found
to have negative (and at times significant) coefficients. Figure 7.3 plots the marginal
effects of bilateral aid on economic growth rates as agency specialization increases.
Again, specialization does not have any positive or significant effect on the dependent
variables. The results for region specialization therefore do not support the argument
that specialization is able to improve agency effectiveness.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 analyze sector specialization and economic growth rates.
When agencies focus on a specific sector of development, they are expected to be-
come experts in their field. As such, their high levels of knowledge are expected to
produce positive development results. Examining Table 7.2, these results are perhaps
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Figure 7.3: Marginal Effects of Bilateral Aid on Economic Growth Rates: Region
Herfindahl Score
the most disappointing. In both regressions, the only significant finding is for the
bilateral specialization index coefficients, which is negative. In light of all the praise
that has been given to agencies that are choosing to focus on specific development
sectors, this seems surprising. One problem may be that many of these agencies that
specialize on a certain sector are still relatively new, and thus their impacts may not
yet be apparent in the data. Establishing an aid agency is a substantial undertaking,
one that is likely to be wrought with unforeseen problems. The GEF, for instance,
had a great deal of administrative and organizational issues in the first few years
after it was created. These haunted the agency for the next several years, as they
were unable to attract sizable donations for quite some time (Hicks et al., 2010).
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In general, the lack of findings for country, region, and sector specialization pro-
vide no support for either Hypothesis 2 or 3. Specialization does not appear to lead to
better performance by multilateral aid agencies compared to bilateral aid agencies.
Additionally, increases in the specialization levels of multilateral aid agencies are
found to have no effect on improving economic growth rates in developing countries.
7.3 Discussion
What are the implications of such negative results regarding agency specializa-
tion? In this subsection, I posit three potential explanations for these null results.
The first is that specialization simply may not be as beneficial as the aid community
expects it to be. Rather than increasing aid effectiveness, specialization may reduce
it. For instance, agencies that specialize may sacrifice the potential gains of larger
networks that span across countries, regions, or sectors. Additionally, by operating
in a diverse setting of recipient countries, aid agencies are able to learn from their
experiences, thereby increasing their knowledge and providing them a sense of ma-
turity from their fieldwork. Agencies can then apply this new found knowledge to
activities in other areas, essentially creating spillover effects. This argument may be
especially applicable for country specialization. Agencies operating in a single coun-
try for instance, or even less than five countries, are most likely not as experienced or
knowledgable as agencies operating in 50 or 100 recipient countries. Related to this
is the fact that agencies operating in fewer countries are most likely going to be much
smaller. As such, their aid may be so insubstantial to recipient governments that
their specialization levels make little difference, as the government must deal with
larger contributions from less specialized agencies. Indeed, the only donor agencies
that are observed to provide aid to a single recipient country are Poland, Portugal,
and the UNECE. Each of these agencies is quite small, and provides relatively small
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amounts of aid, that may be unable to positively influence patterns of economic
growth.
Each of these criticisms are valid. However, rather negating the gains that special-
ization can provide, they rather serve to highlight the limitations of this argument.
Indeed, the criticism expressed above actually imply a potential non-linear rela-
tionship between specialization and effectiveness. While contributing to too many
countries may be ineffective, it may be equally as ineffective to contribute to too
few. Easterly and Williamson (2011) make precisely this point, arguing that there
may be tipping points at which specialization becomes beneficial. Therefore while
the benefits of specialization that were described in Section 3 are still applicable, it
is also important to recognize that the relationship between aid and specialization is
complex.
A second possible explanation for the lack of positive findings with regard to
agency specialization is that the dependent variable of economic growth rates is in-
appropriate. This argument is most applicable to measures of sector specialization.
Many of the specialized agencies that exist target social and environmental issues
rather than economic growth. Consequently, aid from these agencies should not be
expected to have an immediate or direct impact on growth patterns. Although I
eliminate the aid that these agencies provide, further disaggregation may be neces-
sary, as most agencies that specialize do not focus on growth rates specifically. A
more accurate analysis of sector specialization would therefore be to examine results
on issue areas that specialized agencies target. For instance, evaluations of agencies
that focus on health issues would do better to focus their analysis on vaccination
rates or child mortality rates in recipient countries. Future work should expand
these types of sector based analyses.
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Finally, a third possible explanation is that collectively agency specialization
levels have not yet reached the point at which they are able to effectively contribute to
improvements in development. A series of OECD Reports on Division of Labor have
concluded that aid fragmentation levels are quite low to begin with, and furthermore
have made little improvement in the last decade (OECD, 2008, 2009; 4th High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011). Therefore, while increases in the specialization of
a specific agency may be a move in the right direction, unless other agencies improve
their specialization levels as well, it will be difficult for recipient countries to benefit
from receiving more specialized aid.
7.4 Conclusion
These sum of the results presented in this section is quite provoking. While hailed
as a critical factor for improving overall aid effectiveness by the Paris Declaration
and Accra Agenda for Action, I find little empirical support for this argument. Ex-
aminations of country, region, and sector specialization levels provided no indication
that specialization is beneficial for aid effectiveness. It is worth cautioning, however,
on the limitations of these findings. First, my regression assumes a linear relationship
between specialization levels and economic growth. Given the diminishing returns of
specialization, however, future work should examine the possibility of a non-linear
relationship between the two variables. Second, the results for sector specialization
represent a hard test, as they do not examine the targeted goals that specialized
agencies most often have. Third, while specialization may in fact have a positive
effect on development, the lack of specialization among aid agencies and resulting
high levels of fragmentation that exist in recipient countries may be driving the null
results. Thus, while the results presented here provide a first step in examining the
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impact of agency specialization on economic growth rates, there remains much to be
done in future research to accurately assess this relationship.
For multilateral aid agencies, a conundrum exists. While the rankings from Sec-
tion 4 clearly indicate that multilateral aid is more likely to be specialized compared
to bilateral aid, according to the analysis presented above, this doesn’t appear to
matter for patterns of world development. If this finding is supported by future
research, it suggests that multilateral aid is less likely to contribute to future de-
velopment precisely because it is more likely to specialize. However, if the null
findings on specialization presented above are contradicted in future research, this
lends strong support for bolstering the multilateral aid program. As these agencies
are often designed to address development in a specific country, region, or sector,
utilizing them more in the future should lead to improvements in the Third World.
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8. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID: AGENCY AUTONOMY
In this section, I test Hypothesis 4 which focuses on variations in the autonomy
of multilateral aid agencies. In general, differences within multilateral aid agencies
remain largely understudied. Although many case studies exist that focus on the
effectiveness of agencies in under certain conditions, none have attempted to analyze
how differences among multilateral aid agencies influence development outcomes.
That is my primary goal here.
The results of my analysis testify to the importance of further unpacking the
heterogeneity of multilateral aid agencies. Overall, I find evidence suggesting that
agency autonomy has an important influence on the overall effectiveness of the
agency. Thus, it is not only important for aid researchers to seriously consider the
impact that multilateral aid agencies can have, but also for scholars of international
institutions to consider how internal variations within these organizations affect their
operations and performance.
The remainder of the section proceeds as follows. First, I describe my data
and methodology. Second, I present my results using the lagged and differencing
approach advocated by Clemens et al. (2012). I then use difference and system
GMM estimation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) as a robustness check. After discussing these results, I present a final analysis
of agency effectiveness by combining agency specialization and autonomy scores. I
conclude by offering a summary of my findings and a discussion of their implications.
8.1 Data Description
The final hypothesis I test relates to agency autonomy and aid effectiveness.
In Section 5, I created an original dataset ranking agencies based on their voting
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procedures and funding patterns. These variables that are argued to affect agency
autonomy include: the size of a Board of Directors, whether voting power is based
on a one-member-one-vote or proportional rule, whether an aid policy has to be
approved by a majority or a supermajority, the number of donors that fund the
agency, and the concentration of funding among these donors. I summarize my
expectations for these variables in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Summary of Expectations for Autonomy Variable
High Autonomy Low Autonomy
Board Size Large Small
Voting Power One-member-one-vote Proportional
Approval Majority Supermajority
Number of Donors Large Small
Aid Funding Diffuse Concentrated
The unit of observation for the variables collected in Section 5 are at the agency-
year level. However, the unit of analysis for my empirical investigation is recipient-
year. In order to incorporate these agency characteristics into my empirical analysis,
I proceed in the following manner. First, I separate agencies into high and low
autonomy groups for each year of observation. This is quite simple for the two
autonomy variables that are categorical (majority or supermajority vote systems,
proportional or one-member-one-vote systems). In these instances, agencies with a
majority vote system and a one-member-one-vote system are classified as the high
autonomy group, while agencies with supermajority vote systems and proportional
voting distributions are classified as the low autonomy group. This process is more
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complicated for the three continuous autonomy variables (board size, donor count,
and donor concentration), as well as the indices that I create. In order to separate
agencies into high and low groups on these variables, I compare the percentile rank
of the variable to its median. Agencies whose percentile rank is higher than the
median are classified as high autonomy agencies, whereas agencies whose percentile
rank falls below the median are classified as low autonomy agencies. Using these
classifications, I then sum the amount of aid provided by each agency type to the
recipient country of interest in a given year. This provides me with an aid amount
specific to high and low autonomy types at the recipient-year level.
8.2 Analysis: Agency Autonomy
In this subsection, I use this information to empirically test Hypothesis 4. Table
8.2 uses the lagged difference approach advocated by Clemens et al. (2012) to exam-
ine each of the autonomy variables individually and their effect on economic growth
rates in developing countries. The unit of analysis is recipient-period. Generally, the
results are not supportive of my hypothesis. Column 1 examines aid from agencies
with large and small Boards of Directors. Although both groups have positive co-
efficients, they are not significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the coefficient
equality test indicates that there is no statistical difference comparing between each
type of agency. The same pattern holds in column 2, which examines majority and
proportional voting systems: neither aid group is found to have a significant impact
on economic growth rates. In column 3, I do find a positive and significant coef-
ficient for majority vote systems. Examining the coefficient equality test, however,
indicates that the effect of aid from agencies with majority vote systems cannot be
distinguished from the effect of aid from agencies with supermajority vote systems.
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Table 8.2: Autonomy Variables and Economic Growth
Large/ Small Members/ Majority/ Donor Donor
Board Prop. System Supermajority Count Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial GDP PC -6.205 -9.224* -8.881** -6.240 -13.195**
(4.153) (5.094) (3.462) (4.858) (6.071)
Bilateral Aid -0.061 -0.077 -0.079** -0.073 -0.082
(0.048) (0.068) (0.036) (0.047) (0.075)
High Autonomy 0.116 0.402 0.124* 0.141 0.048
(0.096) (0.384) (0.064) (0.095) (0.142)
Low Autonomy 0.137 0.016 0.133 -0.017 -0.148**
(0.174) (0.087) (0.216) (0.226) (0.071)
M2 -0.013 -0.008 0.010 0.010 -0.006
(0.033) (0.030) (0.025) (0.034) (0.029)
Population -1.054 1.794 1.445 4.686 5.718
(6.481) (6.910) (5.408) (5.683) (8.826)
Inflation 0.197 -0.247 -0.559** -0.076 0.219
(0.330) (0.338) (0.236) (0.263) (0.376)
Gov. Consumption -0.144* -0.022 -0.112 -0.173* -0.086
(0.078) (0.086) (0.083) (0.091) (0.132)
FDI 0.712*** 0.603*** 0.757*** 0.673*** 0.458***
(0.219) (0.172) (0.170) (0.220) (0.159)
Disaster Costs 0.008 -0.095 0.013 -0.048 -0.124
(0.097) (0.093) (0.081) (0.100) (0.116)
Democracy 0.025 0.043 0.010 -0.008 0.048
(0.053) (0.062) (0.049) (0.054) (0.075)
Assassinations -0.380 -0.069 -0.387** -0.359* -0.112
(0.359) (0.072) (0.195) (0.183) (0.105)
Constant 0.442 0.400 0.526 -0.903 -0.230
(1.150) (0.825) (0.687) (0.965) (1.321)
Observations 233 198 266 220 143
R-squared 0.274 0.338 0.372 0.280 0.444
Countries 84 79 87 74 60
Coefficient Equality Tests
H0 : βHighAutonomy = βLowAutonomy
Ha : βHighAutonomy 6= βLowAutonomy
F = 0.01 F = 0.97 F = 0.00 F = 0.36 F = 1.24
p = 0.929 p = 0.327 p = 0.968 p = 0.549 p = 0.268
Time dummies omitted. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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I find few results when examining funding characteristics individually either. Al-
though the coefficients of the high autonomy variables are positive, they are not
significant. Although the low autonomy groups have negative coefficients, this effect
is only significant for agencies whose funding is more concentrated. Additionally, the
coefficient equality tests find that the difference between agencies who have concen-
trated and diffuse funding patterns is not significantly distinguishable. Overall, the
results provide little support for the argument that any of the voting procedures and
funding patters have a positive impact on development when examined on their own.
Table 8.3 turns to examining the voting sub-index, funding sub-index, and com-
posite autonomy indices created in Section 5. Columns 1 and 2 test the effect of both
sub-indices, while columns 3 and 4 examine the composite indices. The results reject
Hypothesis 4, as none of the high autonomy groups has a signifiant effect on economic
growth. Similarly, the coefficient equality tests all fail to reject the null hypothesis
for the high and low autonomy groups. Thus, the results using the lagged difference
approach advocated by Clemens et al. (2012) provide no support for Hypothesis 4.
8.2.1 Robustness Check: GMM Estimation
I this subsection, I repeat the above analysis using difference and system GMM
estimation. The results are much more positive that those found presented in Tables
8.2 and 8.3. Table 8.4 examines each of the five autonomy variables individually.
Column 1 finds a positive and significant effect for aid given by agencies with large
boards of directors. Additionally, the difference between large and small boards
is statistically different according to the coefficient equality tests. I find similarly
positive results for each of the other four autonomy variables. Aid from agencies with
a one-member-one vote system, majority voting system, large donors, and diffuse
donor funding are all found to have a positive and significant impact on economic
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Table 8.3: Autonomy Index and Economic Growth
Vote Fund Missing
Sub Sub Missing Not
Index Index Allowed Allowed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial GDP PC -6.659* -8.100 -8.909** -13.718*
(3.938) (5.295) (3.737) (7.015)
Bilateral Aid -0.051 -0.072 -0.115*** -0.089
(0.046) (0.061) (0.044) (0.083)
High Autonomy 0.134 -0.059 0.150 -0.015
(0.112) (0.103) (0.095) (0.101)
Low Autonomy -0.000 -0.018 0.043 -0.182
(0.214) (0.165) (0.160) (0.254)
M2 -0.001 0.007 0.010 -0.005
(0.032) (0.035) (0.026) (0.033)
Population -1.973 5.827 1.480 -2.429
(6.140) (7.806) (5.809) (7.296)
Inflation -0.041 -0.012 -0.366 0.060
(0.280) (0.313) (0.251) (0.362)
Disaster Costs -0.017 -0.047 0.002 -0.094
(0.090) (0.096) (0.090) (0.120)
Gov. Consumption -0.184** -0.069 -0.147 -0.009
(0.075) (0.097) (0.090) (0.142)
FDI 0.649*** 0.595*** 0.707*** 0.356**
(0.189) (0.212) (0.209) (0.154)
Democracy 0.035 0.013 0.000 -0.002
(0.054) (0.070) (0.050) (0.084)
D.assassinations -0.160 -0.313* -0.226** -0.296*
(0.131) (0.160) (0.114) (0.156)
Constant -0.220 -1.300 -0.704 1.727
(0.990) (1.370) (1.027) (1.102)
Observations 255 181 239 121
R-squared 0.280 0.299 0.322 0.414
Countries 80 67 78 53
Coefficient Equality Tests
H0 : βHighAutonomy = βLowAutonomy
Ha : βHighAutonomy 6= βLowAutonomy
F = 0.26 F = 0.03 F = 0.34 F = 0.33
p = 0.611 p = 0.856 p = 0.560 p = 0.566
Time dummies omitted. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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growth rates. Additionally, in all but three cases (members, supermajority, and donor
count for system GMM), the coefficient equality tests reject the null that the effect
of high and low autonomy are equivalent. Thus, unlike the results of the Clemens
et al. (2012) approach, GMM estimation provides strong support for Hypothesis 4.
In Table 8.5, I examine the effect of the four indices using GMM estimation. The
results are highly supportive of Hypothesis 4, in contrast to the result presented in
Table 8.2. The weakest finding is on the voting sub-index for both difference and
system GMM. In column 1, I find no significant effect for more autonomous agencies
based on the voting variables. Note however that the coefficient equality test does
find a statistical difference between the high and low autonomy group for difference
GMM regardless of the lack of significant findings in the regression results. Column
2 finds that agencies with greater autonomy based on the funding variables have a
very strong and positive impact on economic growth rates, and that this difference
is distinct from aid provided by agencies with low autonomy. In column 3, I examine
the results of the composite autonomy index which allows for missing information on
either agency voting or funding. Once again, the results provide strong support for
Hypothesis 4. Estimation results for difference and system GMM both find that aid
from high autonomy agencies has a positive and significant effect on economic growth
rates. Meanwhile, aid from agencies with low autonomy has a negative effect in both
regressions, and this effect is significant in the case of difference GMM. The strong
positive effect of aid from agencies with high autonomy is also confirmed in column
4, which requires complete information on agency voting and funding variables. For
all coefficient inequality tests, the results reject the null hypothesis. Thus, when
examining the autonomy indices created in Section 5 using GMM estimation, I find
strong and consistent confirmation of Hypothesis 4.
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Table 8.4: Autonomy Variables and Economic Growth: GMM Estimation
Large/ Small Members/ Majority/ Donor Donor
Board Prop. System Supermajority Count Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Difference GMM Estimation
Initial GDP PC -2.694* -5.733*** -1.708 -4.106** -5.967***
(1.558) (1.919) (1.342) (1.756) (2.048)
Bilateral Aid -0.019 -0.103 -0.126** -0.033 -0.024
(0.061) (0.095) (0.058) (0.064) (0.059)
High Autonomy 0.455** 0.806** 0.417*** 0.483*** 0.574***
(0.225) (0.358) (0.101) (0.161) (0.125)
Low Autonomy -0.126 0.045 0.027 -0.101 -0.314
(0.170) (0.106) (0.175) (0.169) (0.195)
Observations 269 238 297 243 182
Number of Countries 86 80 90 75 65
Hansen Test† 0.799 0.522 0.539 0.951 0.997
AB Test‡ 0.221 0.717 0.259 0.648 0.298
Number of Lags 3 2 2 2 2
Number of Instruments 81 91 92 92 92
Coefficient Equality Tests
χ2 = 2.88 χ2 = 4.30 χ2 = 2.78 χ2 = 4.66 χ2 = 11.84
p = 0.090 p = 0.038 p = 0.095 p = 0.031 p = 0.000
System GMM Estimation
Initial GDP PC -0.530 0.284 0.434 -0.370 0.357
(0.655) (0.690) (1.041) (0.868) (0.781)
Bilateral Aid -0.027 -0.014 -0.124** -0.049 0.015
(0.061) (0.097) (0.052) (0.056) (0.057)
High Autonomy 0.409** 0.858** 0.393*** 0.277* 0.711***
(0.161) (0.402) (0.095) (0.152) (0.237)
Low Autonomy -0.076 0.214 0.102 0.086 -0.276
(0.177) (0.170) (0.204) (0.194) (0.181)
Observations 378 359 426 364 321
Number of Countries 98 93 98 87 94
Hansen Test† 0.401 0.710 0.774 0.914 0.969
AB Test‡ 0.318 0.345 0.595 0.589 0.284
Number of Lags 3 2 2 2 2
Number of Instruments 96 106 107 107 107
Coefficient Equality Tests
χ2 = 2.61 χ2 = 1.64 χ2 = 0.1.28 χ2 = 0.42 χ2 = 6.91
p = 0.107 p = 0.201 p = 0.258 p = 0.519 p = 0.009
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies omitted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† This is the p-value for the Hansen J Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions. The null
hypothesis is that the instruments are jointly exogenous.
‡ This is the p-value for the Arrellano-Bond Test for second or third level autocorrelation in
first differences. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. If only two lags are
used, I report the AR(2) p-values. If three lags are used, I report the AR(3) p-values.
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Table 8.5: Autonomy Index and Economic Growth: GMM Estimation
Vote Fund Missing Missing
Vote Sub-Index Fund Sub-Index Missing Allowed Missing Not Allowed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference GMM
Initial GDP PC -3.400** -2.529 -2.838 -2.528
(1.701) (1.868) (1.801) (1.968)
Bilateral Aid 0.002 -0.055 -0.082 -0.057
(0.067) (0.062) (0.082) (0.057)
High Autonomy 0.270 0.712*** 0.600*** 0.688***
(0.205) (0.194) (0.187) (0.230)
Low Autonomy -0.317 -0.475*** -0.464** -0.538**
(0.215) (0.168) (0.228) (0.270)
Observations 280 213 268 168
Number of Countries 83 69 83 67
Hansen Test† 0.705 0.240 0.890 0.934
AB Test‡ 0.109 0.537 0.392 0.183
Number of Lags 3 2 2 2
Number of Instruments 77 87 87 87
Coefficient Equality Tests
χ2 = 4.09 χ2 = 14.25 χ2 = 8.86 χ2 = 12.02
p = 0.043 p = 0.000 p = 0.003 p = 0.000
System GMM
Initial GDP PC -1.093* -0.494 0.282 -0.269
(0.644) (0.930) (0.989) (0.776)
Bilateral Aid -0.054 -0.098* 0.008 0.003
(0.082) (0.057) (0.044) (0.073)
High Autonomy 0.149 0.711*** 0.469** 0.568**
(0.189) (0.195) (0.188) (0.255)
Low Autonomy 0.223 -0.114 -0.205 -0.189
(0.307) (0.181) (0.204) (0.205)
Observations 394 339 397 269
Number of Countries 95 86 93 85
Hansen Test† 0.605 0.854 0.889 0.836
AB Test‡ 0.231 0.502 0.353 0.178
Number of Lags 3 2 2 2
Number of Instruments 91 101 101 101
Coefficient Equality Tests
χ2 = 0.86 χ2 = 6.39 χ2 = 3.52 χ2 = 3.89
p = 0.354 p = 0.012 p = 0.061 p = 0.049
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies omitted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† This is the p-value for the Hansen J Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions. The null
hypothesis is that the instruments are jointly exogenous.
‡ This is the p-value for the Arrellano-Bond Test for second or third level autocorrelation in
first differences. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. If only two lags are
used, I report the AR(2) p-values. If three lags are used, I report the AR(3) p-values.
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To conclude, the results of Tables 8.4 and 8.5 provide strong support for my ar-
gument regarding the importance of agency autonomy. Not only are autonomous
agencies able to have a larger impact on economic growth rates, but the potentially
negative influence of less autonomous aid agencies is readily apparent. This is com-
pounded by the fact that bilateral aid continues to have a negative and statistically
insignificant impact on economic growth. My results suggest that the lack of a
positive finding regarding aid’s effectiveness in the broader aid literature may be at-
tributable to both a failure to distinguish between aid types, and a failure to identify
the potentially negative influence that donor countries may have within multilateral
agencies. When multilateral aid agencies are able to operate independently, however,
the results here indicate that they have a strong ability to promote economic growth.
While these results are not supported by the base estimation method I employ,
the strength of the GMM estimation results nevertheless suggest that important
effects exist for aid effectiveness based on agency autonomy. One potential avenue
to investigate this effect further is to examine agencies based on quartiles or even a
continuum rather than separating them into high and low groups. The consequence of
using high and low groups implies the existence of a structural break within the data.
Future analysis utilizing these methods can provide a more fine grained investigation
of the relationship between autonomy and economic growth rates.
8.3 Combining Specialization and Autonomy
The argument I have made thus far treats agency characteristics separately. In
reality, however, the singular agency characteristics that enhance effectiveness do
not exist in a vacuum, but are combined and mixed with other factors that may
also promote or restrict organizational effectiveness. In this subsection, I combine
my analysis of agency specialization and agency autonomy to examine how these two
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qualities interact. In order to accomplish this, I proceeded as follows. First, I combine
the data ranking aid agencies by specialization and by their autonomy scores. Since
the data on bilateral agencies is restricted to specialization, I then separate bilateral
aid into a specialized and non-specialized group based on their median percentile
scores. For multilateral agencies, I separate agencies into three groups depending
on their median percentile specialization and autonomy scores: agencies with high
autonomy and high specialization are classified as the High Group; agencies with high
autonomy but low specialization or vice versa are classified as the Mixed Group; and
agencies with low autonomy and low specialization are classified as the Low Group. I
expect aid from the High Group to have a positive impact on economic growth rates,
whereas aid from the Low Group should have a negative impact. I include all five
aid variables in each of the regression models.
Table 8.6 presents the results of my analysis using the lagged and differencing
approach articulated by Clemens et al. (2012). The unit of analysis is recipient-
period. Columns 1 and 2 use country specialization measures and agency autonomy
to separate aid agencies. Column 1 shows that for agency portfolio size, specialized
bilateral aid has a negative and significant impact on economic growth rates, while
multilateral agencies with high specialization scores and high autonomy have a pos-
itive and significant impact. This supports the arguments I have made throughout
this dissertation. Additionally, a coefficient equality test between specialized bilat-
eral aid and the high group of multilateral aid finds that there is a strong statistical
difference between these two groups. Even when bilateral aid agencies provide aid
to fewer countries, as they are encouraged to by the international aid community,
they are still less effective at promoting development compared to specialized and
autonomous multilateral aid agencies. Comparing within multilateral agencies, how-
ever, a coefficient equality test between the high and mixed group indicate that
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Table 8.6: Analysis of Final Agency Rankings Based on Country Count Rankings
and Autonomy Scores
Country Region Sector
Count HHI Count HHI Count HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial GDP PC -6.632** -6.376** -6.383** -6.503** -6.603** -6.488**
(2.792) (2.769) (2.822) (2.750) (2.787) (2.819)
Spec. B. Aid -0.113** -0.089* -0.398*** -0.162*** -0.086** -0.078*
(0.051) (0.048) (0.153) (0.061) (0.043) (0.042)
Non-Spec. B. Aid 0.001 0.072 -0.061 0.022 0.040 -0.000
(0.055) (0.114) (0.053) (0.051) (0.030) (0.101)
High Group 0.161* 0.103 0.209** 0.117 0.039 0.087
(0.087) (0.088) (0.090) (0.076) (0.075) (0.082)
Mixed Group -0.064 0.031 -0.006 -0.029 -0.013 0.037
(0.112) (0.074) (0.080) (0.101) (0.071) (0.084)
Low Group 1.916** 0.204* 0.398 0.178 0.100
(0.761) (0.105) (0.587) (0.119) (0.113)
M2 -0.008 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Population -0.861 -2.153 0.667 -1.316 -1.684 -1.173
(4.943) (5.100) (4.870) (4.882) (4.826) (5.308)
Inflation -0.299 -0.233 -0.318 -0.332 -0.297 -0.319
(0.219) (0.228) (0.214) (0.220) (0.220) (0.219)
Gov. Consumption -0.133** -0.129** -0.153*** -0.137** -0.160*** -0.124*
(0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064)
FDI 0.684*** 0.680*** 0.630*** 0.665*** 0.701*** 0.686***
(0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.160) (0.162) (0.159)
Disaster Costs, 0.008 0.002 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.005
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Democracy 0.013 0.029 0.010 0.025 0.020 0.021
(0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Assassinations -0.164 -0.179 -0.185* -0.157 -0.161 -0.167
(0.106) (0.108) (0.109) (0.105) (0.109) (0.108)
Constant 0.343 0.434 0.427 0.502 0.119 0.495
(0.705) (0.717) (0.710) (0.712) (0.697) (0.742)
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 382
R-squared 0.265 0.267 0.284 0.270 0.270 0.259
Countries 93 93 93 93 93 93
Coefficient Equality Tests
H0 : βSpec.B.Aid = βHighGroup
Ha : βSpec.B.Aid 6= βHighGroup
F = 6.38 F = 3.12 F = 8.71 F = 7.55 F = 1.96 F = 2.82
p = 0.012 p = 0.078 p = 0.003 p = 0.006 p = 0.162 p = 0.094
H0 : βHighGroup = βLowGroup
Ha : βHighGroup 6= βLowGroup
F † = 1.96 F = 6.40 F = 0.00 F = 0.23 F = 1.03 F = 0.01
p = 0.162 p = 0.012 p = 0.973 p = 0.631 p = 0.312 p = 0.927
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies omitted.
Notes: † The F-test was conducted between the high and mixed group.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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there is no statistical difference between multilateral aid provided by agencies based
on specialization and autonomy.
Column 2 uses the Herfindahl country specialization score to separate aid agen-
cies. According to the results, specialized bilateral aid once again has a negative
and statistically significant effect on economic growth rates. Interestingly, multi-
lateral aid only has a positive effect for agencies that are non-specialized and have
low autonomy. This suggests that agencies who concentrate their spending in fewer
recipient countries and are more susceptible to control by their principals are actu-
ally better at promoting development. Additionally, a coefficient equality test finds
that this aid from the low group is actually more effective compared to aid from the
high group. While these findings counter my hypotheses, this is the only instance in
which the high groups is found to be statistically less effective than the low group.
Examining differences between specialized bilateral aid and the high multilateral aid
group again finds a statistical difference, suggesting that even if the low multilateral
aid group is better at promoting development, the high group remains superior to
aid provided by even the best bilateral aid agencies.
Columns 3 and 4 use region specialization combined with agency autonomy to
investigate aid’s impact on economic growth rates. Specialized bilateral aid continues
to have a negative and significant effect on economic growth rates in both regressions.
The coefficient equality tests between specialized bilateral aid and the high multi-
lateral aid group is significant in both regressions, implying once again that even
the most specialized bilateral aid is not as effective in promoting growth compared
to specialized and autonomous multilateral aid. While the results in column 3 find
that aid from both the high and low group have a positive and statistically signif-
icant effect, neither is found to be significant in column 4. The coefficient equality
tests confirm the lack of difference between these two groups. Overall, the results
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in columns 3 and 4 suggest that although multilateral agencies that focus on fewer
regions and are autonomous are better than bilateral aid at promoting economic
growth, there is little difference among multilateral agencies. This could be due to
the fact that the analysis is global in nature. Perhaps if the analysis were constrained
to specific regions, the conclusions would change.
Last, columns 5 and 6 combine sector specialization measures with autonomy.
The results are mostly negative. Although specialized bilateral aid continues to have
a negative and significant impact on economic growth rates, none of the multilateral
aid variables are found to have a statistically positive influence. Coefficient equal-
ity tests between specialized bilateral aid and the high autonomy group bilateral do
find a statistic difference between the two groups, but no such difference is found
in comparing within multilateral aid groups. While this finding is contrary to my
expectations, I believe it is attributable to the lack of significance regarding sector
specialization and aid effectiveness described earlier. Testing the effectiveness of sec-
tor specialization using economic growth as the dependent variable presents a hard
test. Agencies that specialize in a specific sector should not be expected to contribute
to economic growth broadly, but should rather be expected to contribute to their
area of focus. Thus, I do not take the results presented above as a rejection of the
argument that sector specialization and autonomy do not matter for aid effective-
ness. Rather, I argue that more extensive and sectoral based research is needed to
investigate this relationship further.
8.4 Conclusion
In this section, I examined a question that is not often asked within the foreign
aid community: what types of multilateral aid agencies are most effective at pro-
moting development? Drawing on my general theory of aid effectiveness, I expect
224
autonomous multilateral agencies would be the most effective. I then tested each of
these arguments in turn using an original dataset.
The results are mixed depending on the methodology. Results using the lagged
difference approach described by Clemens et al. (2012) found no difference in multi-
lateral aid effectiveness based on autonomy variables or indices. On the other hand,
both system and GMM estimation methods found strong and consistent support for
the argument that autonomy matters for aid effectiveness. These results hold across
individual components of agency autonomy, as well as the final index of autonomy.
The implications of these results are quite profound. Not only is multilateral aid
more effective than bilateral aid, as demonstrated in Section 6, but multilateral aid
that is divorced from the political influence of donor countries is also substantially
more effective than agencies which are subjected to these influences. This implies
that if we are to truly pursue effective aid policies, delegating more to multilateral
aid agencies may not be enough. Donor countries must also relinquish their control
of these agencies.
Overall, two broad conclusions emerge from this section. First, not all multilateral
aid is the same. This finding parallels other findings that are being made within
the aid community which suggest that a more micro-level approach to analyzing the
effectiveness of foreign aid is warranted. Second, the findings here lend support for the
general salience of international organizations. Although there is a broad literature
concerned with the rising power of international organizations and identifying how
and when governments can control these agencies, my results indicate that these
organizations are most effective when left alone. Specifically, multilateral aid agencies
that are autonomous are best at achieving positive development results. Rather than
limiting their power then, the international community may be better served if it was
expanded.
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9. CONCLUSION: MULTILATERAL AID AND THE FUTURE OF AID
EFFECTIVENESS
This dissertation began with the premise that multilateral foreign aid agencies
have been substantially overlooked by previous research. While numerous studies
of bilateral aid have found mixed evidence regarding aid’s effectiveness, not nearly
as much attention has been paid to the effectiveness of multilateral aid. This is an
important omission to address, especially as the aid community tries to create better
aid policies in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. Although bilateral
aid continues to be the dominant form of aid giving, multilateral aid agencies over
a potentially more effective avenue through which aid can be channelled. Thus,
the main purpose of my dissertation has been to address the understudied area of
multilateral foreign aid and how these aid agencies can contribute to overall aid
effectiveness.
The results of my analyses have several implications for foreign aid research. The
first is that it is important to identify the underlying variations that exist among
aid agencies, and to identify how these differences impact the ability of agencies to
provide effective aid. Although I focus here on agency motivation, specialization,
and autonomy, there are undoubtedly numerous other characteristics that may also
influence aid policies, and therefore impact aid effectiveness. Just as current aid
research is moving towards examining aid effectiveness on a micro-level by analyzing
specific aid recipients and sectors, it is just as important to turn the microscope in
the other direction and examine how the origins of aid create good or bad results for
development.
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Building on this, my results also have real world implications in terms of aid
policies. If the aid community is truly interested in promoting effective development,
then global allocation patterns should be altered in such a way that more aid is
channelled through multilateral aid agencies. While the effect of bilateral aid has
long been debated and questioned, my results indicate that multilateral aid offers a
much more fruitful avenue for effective development. This is true even if bilateral
aid agencies are more specialized, as even specialized bilateral aid is not as effective
as specialized multilateral aid. When giving to multilateral aid agencies, however,
donors must also consider the differences that exist within aid agencies. Specifically,
more specialized multilateral agencies and autonomous aid agencies are more likely to
have the greatest positive impact on development outcomes. Providing more aid to
these types of institutions may therefore create better results than simply increasing
overall aid allocation in the developing world.
My results also have strong implications for the salience of international organi-
zations in general. Although international organizations are often criticized for being
inconsequential for global politics, my analysis indicates that, at least in terms of
foreign aid, these agencies are anything but. Instead, multilateral aid agencies play
a strong and increasingly salient role in addressing development issues throughout
the world. Furthermore, these agencies also appear to be even more effective than
bilateral aid agencies, despite the fact that account for only 30-40% of of all aid
distributed worldwide. Thus, multilateral aid agencies are producing more positive
results, and with less money.
Not all multilateral agencies, however, are as effective as others. This finding
has implications for the design of bureaucracies and other international organiza-
tions as well. If an agency is to be effective, it must have a sufficient amount of
autonomy from its principals. This is especially true when the principals face a
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time-inconsistency problem, such as that faced by governments for their monetary
policy. Establishing an independent organization can help governments overcome
these time-inconsistency issues, but only when they are sufficiently insulated from
principal influence. This suggests that in the future, multilateral aid agencies should
strive to have voting policies that facilitate this. Additionally, my results indicate
that agencies that are already established but are not producing positive results
may benefit from more, rather than less, discretion, which is often the opposite of
what their principals may deem appropriate. Providing these agencies with more
discretion may enable them to implement aid policies that are more consistent with
effective development policies.
9.1 Ranking Aid Agencies
In order to summarize the findings presented here in a systematic way, in Table 9.1
I provide a final ranking of aid agencies based on their specialization and autonomy
scores. As bilateral aid agencies only have specialization scores, I rely solely on these
scores for their rankings. Additionally, some multilateral aid agencies are lacking
information regarding the sources of their funding. These agencies are noted in the
table. The data are drawn from the indices presented in Sections 4 and 5. Agency
final rankings are calculated as follows. First, I averaged all specialization percentile
scores in order to create a summary specialization score. This included both the count
and Herfindahl specialization scores for country, region, and sector specialization. I
then averaged this specialization score with the the autonomy index from Section 5
that allows for the presence of missing data. Thus, the results presented in Table 9.1
give 50% weight to agency autonomy and 50% weight to agency specialization.
The results of Table 9.1 tell an intriguing story. First and most obviously, multi-
lateral aid agencies consistently outperform bilateral aid agencies. Admittedly, the
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Table 9.1: Final Agency Rankings
Agency and Ranking Agency and Ranking (cont.)
UNRWA 1 Slovak Republic 31
UNDP 2 UNAIDS* 32
UNFPA 3 OFID* 33
UNHCR 4 Korea 34
UNICEF 5 Denmark 35
IDA 6 Nordic Dev. Fund* 36
IFAD 7 Austria 37
Poland 8 GAVI* 38
African Dev. Fund 9 Australia 39
AsDB Special Funds 10 Isl.Dev Bank* 40
IBRD 11 GEF* 41
IMF 12 Belgium 42
Af. D B 13 Finland 43
Portugal 14 Luxembourg 44
UNPBF* 15 Japan 45
EBRD* 16 Norway 46
Caribbean Dev. Bank 17 Italy 47
Slovenia 18 Sweden 48
UNECE* 19 Spain 49
Iceland 20 France 50
OSCE* 21 Switzerland 51
IDB Special Oper. Fund 22 Netherlands 52
Greece 23 Canada 53
WHO* 24 United States 54
Ireland 25 United Kingdom 55
BADEA* 26 Germany 56
AFESD* 27 EU Institutions* 57
New Zealand 28
Global Fund* 29
Czech Republic 30
Notes: Rankings based on specialization and autonomy scores.
Bilateral aid agency scores are based only on specialization scores.
* Indicates a multilateral agency with incomplete autonomy data.
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basis of this strong performance of multilateral agencies is from their higher tendency
to specialize. As demonstrated in Section 4, multilateral aid agencies almost always
score higher than bilateral aid agencies in terms of their country, region, and sector
specialization levels. The implications of this, however, are nonetheless important to
acknowledge, especially in light of the positive impacts that specialization is argued
to provide. While multilateral aid agencies appear to be taking advantage of these
benefits, most bilateral aid donors are not.
Second, within bilateral aid agencies, the results indicate that the largest donors
are often the worst performers. The U.S. and U.K., two of the largest aid donors
in the world, for instance, are ranked 54th and 55th respectively. This is disap-
pointing, as the aid community has continually highlighted the problems that a lack
of specialization can create within recipient countries. To a large degree, this may
be attributed to agency budgets. Large donors tend to distribute their funds more
widely, while smaller donors have less money to divide over potential recipients and
sectors. However, the fact that larger donors choose not to specialize does not nec-
essarily imply that they must distribute their aid in such a fashion. It is entirely
possible for a large aid donor to restrict their focus to a specific development sector
or region. Unfortunately, this is not occurring.
Third, within multilateral aid agencies an interesting mix emerges regarding the
most effective agencies. While UN agencies occupy the top five rankings, others
are ranked much lower, such as UNAIDS which falls 32nd. Regional development
banks appear to end up somewhere in the middle. The African Development Bank,
for instance, does quite well (9th) while the Islamic Development Bank does poorly
(40th). Another interesting finding is that GAVI, GEF, and the Nordic Development
Fund, all of which are devoted to addressing environmental concerns are ranked
quite low. This can largely be attributed to their poor autonomy scores. While
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many within the aid community are applauding the emergence of issue specific aid
agencies, my results caution that if deprived of autonomy, these agencies may not be
as effective as they are expected to be. Overall, the rankings reinforce the fact that
a substantial amount of variation exists within multilateral aid agencies. A complete
understanding of how these agencies are shaping development necessitates that we
acknowledge this variation and incorporate it into our analyses.
Returning to previous research on aid allocation and effectiveness, my results can
shed light on many of the seemingly contradictory results presented in the literature.
The first is on the ambiguous conclusion regarding foreign aid effectiveness. My
analysis here indicates that examinations of total aid may be reaching inconclusive
findings due to the fact that they are aggregating bilateral and multilateral aid
into a single measure. As the coefficients of these two aid variables are in opposite
directions, if summed together they will tend to cancel each other out, thus leading
to null findings. Therefore, given the demonstrated differences that exist between
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, specifically with regards to their motivations
and specialization, aid studies should actively incorporate this distinction into their
estimations of aid effectiveness.
The second relates to the impact of multilateral aid. Although many studies have
noted the benefits that multilateral aid can provide due to their non-political nature,
others have harshly criticized these agencies as being ineffective, or even politically
motivated. According to my analysis, the underlying cause for this discrepancy can
be found in the autonomy of the agency. While multilateral aid agencies do poten-
tially offer a way to distribute aid that is devoid of political motivations, this will only
occur under the condition of agency autonomy. If the agency is autonomous, it will
be able to implement aid policies geared towards development, and provide aid to
countries that are most in need, have good institutions, and low levels of corruption.
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However, if donor governments are able to exert their influence on multilateral agen-
cies, their aid policies are more likely to mirror those of bilateral aid agencies, and
be substantially less effective. These differences have been demonstrated by previous
research. For instance, the findings by Rowe (1978) that the IDA, UNDP, and other
UN agencies are distinct from bilateral aid, while the IBRD and IBD are not, can
largely be explained by differences in autonomy levels. Drawing on my results from
Section 5, Table 9.2 demonstrates how the findings of Rowe (1978) can be explaining
within my framework. Each of these examples confirms my expectations regarding
agency autonomy. The UNDP is expected to be autonomous, as it has a large Board
of Directors, uses a one-member-one-vote representation system, is governed by ma-
jority rule, and has a low concentration of funding, all of which are factors that I
predict contribute to enhanced agency autonomy. The IDB, on the other hand, has a
smaller Board of Directors, uses a supermajority voting rule, representation is deter-
mined by monetary contributions, and their funding concentration ranks them quite
low. Therefore, my expectation that the IDB is likely to have low autonomy is con-
firmed by Rowe (1978). For the IBRD and IDA, these are more difficult cases due to
the fact that the agencies both have a relatively large Board and use majority voting
rules, both of which would indicate that they should be autonomous. However, the
agencies also both have a proportional representation system, which would detract
from agency autonomy. However, if we examine agency funding patterns, this am-
biguity disappears. Again drawing from data in Section 5, the IDA is consistently
ranked higher in terms of its financial autonomy compared to the IBRD. Using both
voting and funding characteristics, I am reach the same conclusion as Rowe (1978)
in his case study analysis. Thus, both of my theorized components of autonomy can
be used to explain past discrepancies regarding multilateral aid effectiveness.
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Table 9.2: Explaining Variations in Multilateral Aid Effectiveness
Board Majority or Members or Funding Rowe (1978)
Agency Members Supermajority Proportional Ranking Conclusions
IDB 14 Supermajority Proportional 19th Political
IBRD 25 Majority Proportional 12th Political
IDA 25 Majority Proportional 4th Non-Political
UNDP 36 Majority Members 1st Non-Political
Clearly, there are caveats to the ranking system presented above. Mainly, agency
specialization and autonomy constitute only two of the many factors that can poten-
tially impact agency effectiveness. Other characteristics such as leadership, capacity,
expertise, etc. are all factors that will clearly impact effectiveness as well. How-
ever, the evidence presented throughout this dissertation on the importance of three
key agency characteristics clearly has implications for the general argument that or-
ganizational variations are key to understanding institutional outcomes. Although
many studies have suggested that variations in agency characteristics matter for
effectiveness, my work is able to combine this expectation with actual empirical test-
ing. Thus, the analysis throughout this dissertation can be considered an important
step in terms of focusing research on the internal workings of foreign aid and other
governmental agencies and their subsequent impact on outcomes.
9.2 Moving Beyond Foreign Aid
How applicable are these findings for areas outside foreign aid agencies? The sug-
gestion that international organizations may be better at promoting global public
goods (such as development) compared to governments is not as controversial as a
similar proposition may be in other issue areas. The utility of international orga-
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nizations has been repeatedly demonstrated by past literature (e.g. Hawkins et al.
(2006)). Furthermore, the acceptance of international organizations as useful actors
in world politics is reflected by increased usage and reliance on them by governments
in a variety of issue areas. For instance, the creation of the ICC reflects a growing
need for the international community for a standing, independent judicial body that
can bring perpetrators of of human rights violations to justice. Another example are
the dispute resolution mechanisms of international trade organizations, including the
WTO. In these situations, the organizations are designed to promote an almost uni-
versally accepted public good. Although U.S. continues to withhold their support for
the ICC, they mostly support its actions and mission. Generally then, the findings
here that international organizations may be better at achieving certain goals than
national governments would rather seem to bolster current thought regarding the
usefulness of these organizations rather than challenging the existing status quo.
A more controversial picture emerges when we apply my argument regarding
agency autonomy to other international organizations in potentially more contentious
issue areas. National governments may be much more willing to yield to international
organizations when they more or less agree with the norms and policies they promote.
There can be little question that governments would like to increase development in
the Third World. Thus, increasing the autonomy of multilateral aid agencies may
be fraught with political debates, but it is unlikely to pose a real threat to existing
donor governments. Enhancing the autonomy of international organizations aiming
to provide other commonly agreed on public goods may also prove to be a relatively
smooth process. Autonomy, in fact, can actually help governments achieve progress
on issues they may otherwise be stalled on. For instance, enhanced autonomy of
environmental agencies may be exactly what is needed to help push reluctant states
forward in terms of reducing their carbon emissions and adopting more environmen-
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tally friendly policies. Similarly, autonomy of trade dispute resolution bodies can
increase their appeal to governments, as they are more likely to be unbiased in their
decision making.
But what about policies that are decidedly more divisive, such as ethnic conflict
and the deployment of peacekeeping troops? Should governments allow for greater
autonomy among these organizations as well? I would first argue that my expecta-
tions here are oriented more towards the provision of global public goods that are
widely agreed upon by the international community. Therefore, I do not rationally
expect to easily transplant my theory from the area of development to security. There
are two reasons for this. The first is that the question of the appropriate policy to
pursue in these instances is often not clear. Although there can be no doubt that
generally states will want to reduce or eliminate human suffering as much as possible,
deploying troops to accomplish goal does not always achieve this goal. Moreover,
any decision in such an environment is likely to be fraught with political issues, both
domestically and internationally. Thus, the agency itself will often not have a clear
vision as to the policies that it should pursue. This lies in stark contrast to actions
by multilateral aid agencies, all of whom know that they want to promote develop-
ment and must find the best way to accomplish this. In the case of security policy,
the agency has no such clear guidance. The second reason rests more in practicality.
While governments may be persuaded that the goal of eradicating poverty, slowing
global warming, or prosecuting war criminals is a valid reason to give up a portion
of their sovereignty, we cannot rationally expect them to be similarly willing when
it comes to armed conflict. Nations have been the supreme actors in global politics
for centuries. It is not a role they will likely yield, especially when they feel it may
threaten their own safety and security at home. Therefore even if security organiza-
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tions were to gain greater levels of autonomy, they would be unlikely to retain the
support of most governments, ultimately rendering them insignificant.
Overall, I expect my argument to be most applicable to other issue areas in global
politics that have a goal that is clear and are widely supported by the international
community. Other more contentious political issues, however, are not expected to
reap the gains that international organizations provide, especially if these agencies
are provided with greater levels of autonomy. Far from enhancing their effectiveness,
increased autonomy in agencies that focus on politicized issues may actually diminish
their utility.
9.3 Directions for Future Research
In terms of assessing the impact of organizational characteristics on foreign aid’s
ability to promote third world development, there is much work that remains to be
done. First, other organizational factors should be investigated more thoroughly.
These include items such as agency leadership, expertise levels and staffing, organi-
zational culture, as well as network analysis. Consider, for example, the importance
of agency leadership. The quality of public management has been well documented
by studies of public agencies (Brewer and Selden, 2000; O’Toole and Meier, 1999;
Meier and O’Toole, 2002). For aid agencies, when leadership is strong, agencies
are expected to be more fully committed to their mission (Rainey and Steinbauer,
1999). Additionally, a good leader is able to focus the efforts of the agency towards
actions and priorities that both reflect the preferences of the organization and that
are readily attainable. Komori (2015), for instance, details how the strong leadership
of President Haruhiko Kuroda from 2005-2013 was able to effectively transform the
Asian Development Bank from being broadly focused to being more selective and
regionally focused. In particular, Komori (2015) describes that while former Pres-
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idents had attempted internal reforms previously, these were mostly unsuccessful
due to their conservative nature. President Kuroda, however, provided the leader-
ship and political savvy necessary to enact many internal reforms, most notably the
program of Regional Cooperation Integration, which was strongly resisted by many
donor states. Without similarly strong leadership, aid agencies cannot be expected
to be as effective as they might be. A more in depth analysis of this and other
organizational factors will thus be fruitful in expounding on how internal variations
directly impact aid policies.
Additionally, the autonomy argument presented in Section 3 should also be ap-
plied to bilateral aid agencies. Bilateral aid agencies are not merely extensions of
their governments. Instead, they are bureaucratic entities with specific structures,
cultures, norms, and accountability mechanisms. In some cases, donor countries even
have more than one implementing aid agency. The foreign aid of Japan, for instance,
is distributed by three distinct agencies (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). Although they
all originate in Japan, substantial differences may exist among these agencies, in-
cluding their organizational structure, mission goals, leadership, and accountability
mechanisms. Failing to address this heterogeneity of bilateral aid agencies is an
oversight that should be addressed.
Finally, future work should expand the analysis here to incorporate other indica-
tors of development. Too often studies of foreign aid equate “effective aid” or “ef-
fective development” with economic growth. However, aid’s purposes and goals are
vastly more varied than this. Evaluating aid programs on a single dimension therefore
casts development in an unnecessarily narrow framework. While economic growth
rates are the standard indicator of a country’s development, they do not capture
the whole story. Improvements in health, education, the environment, or political
institutions are often much more immediate for a country’s citizenry. Additionally,
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such studies will lend stronger support to the purported benefits of specialization,
which were only weakly substantiated by my analysis. However, my analysis focused
on economic growth. Expanding to other dependent variables will no doubt provide
a richer description of the utility of specialization.
In conclusion, my dissertation provides strong evidence regarding the importance
of multilateral aid. While the track record for bilateral aid has largely been mixed,
my results suggest that multilateral aid is potentially a much more fruitful channel
through which countries can channel their aid to address global poverty. As we
reach the end of 2015 and the due date for the MDGs, the developed world will
have to reconsider its aid policies, and how to best address the staggering amount
of poverty that remains throughout the third world. If we are to adequately address
the development goals of the future, multilateralism may be the best way forward.
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Figure A.1: Country: Bilateral v. Multilateral Recipients, ODA
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Table A.1: Agency Rankings: Country Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
UNECE 1 1.50 2 0.89
Poland 2 2.29 1 0.75
UNRWA 3 3.00 3 0.40
CarDB 4 8.46 7 0.25
Nordic Dev.Fund 5 8.50 12 0.18
Arab Fund (AFESD) 6 8.52 8 0.23
UNPBF 7 12.17 11 0.19
Iceland 8 15.50 9 0.20
EBRD 9 14.73 16 0.13
AfDB 10 13.79 5 0.43
OSCE 11 16.00 14 0.13
BADEA 12 15.75 23 0.18
AsDB Special Funds 13 14.84 13 0.18
IDB Sp.Fund 14 17.78 20 0.16
IBRD 15 17.50 39 0.10
Portugal 16 31.14 4 0.39
Isl.Dev Bank 17 21.42 26 0.10
AfDF 18 25.49 33 0.09
Slovak Republic 19 34.50 22 0.11
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 20 32.36 21 0.11
IFAD 21 29.09 45 0.06
OFID 22 32.30 47 0.06
Slovenia 23 27.00 18 0.17
Czech Republic 24 51.57 25 0.09
New Zealand 25 50.13 27 0.10
Ireland 26 57.14 19 0.16
Denmark 27 43.43 30 0.10
GAVI 28 69.50 37 0.06
UNHCR 29 48.67 34 0.07
IDA 30 48.77 29 0.11
Sweden 31 55.79 36 0.10
Global Fund 32 74.45 50 0.05
Luxembourg 33 69.42 44 0.05
GEF 34 79.33 40 0.06
Greece 35 78.88 6 0.23
Finland 36 65.60 28 0.11
Norway 37 64.66 38 0.09
Belgium 38 71.07 24 0.15
Australia 39 63.35 10 0.28
Austria 40 75.06 15 0.22
Spain 41 83.81 43 0.08
Switzerland 42 78.17 48 0.06
UNAIDS 43 101.40 57 0.02
Netherlands 44 88.68 42 0.10
Italy 45 89.26 31 0.11
WHO 46 105.67 55 0.02
Korea 47 104.08 17 0.18
UNFPA 48 116.80 56 0.02
Canada 49 101.43 46 0.08
France 50 100.30 49 0.06
EU Institutions 51 104.82 53 0.04
UNICEF 52 119.13 52 0.03
United States 53 108.57 35 0.10
United Kingdom 54 110.94 41 0.08
Japan 55 114.85 32 0.10
UNDP 56 127.90 54 0.02
Germany 57 120.06 51 0.05
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Table A.2: Agency Rankings: Region Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
IDB Sp.Fund 1 1.00 1 1.00
CarDB 2 1.00 2 1.00
AfDF 3 1.00 3 1.00
BADEA 4 1.00 4 1.00
AfDB 5 1.00 5 1.00
UNRWA 6 1.00 6 1.00
AsDB Special Funds 7 1.98 7 0.93
EBRD 8 2.00 16 0.56
OSCE 9 2.00 14 0.61
Arab Fund (AFESD) 10 2.00 20 0.57
UNPBF 11 2.33 9 0.80
IBRD 12 3.00 38 0.49
UNECE 13 2.00 8 0.97
Poland 14 2.43 10 0.81
Nordic Dev.Fund 15 2.88 32 0.44
Isl.Dev Bank 16 2.74 25 0.54
Portugal 17 3.41 12 0.74
Iceland 18 4.00 18 0.59
Slovak Republic 19 4.00 51 0.32
Denmark 20 3.72 29 0.49
Czech Republic 21 4.13 36 0.41
IFAD 22 3.91 43 0.41
OFID 23 3.91 39 0.43
Luxembourg 24 4.21 45 0.38
Slovenia 25 4.00 15 0.71
Sweden 26 4.02 40 0.44
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 27 4.29 24 0.53
Italy 28 4.30 34 0.46
IDA 29 4.32 30 0.49
Spain 30 4.29 48 0.38
Greece 31 4.53 26 0.51
Ireland 32 4.30 11 0.78
New Zealand 33 4.45 19 0.59
Belgium 34 4.42 17 0.60
WHO 35 4.60 57 0.32
Norway 36 4.43 37 0.45
Switzerland 37 4.57 54 0.36
Finland 38 4.58 35 0.46
Austria 39 4.60 47 0.42
Netherlands 40 4.62 49 0.38
Australia 41 4.57 28 0.50
Global Fund 42 4.91 31 0.49
Japan 43 4.80 13 0.64
UNAIDS 44 5.00 53 0.36
UNFPA 44 5.00 44 0.40
GAVI 46 5.00 21 0.54
Germany 47 4.87 55 0.34
GEF 48 5.00 56 0.31
Korea 49 4.96 22 0.55
Canada 50 4.89 50 0.39
UNDP 51 5.00 42 0.42
UNICEF 52 5.00 27 0.50
UNHCR 53 5.00 33 0.50
EU Institutions 54 4.98 41 0.44
United States 55 5.00 52 0.37
France 56 5.00 23 0.51
United Kingdom 56 5.00 46 0.40
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Table A.3: Agency Rankings: Sector Specialization, CPA Data
Count Herfindahl
Donor Agency Rank Average Rank Average
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 1 1.00 1 1.00
GAVI 2 1.00 2 1.00
UNFPA 3 1.00 3 1.00
UNRWA 4 2.69 5 0.63
Global Fund 5 2.00 10 0.51
EBRD 6 3.29 7 0.58
WHO 7 2.00 4 0.91
UNAIDS 8 2.00 11 0.58
AfDB 9 4.75 16 0.40
Nordic Dev.Fund 10 4.60 8 0.49
OSCE 11 4.00 15 0.49
IFAD 12 5.20 14 0.56
AsDB Special Funds 13 6.70 22 0.32
AfDF 14 6.71 21 0.32
UNPBF 15 5.50 6 0.81
CarDB 16 7.31 23 0.31
UNICEF 17 7.88 29 0.23
GEF 18 6.67 19 0.44
IDB Sp.Fund 19 8.33 32 0.24
IBRD 20 6.09 13 0.39
UNECE 21 8.20 27 0.31
Arab Fund (AFESD) 22 8.20 12 0.58
Korea 23 8.67 26 0.35
Isl.Dev Bank 24 9.00 34 0.23
Luxembourg 25 9.71 44 0.19
Austria 26 7.82 20 0.39
UNDP 27 10.33 9 0.54
BADEA 28 9.50 30 0.26
Greece 29 9.89 18 0.36
Czech Republic 30 10.64 31 0.24
IDA 31 9.00 43 0.21
Iceland 32 10.00 53 0.18
Denmark 33 8.40 39 0.27
OFID 34 11.00 24 0.38
Ireland 35 9.65 36 0.21
Italy 36 8.45 40 0.28
Switzerland 37 8.20 49 0.25
Norway 38 8.26 37 0.29
New Zealand 39 8.62 25 0.34
Finland 40 9.08 41 0.24
Portugal 41 10.75 28 0.24
United States 42 8.45 50 0.22
Spain 43 10.77 47 0.19
Sweden 44 8.48 46 0.24
Netherlands 45 8.59 52 0.24
Australia 46 8.59 33 0.28
Japan 47 8.63 17 0.38
Canada 48 8.63 35 0.28
EU Institutions 49 10.32 45 0.21
Belgium 50 8.70 51 0.23
France 51 8.61 38 0.26
United Kingdom 52 8.72 48 0.24
Germany 53 8.85 42 0.25
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics: Country Specialization, ODA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 79.74 89 37.78 1 145 938
Multilateral Count 36.41 24 35.77 1 139 546
T-test : t = 22.04(1190.45), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.54 938
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.01 1.00 546
T-test : t = −1.66(1099.04), p = 0.097
Notes: Difference of means tests assume unequal variances, therefore I
report Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.
P -values indicate a two-tailed test, Pr(|T | > |t|)
Table A.5: Summary Statistics: Region Specialization, ODA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 4.51 5 0.73 1 5 939
Multilateral Count 2.82 2 0.07 1 5 550
T-test : t = 23.32(684.53), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.48 0.45 0.15 0.25 1.00 939
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.68 0.57 0.27 0.26 1.00 550
T-test : t = −16.32(749.37), p = 0.000
Notes: Difference of means tests assume unequal variances, therefore I
report Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.
P -values indicate a two-tailed test, Pr(|T | > |t|)
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Figure A.2: Country: Bilateral v. Multilateral Country Herfindahls, ODA
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Figure A.3: Region: Bilateral v. Multilateral Count of Regions, ODA
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Figure A.4: Region: Bilateral v. Multilateral Herfindahl for Regions, ODA
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Figure A.5: Sector: Bilateral v. Multilateral Count of Sectors, ODA
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Figure A.6: Sector: Bilateral v. Multilateral Sector Herfindahl Scores, ODA
Table A.6: Summary Statistics: Sector Specialization, ODA Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Bilateral Count 8.75 9 2.85 1 12 894
Multilateral Count 6.29 6 3.44 1 12 290
T-test : t = 11.03(425.31), p = 0.000
Bilateral Herfindahl 0.27 0.23 0.15 0.10 1.00 894
Multilateral Herfindahl 0.43 0.35 0.25 0.12 1.00 290
T-test : t = −10.27(358.92), p = 0.000
Notes: Difference of means tests assume unequal variances, therefore I
report Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.
P -values indicate a two-tailed test, Pr(|T | > |t|)
270
Table A.7: Aid Sectors in ODA Data
Social Infrastructure & Services
Education
Health
Population Pol./Progr. & Reproduction
Water Supply & Sanitation
Government & Civil Society
Other Social Infrastructure & Services
Economic Infrastructure & Services
Transport & Storage
Communications
Energy
Banking & Financial Services
Business & Other Services
Production Sectors
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
Industry, Mining, Construction
Trade Policies & Regulations
Tourism
Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting
General Environment Protection
Other Multisector
Commodity Aid / General Prog. Ass.
General Budget Support
Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass.
Other Commodity Ass.
Action Relating to Debt
Humanitarian Aid
Emergency Response
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation
Disaster Prevention & Preparedness
Unallocated / Unspecified
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Table A.8: Panel Analysis of Herfindahl Scores, ODA Data
Country Region Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multilateral -0.015 -0.031 0.127** 0.087 0.274*** 0.280***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.052) (0.061) (0.050) (0.068)
Log Budget -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.010* -0.009* -0.019* -0.019*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
RDB 0.043 0.225* -0.169*
(0.062) (0.115) (0.091)
UN 0.018 0.015 0.118
(0.075) (0.110) (0.115)
World Bank 0.089*** -0.080 -0.262***
(0.028) (0.061) (0.072)
Constant 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.551*** 0.546*** 0.344*** 0.340***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.076) (0.077)
Observations 1,484 1,484 1,489 1,489 1,184 1,184
Groups 57 57 57 57 53 53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Yearly fixed effects are omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
Table B.1: Sample Description
Recipient Years Income Group
Albania 1997 - 2012 Upper middle income
Algeria 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Angola 1997 - 2004 Upper middle income
Armenia 1997 - 2012 Lower middle income
Azerbaijan 2001 - 2012 Upper middle income
Bangladesh 1985 - 2012 Low income
Belarus 2009 - 2012 Upper middle income
Benin 1993 - 2012 Low income
Bhutan 1989 - 2012 Lower middle income
Bolivia 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Botswana 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Brazil 1981 - 2012 Upper middle income
Burkina Faso 1981 - 2012 Low income
Burundi 1985 - 2012 Low income
Cambodia 1997 - 2012 Low income
Cameroon 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Central African Rep. 1981 - 2012 Low income
Chad 1981 - 2012 Low income
China 1985 - 2012 Upper middle income
Colombia 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Comoros 2001 - 2012 Low income
Congo, Rep. 1985 - 2012 Lower middle income
Costa Rica 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Djibouti 2001 - 2008 Lower middle income
Dominican Republic 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Ecuador 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Egypt 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
El Salvador 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Ethiopia 1989 - 1996 Low income
Fiji 1977 - 2008 Upper middle income
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1997 - 2012 Upper middle income
Gabon 1977 - 2008 Upper middle income
Gambia 1977 - 2012 Low income
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Table B.1: (continued)
Recipient Years Income Group
Georgia 1997 - 2012 Lower middle income
Ghana 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Guatemala 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Guinea 2005 - 2012 Low income
Guinea-Bissau 1989 - 2000 Low income
Guyana 1993 - 2008 Lower middle income
Haiti 2001 - 2008 Low income
Honduras 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
India 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Indonesia 1981 - 2012 Lower middle income
Iran 2001 - 2008 Upper middle income
Iraq 2009 - 2012 Upper middle income
Ivory Coast 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Jamaica 2005 - 2008 Upper middle income
Jordan 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Kazakhstan 1997 - 2012 Upper middle income
Kenya 1977 - 2012 Low income
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 - 2012 Lower middle income
Laos 1997 - 2012 Lower middle income
Lebanon 2009 - 2012 Upper middle income
Lesotho 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Liberia 2001 - 2012 Low income
Madagascar 1981 - 2012 Low income
Malawi 1981 - 2012 Low income
Malaysia 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Mali 1993 - 2012 Low income
Mauritania 1985 - 2012 Lower middle income
Mauritius 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Mexico 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Moldova 2001 - 2012 Lower middle income
Mongolia 1993 - 2012 Lower middle income
Montenegro 2005 - 2012 Upper middle income
Morocco 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Mozambique 1993 - 2012 Low income
Namibia 2001 - 2012 Upper middle income
Nepal 1977 - 2012 Low income
Nicaragua 1997 - 2012 Lower middle income
Niger 1977 - 2012 Low income
Nigeria 1981 - 2012 Lower middle income
Pakistan 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Panama 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
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Table B.1: (continued)
Recipient Years Income Group
Papua New Guinea 1977 - 2004 Lower middle income
Paraguay 1989 - 2012 Lower middle income
Peru 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Philippines 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Rwanda 1977 - 2012 Low income
Senegal 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Sierra Leone 2005 - 2012 Low income
Solomon Islands 1997 - 2008 Lower middle income
South Africa 1997 - 2012 Upper middle income
Sri Lanka 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Sudan 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Suriname 1981 - 1984 Upper middle income
Swaziland 1977 - 2012 Lower middle income
Syria 1977 - 2008 Lower middle income
Tajikistan 2001 - 2012 Low income
Tanzania 1989 - 2012 Low income
Thailand 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Timor-Leste 2005 - 2012 Lower middle income
Togo 1977 - 2012 Low income
Tunisia 1981 - 2012 Upper middle income
Turkey 1977 - 2012 Upper middle income
Uganda 1993 - 2012 Low income
Ukraine 2009 - 2012 Lower middle income
Venezuela 2009 - 2012 Upper middle income
Vietnam 1993 - 2012 Lower middle income
Yemen 1993 - 2008 Lower middle income
Zambia 1985 - 2012 Lower middle income
Zimbabwe 2009 - 2012 Low income
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